Elliott Wave

 

 

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Elliott Wave Theory

Elliott Wave Theory interprets market actions in terms of recurrent price structures obedient to the Fibonacci sequence. Basically, Market cycles are composed of two major types of Wave : Impulse Wave and Corrective Wave. For every impulse wave, it can be sub-divided into 5 - wave structure (1-2-3-4-5), while for corrective wave, it can be sub-divided into 3 - wave structures (a-b-c). 


 

Surfer's Waves within Wave

An important feature of Elliott Wave is that they are fractal in nature. 'Fractal' means market structure are built from similar patterns on a larger or smaller scales. Therefore, we can count the wave on a long-term yearly market chart as well as short-term hourly market chart. 

 See waves within wave:

Rules for Wave Count

Based on the market pattern, we can identify ' where we are' in term of wave count. Nevertheless, as the market pattern is relatively simplistic, there are several rules for valid counts: 
  1. Wave 2 should not break below the beginning of Wave 1; 
  2. Wave 3 should not be the shortest wave among Wave 1, 3 and 5; 
  3. Wave 4 should not overlap with Wave 1, except for wave 1, 5, a or c of a higher degree. 
  4. Rule of Alternation : Wave 2 and 4 should unfold in two different wave forms. 

Wave forms in Impulse Wave

There are three major types of wave form in Impulse Wave: 

(a) Extended Wave

Among Wave 1, 3 and 5, only one should unfolded into extended wave. 'Extension' means the wave is elongated in nature and sub-waves are conspicuous in relation to waves of higher degree. 

See extension pattern:

(b) Diagonal Triangle at Wave 5

Sometimes, the momentum at Wave 5 is so weak that the 2nd and 4th sub-waves overlap with each other and evolved into diagonal triangle. 

(c) 5th Wave Failure

In some other circumstances, the Wave 5 is so weak than it even cannot surpass the top of the wave 3, causing a double top at the end of the trend. 

See diagonal triangle and failure fifth pattern:

Wave Forms in Corrective Wave

Corrective Wave forms are rather complicated, but basically we can categorize them into six major wave forms: 
 
  1. Zig-Zag : abc pattern composed of 5-3-5 sub-wave structure. 
  2. Flat : abc pattern composed of 3-3-5 sub-wave structure, with b equals a. 
  3. Irregular : abc pattern composed of 3-3-5 sub-wave structure, with b longer than a. 
  4. Horizontal Triangle : 5-wave triangular pattern composed of 3-3-3-3-3 sub-wave structure. 
  5. Double Three : abcxabc pattern composed of any two from above, linked by x wave. 
  6. Triple Three : abcxabcxabc pattern composed of any three from above, linked by two x waves. 
See Six Corrective patterns:

Conclusion

The attractiveness of Elliott Wave Analysis is : Three impulse wave forms and six corrective wave forms are conclusive. All we have to do is to identify which wave form is going to unfold in order to predict future market actions. This is a bold statement, needless to say, knowledge of market historical wave patterns and experiences in wave count are of paramount importance. 

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Does Gold Always Go Up in Recessions and Depressions?
June 4, 2009

By Robert Prechter, CMT

The following article is adapted from a brand-new eBook on gold and silver published by Robert Prechter, founder and CEO of the technical analysis and research firm Elliott Wave International. For the rest of this revealing 40-page eBook, download it for free here.

I have often read, “Gold always goes up in recessions and depressions.” Is it true? Should you own gold because you think the economy is tanking? Whenever we hear some claim like this, we always do the same thing: We look at the data.

The first thing to point out is that gold did not make a nickel of U.S. money for anyone in any of the recessions and depressions from 1792, when the gold-based dollar was adopted, through 1969, a period of 177 years. Well, to be precise, there was a change in the valuation in 1900, when Congress changed the dollar’s value from 24.75 grains of gold, the amount established in 1792, to 23.22 grains, a devaluation of just six percent total over 108 years. The government did raise the fixed price from $20.67/oz. to $35/oz. in 1934, but that action occurred during an economic expansion, not during the Depression. In 1968, gold finally began trading away from the government’s fixed price. Even then, it slipped to a lower price of $34.95 on January 16 and 19, 1970. So the idea that gold always goes up in recessions and depressions is already shown to be wrong. It did not go up in terms of dollars in any of the (estimated) 35 recessions or three depressions during that period.

What almost always does happen during economic contractions is that the value of whatever people use as money goes up as prices for goods and services fall. When gold is used as money, its value in terms of goods and services goes up. But gold can’t go up in dollar terms when gold and dollars are equated. So no one “makes money” holding gold under these conditions. It is a fine point: What tends to go up relative to goods and services during economic contractions is money, and when gold is officially money, that’s how it behaves. What we want to know is how gold behaves in recessions and depressions when it is not officially accepted as money.

Many gold bugs say that because gold was a good investment during the Great Depression, it is a “deflation hedge.” We addressed this topic in At the Crest of a Tidal Wave (1995, p.357) and Conquer the Crash (2002, pp. 208-209). At the time, government fixed gold’s price, so it didn’t go up or down relative to dollars. Gold was a haven during that time, the same as the dollar was, since they were equated by law. But gold served as a haven because its price was fixed while everything else was crashing in price during the period of deflation. Gold bugs like to claim that gold would have gone up during that period had it not been fixed, but the crashing dollar prices for all other things suggest that in a free market gold, too, would have fallen. It would have fallen, however, from a higher level given the inflation of 1914-1929 following the creation of the Fed. So gold became worth more in dollar terms than it was in 1913, which is why it began flowing out of the country. In 1934, the government finally recognized the new reality by raising gold’s fixed price. Since 1970, markets have been in a large version of 1914-1930, except that gold has been allowed to float, so we can clearly see its inflation-related, pre-depression gains.

Observe that gold’s price remained the same for a Fibonacci 21 years after the Fed was created in 1913; it was revalued in 1934. [Ed. Note: For a full chapter on Fibonacci time considerations for gold, download the 40-page Gold and Silver eBook.] Then it held that value for 35 (a Fibonacci 34 + 1) years, through 1969. So aside from the revaluation of 1934, the inability to make money holding gold during recessions, depressions, or any time at all save for the day of the revaluation in 1934 held fast for 56 (a Fibonacci 55 + 1) years following the creation of the Fed. So even after Congress created the central bank, no one made money holding gold in a recession or depression for two generations.

In 1970, things changed dramatically. Investors lost interest in stocks and preferred owning gold instead, for a period of ten years. The same change occurred again in 2001, and so far it has lasted seven years. But, as we will see, recession had nothing to do with either of these periods of explosive price gain in the precious metals.

The period of time one chooses to collect data can make a huge difference to the outcome of a statistical study. If we were to show the entire track record from 1792, gold would show almost no movement on average during economic contractions. If we were to take only 1969 to the present, it would show much more fluctuation. To give a fairly balanced picture, combining some history with the entire modern, wild-gold era, I asked my colleague Dave Allman to compile statistics beginning at the end of World War II. This is what most economists do, because they believe “modern finance” began at that time and that things have been “normal” since then. It’s also when many data series begin. So our study fits the norm that most economists use. It also provides results entirely from the Fed era, making it relevant to current structural conditions.

[Ed. note: To study the six tables revealing gold's performance record vs. stocks and T-notes since WWII, download the 40-page Gold and Silver eBook.]

Table 1 shows the performance of gold during the 11 officially recognized recessions beginning in 1945. Although one could make a case for different start times, we took the 15th of the starting month and the 15th of the ending month as times to record the price of gold. The results speak for themselves. Even though it is accepted throughout most of the gold-bug community that gold rises in bad economic times, Table 1 shows that such is not the case.

The only reason that the average gain for gold shows a positive number at all is that gold rose significantly during one of these recessions, that of 11/73-3/75. The average gain for all ten of the other recessions is 0.16 percent, almost exactly zero. The median for all 11 recessions is also zero. If we omit the five recessions during which the price of gold was fixed, the median gain is 3.09 percent.

For long-term forecasts and more in-depth, historical analysis for precious metals, including the six revealing tables mentioned in this article, download Prechter’s FREE 40-page eBook on Gold and Silver.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Bob Prechter: Gold is Still Money
May 29, 2009

By Robert Prechter, CMT

The following article is excerpted from a brand-new eBook on gold and silver published by Robert Prechter, founder and CEO of the technical analysis and research firm Elliott Wave International. For the rest of this fascinating 40-page eBook, download it for free here.

Have you ever traveled abroad and taken a look at the local currency and wondered how the citizens of that country could take seriously what looks like “Monopoly money?” I’ve got news for you: You’re using the same stuff. Monopoly money is the money over which some government has a monopoly. It is the currency of the realm only because the state makes it illegal to use any other type.

Promissory notes issued by a state and declared the only legal tender are always doomed to depreciate to worthlessness because of the natural incentives and forces associated with governments. A state cannot resist a method of confiscating assets, particularly one that is hidden from the view of most voters and subjects. By extension, it is unreasonable to advocate a standard for such notes, which is simply a state’s promise that its currency will always be redeemable in a specific amount of something valuable, such as gold. A gold standard of this type is only as good as the political promises behind it, reducing its value to no more than that of paper. It could be argued, in fact, that a state-sponsored gold standard is far more dangerous than none at all, as it imbues citizens with a false sense of security. Their long range plans are thus built upon an unreliable promise that the monetary measuring unit will remain stable. Later, when the government’s “IOU-something specific” becomes, as Colonel E.C. Harwood put it, “IOU nothing in particular,” reliability disappears and the arbitrary reigns. Although the populace tends to retain its confidence in the currency for awhile thereafter, the ultimate result is chaos.

The only sound monetary system is a voluntary one. The free market always chooses the best possible form, or forms, of money. To date, the market’s choice throughout the centuries, wherever a free market for money has existed, has been and remains precious metal and currency redeemable in precious metal. This preference will undoubtedly remain until a better form of money is discovered and chosen. Until then, prices for goods and services should be denominated not in state fictions such as dollars or yen or francs, but in specific weights of today’s preferred monetary metal, i.e., in grams of gold. Anyone might issue promissory notes as currency, but the acceptance of such paper certificates would then be an individual decision, and risks of loss through imprudence or dishonesty would be borne by only a few individuals by their own conscious choice after considering the risks. Critical to the understanding of the wisdom of such a system is the knowledge that private issuers of paper against gold have every long run incentive to provide a sound product, just as do producers of any product. As a result, risks would be minimal, as the market would provide its own policing. Thievery and imprudence will not disappear among men, but at least such tendencies in a free market for money would not have the potential to be institutionalized, as they are when a state controls the currency. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, occasional losses resulting from dishonesty or imprudence would be extremely limited in scope, as opposed to the nationwide disasters that state controlled paper money has facilitated throughout history, which have in turn had global repercussions. As Elliott Wave Principle put it, “That paper is no substitute for gold as a store of value is probably another of nature’s laws.”

That being said, it is also true, and crucial to wise investing, that markets come in both “bull” and “bear” types. Being a “gold bug” at the wrong time can be very costly in currency terms. For nearly three decades, gold and silver’s dollar price trends have confounded the precious metals enthusiasts, who for the entire period have argued that soaring gold and silver prices were “just around the corner” because the Fed’s policies “guarantee runaway inflation.” Yet today, 29 years after the January 1980 peaks in these metals and despite consistent inflation throughout this time, their combined dollar value (weighting each metal equally) is still 40 percent less than it was then.

It is all well and good to despise fiat money, but it is hardly useful to sit in gold and silver as if no other opportunities exist. In contrast to the one-note approach, which has had an immense opportunity cost since 1980, competent market analysis can help you make many timely and profitable financial decisions in all markets, including gold and silver.

For more in-depth, historical analysis and long-term forecasts for precious metals, download Prechter’s FREE 40-page eBook on Gold and Silver.


Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

Think That Central Banks Move the Markets? Think Again
April 23, 2009

By Mark Galasiewski

The following is excerpted from Elliott Wave International’s Global Market Perspective. The full 120-page publication, which features forecasts for every major world market, is available free until April 30. Visit Elliott Wave International to download it free.

Conventional wisdom says that central banks can influence or even direct financial markets and the macroeconomy. The very existence of Elliott waves challenges such assumptions. For if markets responded to every central bank directive, how could Elliott waves exist? Parallel trend channels, Fibonacci price relationships, the similarity of form between waves of different sizes and time periods—none of that would be possible. Central bank decisions would have to coincide perfectly with turning points in Elliott waves, and we know that just doesn’t happen. But even without using waves, we can expose the conventional wisdom for the fallacy that it is.

Take, for example, this assertion in a recent article in a U.K. economic weekly: “Part of the aim of central banks in driving down interest rates is to encourage a greater risk appetite among investors.” Two key assumptions underlie that statement: a) central banks determine interest rates; and b) lower interest rates can increase society’s appetite for risk.

To see how the first assumption is false, let’s take a look at the daily chart of Australian interest rate data. It duplicates a study that Elliott Wave International has often done with U.S. interest rate data. It shows how movements in the cash target rate set by Australia’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), appear to follow those in 3-month Australian Treasury Bills. After decisive moves up in T-bills from 2006 to early 2008, for example, the RBA faithfully raised its target. T-bills have since led the RBA during the financial crisis of the past year. In fact, the record indicates that the RBA almost always follows T-bills over time.

The RBA follows Treasury Bills

The proper conclusion to draw is not that the RBA has orchestrated the decline in rates since the early 1980s—but that it’s been riding it. During good times, central bankers look like geniuses; during bad times, they get tarred and feathered. Closer to the truth is that their interest-rate decisions are not proactive, but reactive, and that they continually follow in the footsteps of the market for lack of any other useful guide.

Now let’s look at the second assumption: that lower interest rates increase society’s appetite for risk. A simple glance at the weekly chart shows this assumption to be false. After the 1987 crash, the ASX All Ordinaries actually rallied for two years on rising rates and then sold off through 1990 on falling rates. Stocks then rose in 1991 on continued falling rates and sold off in 1992 on even lower rates. Continue following the chart to the right and you will see that there is no consistent correlation between the direction of interest rates and that of the stock market.

Stocks have no consistent correlation to interest rates

The myth of central bank potency is so pervasive that conventional analysts can’t even imagine a better explanation for price trends: that the market is the dog wagging its central bank tail, not the other way around.


For more information, download Elliott Wave International’s FREE issue of Global Market Perspective, available until April 30. The 120-page publication covers every major world market, global interest rates, international currencies, metals, energy and more.

 


Mark Galasiewski is the editor of Elliott Wave International’s Asian Financial Forecast and member of EWI’s Global Market Perspective team covering Asian stock indexes.

 

Bob Prechter on Silver & Gold
April 2, 2009

By Nico Issac

In case you hadn't noticed: Over the past year of financial turmoil, the "safe haven" premium of precious metals has offered about as much support as a rubber ducky in a tsunami. Despite a string of powerful rallies, silver and gold remain well below their March 2008 peaks.

It goes without saying that the greatest opportunities in precious metals were not had by those who played the "disaster hedge" card; but rather by those who timed the trends as they developed, regardless of the fundamental backdrop.

Bob Prechter is in the latter group. Amidst the buzz and whirl of the most bullish backdrop in precious metals' recent history, gold and silver prices soared to new, all-time highs and calls for a "New Gold Rush" and "$30 Silver" flooded the mainstream airwaves. Yet Bob alerted subscribers to an approaching top in the March 14, 2008 Elliott Wave Theorist.

"The wave count [in silver] is nearly satisfied, though ideally it should end after one more new high. If this analysis is accurate, and silver does peak and begin a bear market, gold is likely to go down with it."

In the days that followed, prices in both metals fell off a cliff. In turn, Bob was asked to address his exceptional call for a turn down in a March 19, 2008 Bloomberg interview. Here are of excerpts from that conversation:

Bloomberg: "Why did you put out that call on Friday (March 14) about a peak in precious metals?"

Editor’s Note: You can download Bob Prechter’s 5-page report, Gold & Recessions, free from Elliott Wave International. It features 63 years of historical analysis that reveals how gold, T-notes, and the DJIA have performed in recessions and expansions.

Bob Prechter: "One of the reasons is that it seemed like an absolutely sure thing. We track several indicators of sentiment. One of them is the Daily Sentiment Index (DSI). That reached 98% bulls on a one-day basis going into this last high. We were tracking silver as well… as it is clearest in our minds. Now, at the time, we needed one more slightly new high. That happened Monday morning and silver dropped 15% in 48 hours. That's a heck of a reversal and I think it's real."

"Real" indeed: From their March peaks, gold prices plummeted 34%, alongside a 60% sell-off in silver before hitting the breaks in October. Here, the October 2008 Elliott Wave Financial Forecast prepared for a corrective rebound and wrote:

"Silver traced out a five-wave decline from its March peak…Gold should also rally as silver pushes higher. Once silver's rise is exhausted (initial target: $15.15), the larger downtrend should resume for both metals."

A powerful, four-month bounce ensued in both metals: Gold prices came within kissing distance of its March peak before turning down on February 20; silver followed suit -- a fulfillment of this bearish, near-term insight presented in the February 23 Elliott Wave Theorist:

"Silver has been clear as a bell. Silver is due to turn back down, and gold, which is back at $1000/oz, is likely to follow."

Since then, it's been a steady march lower for both metals. Obviously, EWI's forecasts do not always prove this accurate. Yet in this case the analysis speaks for itself.


For more metals analysis from Bob Prechter, download Gold & Recessions a free 5-page report from Elliott Wave International. It features 63 years of historical analysis that reveals how gold, T-notes, and the DJIA have performed in recessions and expansions.

 


Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Key To Trading Success: Ignore Nature's Laws?
March 25, 2009

The following is excerpted from Robert Prechter’s Independent Investor eBook. The 75-page eBook is a compilation of some of the New York Times bestselling author’s writings that challenge conventional financial market assumptions. Visit Elliott Wave International to download the eBook, free.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

…The natural tendency of people to apply physics to finance explains why successful traders are so rare and why they are so immensely rewarded for their skills. There is no such thing as a “born trader” because people are born — or learn very early — to respect the laws of physics. This respect is so strong that they apply these laws even in inappropriate situations. Most people who follow the market closely act as if the market is a physical force aimed at their heads. Buying during rallies and selling during declines is akin to ducking when a rock is hurtling toward you.

Successful traders learn to do something that almost no one else can do. They sell near the emotional extreme of a rally and buy near the emotional extreme of a decline. The mental discipline that a successful trader shows in buying low and selling high is akin to that of a person who sees a rock thrown at his head and refuses to duck. He thinks, I’m betting that the rock will veer away at the last moment, of its own accord. In this endeavor, he must ignore the laws of physics to which his mind naturally defaults. In the physical world, this would be insane behavior; in finance, it makes him rich.

Unfortunately, sometimes the rock does not veer. It hits the trader in the head. All he has to rely upon is percentages. He knows from long study that most of the time, the rock coming at him will veer away, but he also must take the consequences when it doesn’t. The emotional fortitude required to stand in the way of a hurtling stone when you might get hurt is immense, and few people possess it. It is, of course, a great paradox that people who can’t perform this feat get hurt over and over in financial markets and endure a serious stoning, sometimes to death. Many great truths about life are paradoxical, and so is this one.
 

For more information, download Robert Prechter’s free Independent Investor eBook. The 75-page resource teaches investors to think independently by challenging conventional financial market assumptions.

Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Are We Near a Low in the Stock Decline?
Two Unique Charts Reveal the Answer
March 19, 2009

Robert Prechter, New York Times best-selling author and renowned market analyst, was recently asked to present his thoughts on the real estate market and the financial crisis to the Georgia Legislature. The following article has been adapted from the transcript. Elliott Wave International has made the full presentation available free, including the full transcript and 30-minute online video.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

I'd like to try to answer a question: “Are we near a low in the stock decline?” Because in these times when stocks and real estate are declining together, they tend to bottom roughly together as well. So I want to take a minute and look at a valuation chart for the stock market.

Year-end Stock Market Valuation - 1927-1990

What we have here on the “X” axis is the bond yield/stock yield ratio for the S&P 400 companies. Sounds fancy, but all it means is that the further you go out to the right, the less companies are paying in dividends compared to what they are paying on their IOUs—on their bonds. On the “Y” axis we have stock prices relative to book value. Book value is roughly equivalent to liquidation value, in other words, if you went and sold all the assets on the open market. When stocks get expensive, prices tend to rise relative to book value, and dividends tend to fall relative to the cost of borrowing. Why does that happen? At such times, people don't really care about dividends because they think they are going to get rich on capital gains. So dividend payout falls, and stocks get more expensive.

The small square boxes indicate year-end figures. The large box is a general area that has contained values for the stock market for most of the years of the 20th century. We had a few outliers: 1928 and August 1987, which preceded crashes in the stock market. And of course stocks were really cheap in the early '30s and again in 1941. If you are really astute, you have noticed something about this chart, which is that I've left off some of the data. It ends in 1990. What happened in the past two decades? Now I'm going to show you same chart but with the data from the last two decades on it. The March 2000 reading we call Pluto. Real estate wasn't so bad; I think it only got to about Neptune. But the stock market reached Pluto in March of 2000 in terms of the bond yield/stock yield ratio and the price multiple of the underlying values of companies. That's going to take quite awhile to retrace.

Year-end Stock Market Valuation - 1927-1990

I've also plotted the reading for November 2008. The market has made quite a trek back toward normal valuations, but if you look at these multiples in terms of book value, we are at 4 times. It has to go down to 2 times to get back into the box, and we are getting there on the bond yield/stock yield ratio which means that the dividend payout is rising somewhat to catch up with borrowing costs. And because the S&P is down 45%, of course, the dividend payout as a percentage has gone up. But there is a problem there. If you're reading the newspapers, you know that companies have been cutting dividends. In fact, they've been cutting them at the fastest rate in half a century. So it is going to be difficult for values to get back to a normal valuation range. So the stock market has quite a bit lower to go in order to catch up with normal values, and this suggests that real estate may have the same sort of trend going on.


For more information, access Robert Prechter's full presentation to the Georgia Legislature, free from Elliott Wave International. It expands on the excerpt above with the full transcript, a 30- minute online video, and 12 additional charts and figures.

 


Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

6 Questions You Should Be Asking About the Financial Crisis
(And 6 Must-Read Answers)
March 11, 2009

Elliott Wave International, the world’s largest market forecasting firm, receives thousands of questions every year from web site visitors and subscribers on their free Message Board.

Here the company shares 6 of the recent critical questions on the financial crisis and 6 answers provided by their professional analysts.

For more free questions and answers or to submit your own question, visit Elliott Wave International’s Message Board.


Q: Can increased government spending help stop the crisis?
What do you think about the new mortgage bailout plan – or bailouts and proposals for additional government spending in general? The opinions on whether or not this will ultimately work seem so divided...

Answer:
In Ch. 13 of his Conquer the Crash, “Can the Fed Stop Deflation?”, Bob Prechter writes; quote: "Can the government spend our way out of deflation and depression? Governments sometimes employ aspects of' 'fiscal policy,' i.e., altering spending or taxing policies, to 'pump up' demand for goods and services. Raising taxes for any reason would be harmful. Increasing government spending (with or without raising taxes) simply transfers wealth from savers to spenders, substituting a short-run stimulus for long-run financial deterioration. Japan has used this approach for twelve years, and it hasn’t worked. Slashing taxes absent government spending cuts would be useless because the government would have to borrow the difference. Cutting government spending is a good thing, but politics will prevent its happening prior to a crisis. ... Prior excesses have resulted in a lack of solutions to the deflation problem. Like the discomfort of drug addiction withdrawal, the discomfort of credit addiction withdrawal cannot be avoided. The time to have thought about avoiding a system-wide deflation was years ago. Now it’s too late. It does not matter how it happens; in the right psychological environment, deflation will win, at least initially."

Q: In deflation, what's best: to have no debts or preserve capital?
During a deflationary period, if you had to choose one or the other – debt reduction or preservation of capital – which one is MOST important?

Answer:
In Ch. 29 of Conquer the Crash, "Calling in Loans and Paying off Debts," Elliott Wave International’s founder and president Bob Prechter writes; quote: "Being debt-free means that you are freer, period. You don’t have to sweat credit card payments. You don’t have to sweat home or auto repossession or loss of your business. You don’t have to work 6 percent more, or 10 percent more, or 18 percent more just to stay even. ...the best mortgage is none at all. If you own your home outright and lose your job, you will still have a residence." Of course, one could pay off some debts AND keep some capital – it all depends on an individual's risk appetite and tolerance.

Q: Which news and events can move the market and which can't?
I've noticed that a lot of times, the stock market does the opposite of what the news suggests it should do – or does nothing at all. Can you make a distinction, if there is one, between news that does not move the market and the news that does? I'm talking specifically about the news and anticipation of another bailout plan plus stimulus package that is supposedly rallying U.S. stocks right now.

Answer:
The subject of the news is almost irrelevant. What IS relevant is the state of investors' collective mood at the time of the news release. If they feel bullish (or bearish), they will interpret just about any news story as bullish (or bearish) too. (Or "dismiss the news," as financial commentators often put it.) If you need a good example, just compare the February 6 horrific U.S. jobs report with that day's rally in the DJIA. Or, contrast the February 10 passage of the "$838 Billion Economic Stimulus Package" with a 300+ drop on the Dow. The important thing to keep in mind is that while the news can cause short-term price spikes, it has no effect on the longer-term trend; only social mood does.

Q: If this deflation deepens, will the US dollar crash?
Bob Prechter’s Conquer the Crash and your monthly publications like Bob’s Elliott Wave Theorist, you've been saying that in deflation, "cash is king" as the value of the dollar rises. But won't the U.S. government's spending spree cause the dollar to crash instead against the euro and other currencies?

Answer:
It's very important to make a distinction between the dollar's domestic and international values. In a deflation, the value of any currency – the U.S. dollar, in this case – rises domestically: As asset prices fall, each unit of currency buys more domestically-available goods and services. "Cash is the only asset that assuredly rises in value during deflation." – Bob Prechter, Conquer the Crash, Ch. 18. However, the USD's international value (as represented by the U.S. Dollar Index) in a deflation can rise OR fall relative to other currencies. If, for instance, the euro is deflating faster than the dollar, then the dollar's value relative to the euro will rise, and vice versa.

Q: Won't government bailouts turn deflation into inflation?
Trillions of dollars in bailouts "injected" into the economy – won't they reverse deflation and turn it into inflation instead?

Answer:
Here is a quote from Bob Prechter’s October 2008 Elliott Wave Theorist: "Believers in perpetual inflation think that the government can keep assuming others’ bad debts infinitely. But it can’t. The only reason that Congress has gotten away with issuing this latest blizzard of new IOUs is that society is still near the top of a Grand Supercycle, so optimism and confidence still have the upper hand. But as pessimism and skepticism continue to wax and the economy contracts, the bond market will figure out that the Treasury will be unable to fund all these obligations with tax collections. Then Treasury bond prices will begin falling as if they were sub-prime mortgages. A collapsing bond market is deflation; it is a contraction of the outstanding credit supply. Recent bailout schemes will not reverse the deflationary freight train. They will serve only to confuse the marketplace and hinder the efficient retirement of bad debts, thus exacerbating the crisis and aggravating investors’ uncertainties and thereby falling right in line with the declining trend of social mood."

Q: When will recession end – and DEPRESSION begin?
When do you think the economic DEPRESSION will officially begin?

Answer:
It took mainstream economists over a year to recognize the "official" start of the recession! Because a depression is a much bigger and rarer event, the delay with its "official" recognition will likely be even greater. Not to mention the fact that, interestingly, there is no "official" definition of a depression; even if there were one, ours here at Elliott Wave International would probably differ. Rest assured, though: We intend to update subscribers on any "progress" in that direction.


To read 30+ additional questions and answers on the financial crisis, investing, capital safety and more, visit Elliott Wave International’s free Message Board.

Elliott Wave International (EWI) is the world’s largest market forecasting firm. EWI’s 20-plus analysts provide around-the-clock forecasts of every major market in the world via the internet and proprietary web systems like Reuters and Bloomberg. EWI’s educational services include conferences, workshops, webinars, video tapes, special reports, books and one of the internet’s richest free content programs, Club EWI.

 

 

 

How To Tell a Good Forecast from a Bad One
March 5, 2009

Here's a forecast for you. Clear and direct. As quoted by a Reuters reporter in his January 15, 2009, article, entitled, "Global Lending Thaw May Yet Return to Deep Freeze."

"'This is a temporary respite and when it's over, the stock market will make new lows...,' says Robert Prechter, chief executive officer at research company Elliott Wave International in Gainesville, Georgia." [Reuters, 1/15/09]

But there are lots of forecasts out there – for the economy, for the Dow, for the price of oil, for the chances of the Boston Celtics repeating as NBA champions – so the question arises, how can you tell a good forecast from a bad one?

Bob Prechter addressed that very question with another reporter in a Q&A originally published in the book, Prechter's Perspective.

Editor’s Note: For more market insights from Bob Prechter, visit Elliott Wave International to download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook, part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.

The following text was originally published in Robert Prechter’s 2004 bestselling book, Prechter’s Perspective.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

Q: In general, is there any way for a person to tell a good forecast from a bad one?

Bob Prechter: There is a subtle way to tell a potentially useful forecast from a useless one. Most published forecasts are at best descriptions of what already has happened. I never give any forecast a second thought unless it addresses the question of the point at which a change in trend may occur.

As an example outside the financial markets: a sportswriter for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution published his ratings (scale 1-5) for each of the players on the Atlanta Braves baseball team as a forecast of how they would perform in 1984. At the start of the season, he rated 1983's Most Valuable Player a "5," Atlanta's slugger a "4," and the right fielder a lowly "2" due to bad performance in 1983 following two excellent years. Later in 1984, the MVP was batting only .215, and the slugger was batting a dismal .179, while the lowest-rated player, the right fielder, had hit 8 home runs and led the team in batting average and RBIs.

The point is not that the sportswriter was wrong in his predictions. The point is that he didn't make any predictions, even though he thought he did and said he did. He was merely rating the 1983 Braves in retrospect. He ignored possible bases upon which to forecast the 1984 season, things like motivation, new developments or events in a player's life, cyclic changes in playing success, etc. As with most forecasts, these things weren't even considered.

Read forecasts carefully. If they are mild-mannered extrapolations of a recent trend, it's probably the best policy to toss them aside and go search for something potentially useful.

Q: Obviously, the same holds true in finance.

Bob Prechter: All the time. When economists say, as they so often do, that they see "no reason to expect anything different" from the recent past, they mean it from the bottom of their knowledge. The linear projections they typically employ result in logic such as that expressed by an economist in a national newspaper, who said, "This rising consumer confidence is good news for the economy. Rising confidence spurs the economy, and the pickup in the economy then serves to heighten confidence." By this line of reasoning, no change of direction could ever occur. That's why, absent other knowledge, the only forecasts even worth your time considering are those that predict a change. Not because the forecaster is certain to be right, but because it shows that he is thinking and perhaps employing a tool that can anticipate trends.

Q: So the word "prediction" doesn't necessarily apply to the future!

Bob Prechter: Right. And it's those predictions about the future that are the tough ones. That's why economists stick to predicting the past, which is a crafty solution. It leads to misery among the people who follow them, but it doesn't seem to affect economists' jobs, so it certainly keeps them happy!

Q: Do you think that predicting the economy is possible?

Bob Prechter: It is not only possible, it is downright easy compared with predicting the stock market. One economist has gotten a lot of chuckles by saying that the stock market has predicted something like 19 of the last 13 recessions. However, that is only a reasonable statement if you believe that a certain rigid definition of a recession is the only one that is viable. In fact, if you look at the ebb and flow of economic activity and generally realize that it lags stock market activity of between 0 and 12 months, you will find that there is no better single indicator of what the economy is going to do than the stock market. Not only that, but even 19 out of 13 is infinitely better than any economist has ever done.

……….

For more on deflation, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook or browse various deflation topics like those below at www.elliottwave.com/deflation.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

A Better Way To Handle a Shrinking Business
February 26, 2009

This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive it, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook, part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.

The following text was originally published in Robert Prechter’s February 2009 Elliott Wave Theorist

By Robert Prechter, CMT

During depressions, many businesses make a fatal mistake: They lay off employees. Some businesses have no choice; if the product or service is related more to quantity than quality, then perhaps there is no alternative. But many businesses are far better served by keeping their employees and reducing compensation. That way, they can continue to serve customers with full quality and stand ready to lead the competition when the next economic expansion arrives.

Surely most employees would rather endure an across-the-board salary cut than risk being laid off. In the 1930s, General Electric polled its workers on this very question, and the majority agreed that they would rather endure salary reductions. A few years later, when the economy recovered, GE had all of its employees in place and did not have to spend years recruiting new people. It shot out of the gate in full operating mode.
Moreover, the company had made progress improving designs and making plans during the lull. When business picked up, so did salaries. In the end, it was win-win for everyone.

Take, for example, a news service that needs to reduce costs. Instead of cutting staff by 50 percent, thereby forcing a radical reduction in the scope of the news coverage, it would make more sense to cut salaries by 50 percent and retain full service. If lowering the price of the service would keep the subscriber, viewer or listener base steady, or if reducing the cost of advertising would keep the support base steady, it would be better to make one of those moves rather than cutting staff. Either program would maintain quality and serve to keep the service in the forefront among news providers. Inflexible competitors would go out of business, thereby helping the survivors.

If an airline is in trouble, it should not cut routes and service while holding prices and salaries up. It should cut salaries and prices and continue serving the highest possible number of customers. That way, it will be the carrier of choice for many fliers when the economy returns to expansion mode. Again, everyone wins, including the employees.

This idea would work well for any business that does not have long-term contracts – such as with labor unions or high-level employees – guaranteeing salaries. Even in such a case, negotiating reductions would be smarter than going bankrupt.

This approach could work for many kinds of businesses: airlines, manufacturers, newspapers, shippers and sports teams, to name a few. If you work for a business for which this plan would serve, mention it to those in management. Even they would probably prefer a reduction in income to none at all.

Reducing salaries has another benefit, which is that fewer people would go to the state for “unemployment benefits,” reducing the strain on state budgets and taxpayers. If your business would operate better with all its employees, consider a company-wide salary reduction as opposed to layoffs.

……….

For more on deflation, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook or browse various deflation topics like those below at www.elliottwave.com/deflation.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

The Last Bastion Against Deflation: The Federal Government
February 19, 2009

This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive it, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook, part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.

The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival eBook, a free 60-page compilation of Prechter’s most important teachings and warnings about deflation.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

Now that the downward portion of the credit cycle is firmly in force, further inflation is impossible. But there is one entity left that can try to stave off deflation: the federal government.

The ultimate source of all the bad credit in the U.S. financial system is Congress. Congress created the Federal Reserve System and many privileged lending corporations: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, Sallie Mae, the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal Home Loan Banks, to name a few. The August issue [of The Elliott Wave Theorist] cited our estimate that the mortgage-encouraging entities that Congress created account for 75 percent of all U.S. debt creation with respect to housing. For investors in mortgage (in)securities, the ratio is even greater. Recent reports show that these agencies, which have been stealing people blind by taking interest for nothing, account for a stunning 82 percent of all securitized mortgage debt. Roughly speaking, the government directly encouraged the indebtedness of four out of five home-related borrowers. As noted in the August issue, it indirectly encouraged the rest through the Fed’s lending to banks and the FDIC’s guarantee of bank deposits. These policies allowed borrowers to drive up house prices to absurd levels, making them unaffordable to people who wanted to buy them with actual money. Proof that these mortgages are artificial and the product of something other than a free market is the fact that while Germany, for example, has issued mortgage-backed securities with a value equal to 0.2 percent of its annual GDP, the U.S. has issued them so ferociously that their value has reached 49.6 percent of annual GDP, a multiple of 250 times Germany’s rate, and that is not in total value but only in value relative to the U.S.’s much larger GDP. (Statistics courtesy of the British Treasury.)

Well, the ultimate source of this seemingly risk-free credit still exists, at least for now. When Bernanke & Co. met in the back rooms of the White House in recent weekends, he must have said this: “Boys, we’re nearly out of ammo. We have $400b. of credit left to lend, and we have two percentage points lower to go in interest rates. The only way to stave off deflation is for you to guarantee all the bad debts in the system.” So far, government has leapt to oblige. One of its representatives strode to the podium to declare that it would pledge the future production of the American taxpayer in order to trade, in essence, all the bad IOUs held by speculators in Fannie and Freddie’s mortgages for gilt-edged, freshly stamped U.S. Treasury bonds.

Now, what exactly does that mean for deflation? This latest extension of the decades-long debt-creation scheme has essentially exchanged bad IOUs for T-bonds. This move does not create inflation, but it is an attempt to stop deflation. Instead of becoming worthless wallpaper and 20-cents-on-the-dollar pieces of paper, these IOUs have, through the flap of a jaw, maintained their full, 100 percent liability. This means that the credit supply attending all these mortgages, which was in the process of collapsing, has ballooned right back up to its former level.

You might think this shift of liability is a magic potion to stave off deflation. But it’s not.

Believers in perpetual inflation will ask, “What’s to stop the U.S. government from simply adopting all bad debts, keeping the credit bubble inflated?” Answer: The U.S. government’s IOUs have a price, an interest rate and a safety rating. Just as mortgage prices, rates and safety ratings were under investors’ control, so they are for Treasuries. Remember when Bill Clinton became outraged when he found out that “a bunch of bond traders,” not politicians, determined the price of T-bonds and the interest rates that the government must charge? If investors begin to fear the government’s ability to pay interest and principal, they will move out of Treasuries the way they moved out of mortgages. The American financial system is too soaked with bad debt for a government bailout to work, and the market won’t let politicians get away with assuming all the bad debts. It may take some time for the market to figure out what to do about it, but as always, there is no such thing as a free lunch. The only question is who pays for it.

The Fed is nearly out of the picture, so the consortium of last resort, the federal government, is assuming the job of propping up the debt bubble. It is multiples bigger than any such entity that went before, because it can draw on the liquidity of American taxpayers and clandestinely steal value from American savers. So the question comes down to this: Will the public put up with more financial exploitation? To date, that’s exactly what it has done, but social mood has entered wave c of a Supercycle-degree decline, and voters are likely to become far less complacent, and more belligerent, than they have been for the past 76 years.

An early hint of the public’s reaction comes in the form of news reports. In my lifetime, I can hardly remember times when the media questioned benevolent-sounding actions of the government. Articles were always about who the action would “help.” But many commentators have more accurately reported on the latest bailout. USA Today’s headline reads, “Taxpayers take on trillions of risk.” (9/8) This headline is stunning because of its accuracy. When the government bailed out Chrysler, no newspaper ran an equally accurate headline saying, “Congress assures long-run bankruptcy for GM and Ford.” They all talked about why it was a good thing. This time, realism and skepticism (at a later stage of the cycle it will be cynicism and outrage) attend the bailout. The Wall Street Journal’s “Market Watch” reports an overwhelmingly negative response among emailers. Local newspapers’ “Letters” sections publish comments of dismay and even outrage. CNBC’s Mark Haines, in an interview on 9/8 with MSNBC, began by saying ironically, “Isn’t socialism great?” This breadth of disgust is new, and it’s a reflection of emerging negative social mood.

Social mood trends arise from mental states and lead to social actions and events. Deflation is a social event. Ultimately, social mood will determine whether deflation occurs or not. When voters become angry enough, Congressmen will stop flinging pork at all comers. Now the automakers want a bailout. Voters have remained complacent about it so far, but this benign attitude won’t last. The day the government capitulates and announces that it can’t bail out everyone is the day deflationary psychology will have won out.

……….

For more on deflation, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook or browse various deflation topics like those below at www.elliottwave.com/deflation.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

10 Things You Should and Should Not Do During Deflation
February 10, 2009

This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive it, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook, part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.

The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival eBook, a free 60-page compilation of Prechter’s most important teachings and warnings about deflation.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

1) Should you invest in real estate?

Short Answer: NO

Long Answer: The worst thing about real estate is its lack of liquidity during a bear market. At least in the stock market, when your stock is down 60 percent and you realize you’ve made a horrendous mistake, you can call your broker and get out (unless you’re a mutual fund, insurance company or other institution with millions of shares, in which case, you’re stuck). With real estate, you can’t pick up the phone and sell. You need to find a buyer for your house in order to sell it. In a depression, buyers just go away. Mom and Pop move in with the kids, or the kids move in with Mom and Pop. People start living in their offices or moving their offices into their living quarters. Businesses close down. In time, there is a massive glut of real estate.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 16

2) Should you prepare for a change in politics?

Short Answer: YES

Long Answer: At some point during a financial crisis, money flows typically become a political issue. You should keep a sharp eye on political trends in your home country. In severe economic times, governments have been known to ban foreign investment, demand capital repatriation, outlaw money transfers abroad, close banks, freeze bank accounts, restrict or seize private pensions, raise taxes, fix prices and impose currency exchange values. They have been known to use force to change the course of who gets hurt and who is spared, which means that the prudent are punished and the thriftless are rewarded, reversing the result from what it would be according to who deserves to be spared or get hurt. In extreme cases, such as when authoritarians assume power, they simply appropriate or take de facto control of your property.
You cannot anticipate every possible law, regulation or political event that will be implemented to thwart your attempt at safety, liquidity and solvency. This is why you must plan ahead and pay attention. As you do, think about these issues so that when political forces troll for victims, you are legally outside the scope of the dragnet.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 27

3) Should you invest in commercial bonds?

Short Answer: NO

Long Answer: If there is one bit of conventional wisdom that we hear repeatedly with respect to investing for a deflationary depression, it is that long-term bonds are the best possible investment. This assertion is wrong. Any bond issued by a borrower who cannot pay goes to zero in a depression. In the Great Depression, bonds of many companies, municipalities and foreign governments were crushed. They became wallpaper as their issuers went bankrupt and defaulted. Bonds of suspect issuers also went way down, at least for a time. Understand that in a crash, no one knows its depth, and almost everyone becomes afraid. That makes investors sell bonds of any issuers that they fear could default. Even when people trust the bonds they own, they are sometimes forced to sell them to raise cash to live on. For this reason, even the safest bonds can go down, at least temporarily, as AAA bonds did in 1931 and 1932.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 15

4) Should you take precautions if you run a business?

Short Answer: YES

Long Answer: Avoid long-term employment contracts with employees. Try to locate in a state with “at-will” employment laws. Red tape and legal impediments to firing could bankrupt your company in a financial crunch, thus putting everyone in your company out of work.

If you run a business that normally carries a large business inventory (such as an auto or boat dealership), try to reduce it. If your business requires certain manufactured specialty items that may be hard to obtain in a depression, stock up.

If you are an employer, start making plans for what you will do if the company’s cash flow declines and you have to cut expenditures. Would it be best to fire certain people? Would it be better to adjust all salaries downward an equal percentage so that you can keep everyone employed?

Finally, plan how you will take advantage of the next major bottom in the economy. Positioning your company properly at that time could ensure success for decades to come.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 30

5) Should you invest in collectibles?

Short Answer: NO

Long Answer: Collecting for investment purposes is almost always foolish. Never buy anything marketed as a collectible. The chances of losing money when collectibility is priced into an item are huge. Usually, collecting trends are fads. They might be short-run or long-run fads, but they eventually dissolve.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 17

6) Should you do anything with respect to your employment?

Short Answer: YES

Long Answer: If you have no special reason to believe that the company you work for will prosper so much in a contracting economy that its stock will rise in a bear market, then cash out any stock or stock options that your company has issued to you (or that you bought on your own).

If your remuneration is tied to the same company’s fortunes in the form of stock or stock options, try to convert it to a liquid income stream. Make sure you get paid actual money for your labor.

If you have a choice of employment, try to think about which job will best weather the coming financial and economic storm. Then go get it.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 31

7) Should you speculate in stocks?

Short Answer: NO

Long Answer: Perhaps the number one precaution to take at the start of a deflationary crash is to make sure that your investment capital is not invested “long” in stocks, stock mutual funds, stock index futures, stock options or any other equity-based investment or speculation. That advice alone should be worth the time you [spend to read Conquer the Crash].

In 2000 and 2001, countless Internet stocks fell from $50 or $100 a share to near zero in a matter of months. In 2001, Enron went from $85 to pennies a share in less than a year. These are the early casualties of debt, leverage and incautious speculation.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 20

8) Should you call in loans and pay off your debt?

Short Answer: YES

Long Answer: Have you lent money to friends, relatives or co-workers? The odds of collecting any of these debts are usually slim to none, but if you can prod your personal debtors into paying you back before they get further strapped for cash, it will not only help you but it will also give you some additional wherewithal to help those very same people if they become destitute later.

If at all possible, remain or become debt-free. Being debt-free means that you are freer, period. You don’t have to sweat credit card payments. You don’t have to sweat home or auto repossession or loss of your business. You don’t have to work 6 percent more, or 10 percent more, or 18 percent more just to stay even.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 29

9) Should you invest in commodities, such as crude oil?

Short Answer: Mostly NO

Long Answer: Pay particular attention to what happened in 1929-1932, the three years of intense deflation in which the stock market crashed. As you can see, commodities crashed, too.

You can get rich being short commodity futures in a deflationary crash. This is a player’s game, though, and I am not about to urge a typical investor to follow that course. If you are a seasoned commodity trader, avoid the long side and use rallies to sell short. Make sure that your broker keeps your liquid funds in T-bills or an equally safe medium.

There can be exceptions to the broad trend. A commodity can rise against the trend on a war, a war scare, a shortage or a disruption of transport. Oil is an example of a commodity with that type of risk. This commodity should have nowhere to go but down during a depression.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 21

10) Should you invest in cash?

Short Answer: YES

Long Answer: For those among the public who have recently become concerned that being fully invested in one stock or stock fund is not risk-free, the analysts’ battle cry is “diversification.” They recommend having your assets spread out in numerous different stocks, numerous different stock funds and/or numerous different (foreign) stock markets. Advocates of junk bonds likewise counsel prospective investors that having lots of different issues will reduce risk.

This “strategy” is bogus. Why invest in anything unless you have a strong opinion about where it’s going and a game plan for when to get out? Diversification is gospel today because investment assets of so many kinds have gone up for so long, but the future is another matter. Owning an array of investments is financial suicide during deflation. They all go down, and the logistics of getting out of them can be a nightmare. There can be weird exceptions to this rule, such as gold in the early 1930s when the government fixed the price, or perhaps some commodity that is crucial in a war, but otherwise, all assets go down in price during deflation except one: cash.

– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 18
 

……….

For more on deflation, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook or browse various deflation topics like those below at www.elliottwave.com/deflation.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Jaguar Inflation - A Layman's Explanation of Government Intervention
February 6, 2009

This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive it, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook, part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.

The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival eBook, a free 60-page compilation of Prechter’s most important teachings and warnings about deflation.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

I am tired of hearing people insist that the Fed can expand credit all it wants. Sometimes an analogy clarifies a subject, so let’s try one.

It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the health of the nation depends upon producing Jaguar automobiles and providing them to as many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it begins operating Jaguar plants all over the country, subsidizing production with tax money. To everyone’s delight, it offers these luxury cars for sale at 50 percent off the old price. People flock to the showrooms and buy. Later, sales slow down, so the government cuts the price in half again. More people rush in and buy.

Sales again slow, so it lowers the price to $900 each. People return to the stores to buy two or three, or half a dozen. Why not? Look how cheap they are! Buyers give Jaguars to their kids and park an extra one on the lawn.

Finally, the country is awash in Jaguars. Alas, sales slow again, and the government panics. It must move more Jaguars, or, according to its theory — ironically now made fact — the economy will recede. People are working three days a week just to pay their taxes so the government can keep producing more Jaguars. If Jaguars stop moving, the economy will stop. So the government begins giving Jaguars away. A few more cars move out of the showrooms, but then it ends. Nobody wants any more Jaguars. They don’t care if they’re free. They can’t find a use for them. Production of Jaguars ceases. It takes years to work through the overhanging supply of Jaguars. Tax collections collapse, the factories close, and unemployment soars. The economy is wrecked. People can’t afford to buy gasoline, so many of the Jaguars rust away to worthlessness. The number of Jaguars — at best — returns to the level it was before the program began.

The same thing can happen with credit.

It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the health of the nation depends upon producing credit and providing it to as many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it begins operating credit-production plants all over the country, called Federal Reserve Banks. To everyone’s delight, these banks offer the credit for sale at below market rates. People flock to the banks and buy. Later, sales slow down, so the banks cut the price again. More people rush in and buy. Sales again slow, so they lower the price to one percent. People return to the banks to buy even more credit. Why not? Look how cheap it is! Borrowers use credit to buy houses, boats and an extra Jaguar to park out on the lawn. Finally, the country is awash in credit.

Alas, sales slow again, and the banks panic. They must move more credit, or, according to its theory — ironically now made fact — the economy will recede. People are working three days a week just to pay the interest on their debt to the banks so the banks can keep offering more credit. If credit stops moving, the economy will stop. So the banks begin giving credit away, at zero percent interest. A few more loans move through the tellers’ windows, but then it ends. Nobody wants any more credit. They don’t care if it’s free. They can’t find a use for it. Production of credit ceases. It takes years to work through the overhanging supply of credit. Interest payments collapse, banks close, and unemployment soars. The economy is wrecked. People can’t afford to pay interest on their debts, so many bonds deteriorate to worthlessness. The value of credit — at best — returns to the level it was before the program began.

See how it works?

Is the analogy perfect? No. The idea of pushing credit on people is far more dangerous than the idea of pushing Jaguars on them. In the credit scenario, debtors and even most creditors lose everything in the end. In the Jaguar scenario, at least everyone ends up with a garage full of cars. Of course, the Jaguar scenario is impossible, because the government can’t produce value. It can, however, reduce values. A government that imposes a central bank monopoly, for example, can reduce the incremental value of credit. A monopoly credit system also allows for fraud and theft on a far bigger scale. Instead of government appropriating citizens’ labor openly by having them produce cars, a monopoly banking system does so clandestinely by stealing stored labor from citizens’ bank accounts by inflating the supply of credit, thereby reducing the value of their savings.

I hate to challenge mainstream 20th century macroeconomic theory, but the idea that a growing economy needs easy credit is a false theory. Credit should be supplied by the free market, in which case it will almost always be offered intelligently, primarily to producers, not consumers. Would lower levels of credit availability mean that fewer people would own a house or a car? Quite the opposite. Only the timeline would be different.

Initially it would take a few years longer for the same number of people to own houses and cars – actually own them, not rent them from banks. Because banks would not be appropriating so much of everyone’s labor and wealth, the economy would grow much faster. Eventually, the extent of home and car ownership – actual ownership – would eclipse that in an easy-credit society. Moreover, people would keep their homes and cars because banks would not be foreclosing on them. As a bonus, there would be no devastating across-the-board collapse of the banking system, which, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, is inevitable under a central bank’s fiat-credit monopoly.

Jaguars, anyone?

……….

For more on deflation, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook or browse various deflation topics like those below at www.elliottwave.com/deflation.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Exposing Three Myths of Deflation and Recession
February 4, 2009

This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive it, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook, part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.

The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival eBook, a 60-page compilation of Prechter’s most important teachings and warnings about deflation.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

Myth 1: “War Will Bail Out the Economy”

Many people argue that war will bring both inflation and economic boom. Wars have not been fought in order to inflate money supplies. You might recall that Germany went utterly broke in 1923 via hyperinflation yet managed to start a world war 16 years later, which was surely not engaged in order to inflate the country’s money supply. Nor are wars and inflated money supplies guarantors of economic boom. The American colonies and the Confederate states each hyperinflated their currencies during wartime, but doing so did not help their economies; quite the opposite. With respect to war, the standard procedure today would be for the government to borrow to finance a war, which would not necessarily guarantee inflation. If new credit at current prices were unavailable, either the new debt could not be sold or it would “crowd out” other new debt. The U.S. could decide to inflate its currency as opposed to the credit supply. As explained in Conquer the Crash, doing so would be seen today as a highly imprudent course, so it is unlikely, to say the least. If it were to occur anyway, the collapse of bond prices in response would neutralize the currency inflation until the credit markets were wiped out. Despite these arguments, I concede that war can be so disruptive, involving the destruction of goods and the curtailment of commercial services, that the environment from the standpoint of prices could end up appearing inflationary. To summarize my view, the monetary result may not be certain, but an inflationary result is hardly inevitable.

There is in fact a reliable relationship between monetary trends and war. A downturn in social mood towards defensiveness, anger and fear causes people to (1) withdraw credit from the marketplace, which reduces the credit supply and (2) get angry with one another, which eventually leads to a fight. That’s why The Elliott Wave Theorist has been predicting both deflation and war. You cannot cure one with the other; they are results of the same cause.

Myth 2: “Deflation Will Cause a Run on the Dollar, Which Will Make Prices Rise”

This is an argument that deflation will cause inflation, which is untenable. In terms of domestic purchasing power, the dollar’s value should rise in deflation. You will then be able to buy more of most goods and services.

It is unknown how the dollar will fare against other currencies, and there is no way to answer that question other than following Elliott wave patterns as they develop. From the standpoint of predicting deflation, the dollar’s convertibility ratios are irrelevant. There may well be a “run on the dollar” against foreign currencies, but it would not be because of deflation. I think the impulse to predict a run on the dollar comes from people who own a lot of gold, silver or Swiss francs. They feel the ’70s returning, and so they envision the dollar falling against all of these alternatives. If deflation occurs, a concurrent drop in the dollar relative to other currencies would be for other reasons. Perhaps the dollar is overvalued because it has enjoyed reserve status for so long, which might make it fall relative to other currencies. If this is what you expect, what are you going to buy in the currency arena? The yen? Japan has been leading the way into the abyss. The Euro? Depression will wrack the European Union. Maybe the Swiss franc or the Singapore dollar. But these are technical questions, not challenges to deflation or domestic price behavior.

Myth 3: “Consumers Remain the Engine Driving the U.S. Economy”

Only producers can afford to buy things. A consumer qua consumer has no economic value or power.

The only way that consumers who are not (adequate) producers can buy things is to borrow the money. So when economists tell you that the consumer is holding up the economy, they mean that expanding credit is holding up the economy. This is a description of the problem, not the solution! The more the consumer goes into hock, the worse the problem gets, which is precisely the opposite of what economists are telling us. The more you hear that the consumer is propping up the economy, the more you know that the debt bubble is growing, and with it the risk of deflation.

……….

For more on deflation, download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook or browse various deflation topics like those below at www.elliottwave.com/deflation.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Is the World Finally Ready to Accept the Deflationary Scenario?
February 2, 2009

This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market analyst Robert Prechter, the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive it, download Prechter's FREE 60-page Deflation Survival Guide now.

The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter's 2002 New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Amazon best-seller, Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

Seventy years of nearly continuous inflation have made most people utterly confident of its permanence. If the majority of economists have any monetary fear at all, it is fear of inflation, which is the opposite of deflation.

As for the very idea of deflation, one economist a few years ago told a national newspaper that deflation had a “1 in 10,000” chance of occurring. The Chairman of Carnegie Mellon's business school calls the notion of deflation “utter nonsense.” A professor of economics at Pepperdine University states flatly, “Rising stock prices will inevitably lead to rising prices in the rest of the economy.” The publication of an economic think-tank insists, “Anyone who asserts that deflation is imminent or already underway ignores the rationale for fiat currency — that is, to facilitate the manipulation of economic activity.” A financial writer explains, “Deflation…is totally a function of the Federal Reserve's management of monetary policy. It has nothing to do with the business cycle, productivity, taxes, booms and busts or anything else.” Concurring, an adviser writes in a national magazine, “U.S. deflation would be simple to stop today. The Federal Reserve could just print more money, ending the price slide in its tracks.” Yet another sneers, “Get real,” and likens anyone concerned about deflation to “small children.” One maverick economist whose model accommodates deflation and who actually expects a period of deflation is nevertheless convinced that it will be a “good deflation” and “nothing to fear.” On financial television, another analyst (who apparently defines deflation as falling prices) quips, “Don't worry about deflation. All it does is pad profits.” A banker calls any episode of falling oil prices “a positive catalyst [that] will put more money in consumers' pockets. It will benefit companies that are powered by energy and oil, and it will benefit the overall economy.” Others excitedly welcome recently falling commodity prices as an economic stimulus “equivalent to a massive tax cut.” A national business magazine guarantees, “That's not deflation ahead, just slower inflation. Put your deflation worries away.” The senior economist with Deutsche Bank in New York estimates, “The chance of deflation is at most one in 50” (apparently up from the 1 in 10,000 of a couple of years ago). The President of the San Francisco Fed says, “The idea that we are launching into a prolonged period of declining prices I don't think has substance.” A former government economist jokes that deflation is “57th on my list of worries, right after the 56th — fear of being eaten by piranhas.” These comments about deflation represent entrenched professional opinion.

As you can see, anyone challenging virtually the entire army of financial and economic thinkers, from academic to professional, from liberal to conservative, from Keynesian socialist to Objectivist free-market, from Monetarist technocratic even to many vocal proponents of the Austrian school, must respond to their belief that inflation is virtually inevitable and deflation impossible.

……….

For more on deflation, download Prechter's FREE 60-page Deflation Survival Guide or browse various deflation topics like those below at www.elliottwave.com/deflation.


Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Can the Government Stop Another Great Depression?
January 13, 2009

The following article is excerpted from a recent issue Elliott Wave International’s Financial Forecast.

Elliott Wave International (EWI) is offering the full 10-page issue, entitled “The Most Important Investment Report You’ll Read in 2009,” free for a limited time. In addition to the following market commentary, it includes independent forecasts of stocks, bonds, metals, the U.S. dollar and economic trends.

Visit EWI to download the full report, free.

By Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall
Editors of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast

As Conquer the Crash so boldly counseled, prosperity entails managing one’s finances and livelihood so as to be in tune with a 1930s’ style deflationary depression. But conventional wisdom disagrees. “There’s no comparison” to the Great Depression, says the world’s leading financial authority, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke: “I’ve written books about the Depression. We didn’t have the social safety net that we have today. So let’s put that out of our minds.” He cites as evidence a 25% unemployment rate, a one-third decline in U.S. GDP and a 90% decline in stock prices, all of which occurred during the 1930s’ depression.

Unfortunately, what Bernanke’s managed to do is put one important word out of his mind—yet. Like the rest of the “this is no depression” camp, he fails to note that his cited figures are the extreme readings of that era. Bernanke also ignores the critical fact that today’s bear market is actually ahead of where the stock market was at the same point during the 1929-1932 decline and that the economy is lurching lower in a manner suggesting strongly that it will have little trouble keeping pace with the economic contraction of the 1930s (see Economy & Deflation section below).

Another common refrain is that, in contrast to the early 1930s, there are now competent financial authorities doing everything in their power to unlock the credit markets and reignite the bull market in equities. It’s certainly true that the Fed is doing everything in its power, and even some things that aren’t, to reel in the crisis. The U.S. Treasury is doing likewise. By Bianco Research’s tally, the potential total of U.S. bailouts is closing in on $9 trillion. But these efforts are every bit as impotent as Conquer the Crash and the September issue of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast suggested that they would be. Here’s the key quote from the September EWFF: “The bailouts keep coming at lower lows, signaling further declines ahead.” Incredibly to most people, since this quote appeared the Dow has declined by another 30% and various government financial wizards have put forward even bolder yet more haphazard “rescue” initiatives.

The ballooning bailout makes us more convinced than ever that it will fail. The whole “Keystone Cops” approach to “the rescue” strengthens our conviction. One day the bailout is aimed at jacking up asset prices; the next it is buying mortgages; the next it is rescuing the consumer; and the next it’s all-hands-on-deck to prop up whoever it is that happens to be failing on that day. The alphabet soup of rescue programs now includes ABCPMMMFLF (no, we didn’t make this up), which is supposed to “shore up” the $1 trillion asset-backed commercial paper markets. And still, credit spreads shoot higher.

Another program, the “systematically significant failing institutions program” (SSFIP), was established in November to deliver a $40 billion “equity injection” into AIG. The problem, which will probably become the focus of intense Congressional scrutiny at some later point, is that the injection was made in October, before the program even existed. The Wall Street Journal puts it this way: “Practically every day the government launches a massively expensive new initiative to solve the problems that the last day’s initiative did not.” At the latest economic summit in mid-November, the U.S. and other nations were reputedly “close to a deal to create a new ‘early warning system’ to detect weaknesses in the global financial system before they reach epic proportions.” Among the stated objectives: greater transparency. Of course, “sources spoke on the condition of anonymity because plans are still being worked out.” The real reason that these people want to remain anonymous is that like everyone else, they recognize the proportions of the unfolding epic and thus the futility of the bailout effort.

For more information on navigating the current market turmoil, including forecasts of stocks, bonds, metals, the U.S. dollar and economic trends, download Elliott Wave International’s free 10-page report, The Most Important Investment Report You’ll Read in 2009.


Steve Hochberg began his professional career with Merrill Lynch & Co. and joined Elliott Wave International in 1994. He became co-editor of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast for its inaugural issue in July 1999. Pete Kendall joined Elliott Wave International as a researcher in 1992. He has been co-editor of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast since its inception in July 1999. He is also the director of Elliott Wave International’s Center for Cultural Studies.

 

 

 

Making Preparations and Taking Action in Today’s Deflationary Environment
December 12, 2008

Editor’s Note: The following article is adapted from Robert Prechter’s 2002 best-selling book, Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression.

In addition to this article, visit Elliott Wave International to download the free 15-page report about how to protect yourself, you wealth and your family in this environment. It contains details about what you should do with your pension plan, valuable tips for business owners, insights on handling loans and debt and important warnings against trusting the government to protect you.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

The ultimate effect of deflation is to reduce the supply of money and credit. Your goal is to make sure that it doesn’t reduce the supply of your money and credit. The ultimate effect of depression is financial ruin. Your goal is to make sure that it doesn’t ruin you.
Many investment advisors speak as if making money by investing is easy. It’s not. What’s easy is losing money, which is exactly what most investors do. They might make money for a while, but they lose eventually. Just keeping what you have over a lifetime of investing can be an achievement. That’s what this my book, Conquer the Crash, is designed to help you do, in perhaps the single most difficult financial environment that exists.

Protecting your liquid wealth against a deflationary crash and depression is pretty easy once you know what to do. Protecting your other assets and ensuring your livelihood can be serious challenges. Knowing how to proceed used to be the most difficult part of your task because almost no one writes about the issue. My book remedies that situation.

Preparing To Take the Right Actions

In a crash and depression, we will see stocks going down 90 percent and more, mutual funds collapsing, massive layoffs, high unemployment, corporate and municipal bankruptcies, bank and insurance company failures and ultimately financial and political crises. The average person, who has no inkling of the risks in the financial system, will be shocked that such things could happen, despite the fact that they have happened repeatedly throughout history.

Being unprepared will leave you vulnerable to a major disruption in your life. Being prepared will allow you to make exceptional profits both in the crash and in the ensuing recovery. For now, you should focus on making sure that you do not become a zombie-eyed victim of the depression.

Taking the Right Actions

Countless advisors have touted “stocks only,” “gold only,” “diversification,” a “balanced portfolio” and other end-all solutions to the problem of attending to your investments. These approaches are usually delusions. As I try to make clear in Conquer the Crash, no investment strategy will provide stability forever. You will have to be nimble enough to see major trends coming and make changes accordingly.

The main goal of investing in a crash environment is safety. When deflation looms, almost every investment category becomes associated with immense risks. Most investors have no idea of these risks and will think you are a fool for taking precautions.
Many readers will object to taking certain prudent actions because of the presumed cost. For example: “I can’t take a profit; I’ll have to pay taxes!” My reply is, if you don’t want to pay taxes, well, you’ll get your wish; your profit will turn into a loss, and you won’t have to pay any taxes. Or they say, “I can’t sell my stocks for cash; interest rates are only 2 percent!” My reply is, if you can’t abide a 2 percent annual gain, well, you’ll get your wish there, too; you’ll have a 30 percent annual loss instead. Others say, “I can’t cash out my retirement plan; there’s a penalty!” I reply, take your money out before there is none to get. Then there is the venerable, “I can’t sell now; I’d be taking a loss!” I say no, you are recovering some capital that you can put to better use. My advice always is, make the right move, and the costs will take care of themselves.

If you are preoccupied with pedestrian concerns or blithely going along with mainstream opinions, you need to wake up now, while there is still time, and actively take charge of your personal finances. First you must make your capital, your person and your family safe. Then you can explore options for making money during the crash and especially after it’s over.
…………….

For more information, Prechter has made five full chapters from his book available for free download.
What to do with your pension plan
How to identify a safe haven (a safe place for your family)
What should you do if you run a business
Calling in loans and paying off debt
Should you rely on the government to protect you?


Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
 

 

 

Robert Prechter Explains the Price Effects of Inflation and Deflation
November 19, 2008

Editor’s Note: On Nov. 19, 2008, the U.S. Labor Department reported a 1 percent drop in the consumer price index for October 2008. The drop marked the largest decline in 61 years, and it was the first decline in that measure in nearly a quarter of a century. The 1 percent drop was twice as large as many mainstream analysts had forecast. Such a large decline in consumer prices is forcing U.S. policymakers to rethink the possibility of deflation in America. For more on deflation, we turn to Robert Prechter, the man who literally wrote a book on how to survive it. The following article, adapted from Prechter’s book Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression, will help you understand exactly what to expect from deflation.

In addition to this article, visit Elliott Wave International to download the free 8-page report, Inflation vs. Deflation. It contains details on which threat you should prepare for and steps you can take to protect your money.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

Before explaining the price effects of inflation and deflation, we must define the terms inflation, deflation, money, credit and debt.

Webster's says, "Inflation is an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods," and "Deflation is a contraction in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods."

Money is a socially accepted medium of exchange, value storage and final payment. A specified amount of that medium also serves as a unit of account.

According to its two financial definitions, credit may be summarized as a right to access money. Credit can be held by the owner of the money, in the form of a warehouse receipt for a money deposit, which today is a checking account at a bank. Credit can also be transferred by the owner or by the owner's custodial institution to a borrower in exchange for a fee or fees – called interest – as specified in a repayment contract called a bond, note, bill or just plain IOU, which is debt. In today's economy, most credit is lent, so people often use the terms "credit" and "debt" interchangeably, as money lent by one entity is simultaneously money borrowed by another.

When the volume of money and credit rises relative to the volume of goods available, the relative value of each unit of money falls, making prices for goods generally rise. When the volume of money and credit falls relative to the volume of goods available, the relative value of each unit of money rises, making prices of goods generally fall. Though many people find it difficult to do, the proper way to conceive of these changes is that the value of units of money are rising and falling, not the values of goods.

The most common misunderstanding about inflation and deflation – echoed even by some renowned economists – is the idea that inflation is rising prices and deflation is falling prices. General price changes, though, are simply effects of inflation and deflation.

The price effects of inflation can occur in goods, which most people recognize as relating to inflation, or in investment assets, which people do not generally recognize as relating to inflation. The inflation of the 1970s induced dramatic price rises in gold, silver and commodities. The inflation of the 1980s and 1990s induced dramatic price rises in stock certificates and real estate. This difference in effect is due to differences in the social psychology that accompanies inflation and disinflation, respectively.

The price effects of deflation are simpler. They tend to occur across the board, in goods and investment assets simultaneously.

…………….

For more information on deflation and inflation, including money-saving steps for protecting your wealth, download Elliott Wave International’s free 8-page report, Inflation vs. Deflation.

Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

The Government Doesn’t Want You to Read This Article About the Financial Crisis
December 2, 2008

Editor’s Note: This article has been excerpted from a free issue of Robert Prechter’s monthly market letter, The Elliott Wave Theorist.

The full 10-page market letter, Be One of the Few The Government Hasn’t Fooled, can be downloaded free from Elliott Wave International.

By Robert Prechter, CMT

“Who Will Benefit From The Housing Act?”

This question is an actual headline from a national daily paper. The real answer is: mortgage lending corporations, developers, real estate agents, speculators and politicians. The government is also pledging tax money to providers of “financial counseling” and grants for speculators who want to “buy and renovate foreclosed housing”; in other words, it will hand tax money to charlatans and unfunded wheeler-dealers. But a far better headline would have been, “Whom Will the Housing Act Hurt?” The answer to that question is: (1) prudent people, i.e. savers, earners, renters and people who have waited to buy a house at a reasonable price; and (2) innocent people, i.e. taxpayers.

Government action (unless it is aimed at destruction) always causes the opposite of its stated effect. If taxpayers ultimately have to shoulder the burden for all the bad mortgage debt, those who are on the edge of being able to make their mortgage payments will be forced over the edge, causing more missed mortgage payments and more foreclosures.

There is never any need for a law granting privilege except when the goal is to reward the undeserving and to punish the innocent. If the goal were otherwise, there would be no need for a statutory law, because the natural laws of economics, when unencumbered, serve to reward the deserving and punish the imprudent and the guilty. Populists loudly challenge this idea, but they are wrong.

I thought the Fed was created to “help manage the economy.”

After a secret meeting on Jekyll Island (GA), Congress and a handful of bankers created the Federal Reserve System for two purposes. The first one was to allow the government to counterfeit money, thereby letting it steal value from savers through inflation. The second was to allow bankers to make profits through debt creation, also at the expense of savers. Any other claim is a smokescreen.

So shouldn’t we blame the Fed for the country’s financial problems?

That’s like blaming the collapse of your house on the biggest termite. The Fed is only one of the monsters that Congress has created. In the financial realm, others include Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, Sallie Mae, the FDIC, the FHA, the FHLBs and the income tax. But there are also a hundred other havoc-wreaking agencies of the federal government. Congress is to blame for ruining America. The Fed is only one of the mechanisms it created along the way. It’s a big one, and it’s fine to campaign against it, but to blame it for everything is to give its creator a free pass.

This is an important distinction, because many people seem to think that abolishing the Fed will cure America’s money woes. They seem to think that once the Fed is abolished, Congress will behave responsibly. One website even calls for abolishing the Fed in favor of giving money-printing power directly to the federal government! Abolishing the Fed is a worthy goal, but Congress will work tirelessly to create one disastrous institution after another, because that’s what campaign donors pay for.


For more information on the government’s role in the financial crisis, download Robert Prechter’s free 10-page market letter, Be One of the Few the Government Hasn’t Fooled.

Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Has Cash Been King for the Past 10 Years?

If you're like most investors, you've been nearly brainwashed with conventional market "wisdom" that stocks are the best way to grow your portfolio.

You would be crazy not to have your money in the markets, right?

But when markets drop, as we've seen in this credit crisis, it's amazing how quickly the story changes.

Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall, editors of Elliott Wave International's Financial Forecast, challenged the notion of stocks' superiority years before this latest downturn.

Learn how cash has been king – and will remain so – far longer than the latest news headlines may have you believe in this free excerpt from Elliott Wave International's Credit Crisis Survival Kit.

Elliott Wave International has also made the full Credit Crisis Survival Kit available free for a limited time. In addition to this excerpt, it contains 14 other articles, reports, and videos that reveal how to survive and prosper during the credit crisis. Visit EWI to download the kit, free.

Cash's Invisible Reign Made Visible
[excerpted from Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, August 2008]

With respect to cash and its status as the preeminent financial asset, however, we are starting to wonder if investors will ever come around to our point of view, which, as we explained in the March special section, is that there are times when "the phrase 'focus on the long term' means "get out and wait.'" As we also pointed out, the last eight years are clearly one of these times, as cash has outperformed all three major stock averages over this period. A July 3 USA Today article shows how this outlook is actually becoming more farsighted as the bear market intensifies:

3-month Treasuries Beat
S&P 500 for past 10 Years

The article says, "Investors who bought stocks for the long run are finding out just how long the long run can be." But the farther back in time cash's dominance stretches and the rockier the stock market gets, the farther investors seem to move from ever taking anything off the table. After stating that "there can be times, long times, when stocks won't beat T-bills," a professor and popular buy-and-hold advocate is cited as "optimistic that the next 10 years will be better than the past decade." In March EWFF stated, "Cash will continue to outperform until stocks are no longer fashionable." There is no sign that such a condition is even close to happening.

It's somewhat amazing that cash is not capturing anyone's fancy because a tremendous society-wide thirst for cash is spreading fast. "In a deflation," the Elliott Wave Financial Forecast has stated, "Rule No. 1 is to unload everything that isn't nailed down. Rule No. 2 is to sell whatever everything remaining is nailed to." The banking system is surely deflating, because, echoing Elliott Wave Financial Forecast's wording again, "Desperate American Banks Are Selling Everything That Isn't Nailed Down." SunTrust is selling its stock in Coca-Cola, an asset the bank held for 90 years. Merrill Lynch sold its founding stake in Bloomberg as well as various other subsidiaries.

Meanwhile, "Americans are selling prized possessions online and at flea markets at alarming rates." Pawnshops and auction sites are booming. At Craigslist.org, the number of for-sale listings soared 70% in eight months. This fits with our review of Craigslist's prospects when it was getting started in 2005: "This is just the set-up phase. Once the global garage sale really gets rolling, truly astounding volumes of dirt-cheap goods will be available on-line and elsewhere." The global garage sale is on. The chart of the U.S. savings rate shows that the bull market in cash has come to life.

A 30-year downtrend in savings rates ended at minus 2.3% in August 2005. In May 2008, the savings rate skyrocketed to 5%. This jolt may be somewhat overstated due to the arrival of the government's stimulus checks, but the burst should be the start of a critical new mindset among consumers. When the government showered the economy with $600 checks, many did something they never would have thought of through most of the bull market: They put the money in the bank, which is exactly what the administration did not want. In fact, federal, state and local governments are desperate for the tax revenue that a little ripple-effect spending would have generated.

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, states must close a $40 billion shortfall in the current fiscal year. "The problem today is that tax revenue is vanishing," says a story about the sudden appearance of the worst fiscal crisis in New York since 1975. Even cities like East Hampton, New York, where someone paid $103 million for an oceanfront house last year, are out of money. "Nobody understands how it happened," says one resident. The pages of this newsletter show otherwise. If we are right, a deflationary decline is depleting and destroying cash flows in novel new ways that no one alive has experienced before.


The previous analysis was excerpted from Elliott Wave International's Credit Crisis Survival Kit. The kit, featuring 15 free resources to help you survive and prosper during the credit crisis, is available free. Visit EWI to download the kit, free.

 

 

 

The Primary Precondition of Deflation

By Robert Prechter, CMT
Elliott Wave International
 

The following was adapted from Bob Prechter’s 2002 New York Times and Amazon best seller, Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression.

Deflation requires a precondition: a major societal buildup in the extension of credit (and its flip side, the assumption of debt). Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek warned of the consequences of credit expansion, as have a handful of other economists, who today are mostly ignored. Bank credit and Elliott wave expert Hamilton Bolton, in a 1957 letter, summarized his observations this way:

In reading a history of major depressions in the U.S. from 1830 on, I was impressed with the following:

(a) All were set off by a deflation of excess credit. This was the one factor in common.
(b) Sometimes the excess-of-credit situation seemed to last years before the bubble broke.
(c) Some outside event, such as a major failure, brought the thing to a head, but the signs were visible many months, and in some cases years, in advance.
(d) None was ever quite like the last, so that the public was always fooled thereby.
(e) Some panics occurred under great government surpluses of revenue (1837, for instance) and some under great government deficits.
(f) Credit is credit, whether non-self-liquidating or self-liquidating.
(g)
Deflation of non-self-liquidating credit usually produces the greater slumps.

Self-liquidating credit is a loan that is paid back, with interest, in a moderately short time from production. Production facilitated by the loan – for business start-up or expansion, for example – generates the financial return that makes repayment possible. The full transaction adds value to the economy.

Non-self-liquidating credit is a loan that is not tied to production and tends to stay in the system. When financial institutions lend for consumer purchases such as cars, boats or homes, or for speculations such as the purchase of stock certificates, no production effort is tied to the loan. Interest payments on such loans stress some other source of income. Contrary to nearly ubiquitous belief, such lending is almost always counter-productive; it adds costs to the economy, not value. If someone needs a cheap car to get to work, then a loan to buy it adds value to the economy; if someone wants a new SUV to consume, then a loan to buy it does not add value to the economy. Advocates claim that such loans "stimulate production," but they ignore the cost of the required debt service, which burdens production. They also ignore the subtle deterioration in the quality of spending choices due to the shift of buying power from people who have demonstrated a superior ability to invest or produce (creditors) to those who have demonstrated primarily a superior ability to consume (debtors).

Near the end of a major expansion, few creditors expect default, which is why they lend freely to weak borrowers. Few borrowers expect their fortunes to change, which is why they borrow freely. Deflation involves a substantial amount of involuntary debt liquidation because almost no one expects deflation before it starts.

For more on deflation, including the following topics, see Elliott Wave International’s free guide to deflation, inflation, money, credit and debt. There, you can also download two free chapters from Conquer the Crash.

Learn more about these six important topics:

1. What is Deflation and When Does it Occur?
2.
Price Effects of Inflation and Deflation
3.
The Primary Precondition of Deflation
4.
What Triggers the Change to Deflation?
5.
Why Deflationary Crashes and Depressions Go Together
6.
Financial Values Can Disappear in Deflation

Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

 

3 Questions The Government Doesn’t Want You To Ask About the Financial Crisis
(And 3 Shocking Answers!)

September 22, 2008

Bob Prechter, President of Elliott Wave International (EWI), is no stranger to challenging the status quo. His New York Times bestseller, Conquer the Crash, was published in 2002 before anyone was even talking about the current financial crisis.

In his recent 10-page market letter, Prechter shifts his focus to the government’s role in the latest financial turmoil.

Elliott Wave International is offering the full 10-page report free if you’d like to read all 28 answers. Visit EWI to download the full report, free.

Here are 3 questions excerpted from the free report:

1. Didn’t Congress create the Federal Housing Authority, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks for the purpose of helping the public buy homes?

You’re kidding, right? What happened is that clever businessmen schemed with members of Congress to create privileged lending institutions so they could get rich off the public’s labor. In return, members of Congress got big campaign contributions from the privileged corporations and, as a bonus, even more votes. The public’s welfare had nothing to do with it.

Who celebrated when Congress passed the latest housing bill? Answer: “The California Mortgage Bankers Association applauded Congress for permanently increasing the size of loans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can buy….” (USA, 7/28) The legislation exists to “protect the nation’s two largest mortgage companies….” (NYT, 7/24) Who took out full-page ads to encourage Congress to “enact housing stimulus legislation now”? Answer: the National Association of Home Builders. Who celebrated when the administration “unveiled a new set of best [sic] practices designed to encourage banks to issue a debt instrument known as a covered bond”? Answer: “[Treasury Secretary] Paulson was joined at the news conference by officials from the Federal Reserve [and] the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation…. Officials from banking giants Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo & Co. issued a joint statement saying, ‘We look forward to being leading issuers’” (AP, 7/29) of covered bonds. And voters still believe that Congress is there to help the needy.

2. Who cares if a bank goes under? Won’t the FDIC protect depositors?

The FDIC is not funded well enough to bail out even a handful of the biggest banks in America. It has enough money to pay depositors of about three big banks. After that, it’s broke. But here is the real irony: The FDIC, as history will ultimately demonstrate, causes banks to fail. The FDIC creates destruction three ways. First, its very existence encourages banks to take lending risks that they would never otherwise contemplate, while it simultaneously removes depositors’ incentives to keep their bankers prudent. This double influence produces an unsound banking system. We have reached that point today. Second, the FDIC imposes costly rules on banks. In July, it “implemented a new rule…requiring the 159 [largest] banks to keep records that will give quick access to customer information.” As the American Bankers Association puts it, the new rule “will impose a lot of burden on a lot of banks for no reason.” (AJC, 7/19) Third, the FDIC gets its money in the form of “premiums” from—guess whom?—healthy banks! So as weak banks go under, the FDIC can wring more money from still-solvent banks. If it begins calling in money during a systemic credit implosion, marginal banks will go under, requiring more money for the FDIC, which will have to take more money from banks, breaking more marginal banks, etc. The FDIC could continue this behavior until all banks are bust, but it will more likely give up and renege. Remember, every government program ultimately brings about the opposite of the stated goal, and the FDIC is no exception.

3. Who are the “homeowners”?

Everywhere you turn, news articles are discussing how Congress, the President and the Fed are taking action to “help homeowners.” People’s understanding of this statement is 100 percent wrong. The homeowners in question are not the residents of the houses. The homeowners are banks. Unlike some states, Georgia made its law very specific on this point. Our local paper recently explained that, by recognizing the reality of ownership, “Georgia employs primarily a nonjudicial foreclosure” and therefore “has one of the fastest procedures in the country.” Specifically, “The property owner gives the mortgage holder a ‘security deed’ or a ‘deed to secure debt’. Technically, until the debt is paid, in full, the mortgage holder owns the property and allows the borrower to possess it.” (GT, 8/6) In states where the mortgage holder is deemed the property owner, the title is merely a legal technicality. The day he stops making mortgage payments, he no longer owns the property; the bank does. After foreclosure, many of those whom politicians and the media call homeowners will simply go from paying interest to a bank to paying rent to a landlord. For those with little or no equity, it’s not that big a deal. The real devastation is happening in banks’ portfolios, and banks, not home-dwellers, are the ones whom the government is trying to rescue, at others’ expense.

One might be tempted to charge therefore that Congress makes its laws for the purpose of helping banks. This idea, too, is incorrect. Helping banks is merely a side effect. The reason that Congress creates privileges for bankers is to benefit politicians. They make laws in response to campaign contributions from lending institutions, real-estate organizations and builders’ associations. They also garner votes from mortgage holders and, miraculously, from voters who think that their “representatives” are being “compassionate.”


The previous 3 questions and answers from Bob Prechter were excerpted from his recent 10-page market letter, The Elliott Wave Theorist.

Elliott Wave International is offering the full 10-page report free if you’d like to read all 28 answers. Visit EWI to download the full report, free.

 

 

 

 

Gold, the Dow, T-Notes: Which Does Best During Recessions?

By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
April 11, 2008

Each year, the NCAA college basketball tournament winnows its starting field of 64 teams to the Final Four teams who play for a chance to become the national champion. Congratulations to the University of Kansas and the University of Tennessee, this year's men's and women's basketball champions.

The structure of the NCAA tournament got me to thinking. Wouldn't it be great if we could set up brackets for our own investments the same way – start with 64 equities, bonds, mutual funds, commodity futures, metals, etc. Then let them duke it out against one another to see which ones emerge as the "Investment Final Four"?


Click here to download a free 5-page report from Elliott Wave International with even more information on which investment does best during recessions. The report, excerpted from Bob Prechter's Elliott Wave Theorist, includes in-depth historical analysis and six eye-opening tables.


Since most of us have neither the time nor the money to act as our own version of the NCAA (which might stand for the "National Coordinator of Asset Allocation"), it's worth knowing that Bob Prechter of Elliott Wave International has already set his mind to the task. He has specifically explored which investments do best in times of recession and which do best during economic expansions. But instead of starting with a field of 64 investments, he researched the three most popular investments – gold, the Dow, and Treasury bonds. We can call them the Treasured Three, rather than the Final Four.

Gold and Recessions

Since economists and even Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, now admit that it looks like the U.S. economy has entered a recession, many people may wonder whether they need to change the mix of their investments. In particular, as some prices keep going up – notably for food and gas – the threat of inflation makes people more interested in gold as an investment, since it's usually seen as a bulwark against monetary inflation.

It is this conventional wisdom that piqued Prechter's curiosity. He wanted to find out whether it would hold up to a reality test. As he writes in The Elliott Wave Theorist, "I have often read, 'Gold always goes up in recessions and depressions.' Is it true? Should you own gold because you think the economy is tanking? Whenever we hear some claim like this, we always do the same thing: We look at the data."

So he and another Elliott wave analyst ran the numbers, reviewing the behavior of these three key investments during recessions following World War II, from February 1945 through November 2001. This is what they learned:

Gold was not the best investment during recessions in terms of total return.

The winner of this tournament was actually Treasury Notes, which had a total return of 9.96%. In contrast, gold had a total return of 8.80%, and the Dow came in at 6.89%. But that's not all – once they figured in the transaction costs for each investment (at a 2008 level), gold fell from second to third place as a worthwhile investment during recessions. The total returns with transaction costs came out this way:

1. T-Notes 9.82%
2. Dow 6.85%
3. Gold 4.80%

This result turns conventional wisdom on its head. It's also worth being aware of as you invest in 2008. Here's how Prechter sums up the results:

The Best Investment During Recessions

The most important question, however, is not whether the Dow beat gold or vice versa but whether making either investment would have been better than taking no risk at all. Table 3 [see free report provided by Elliott Wave International] shows that ten-year Treasury notes beat both gold and the Dow during recessions since 1945, and they did so far more reliably. T-notes provided a capital gain in 10 of the 11 recessions, and of course they provided interest income during all of them. And the transaction costs are low….

So if you want to make money reliably and safely during recessions and depression, you should own bonds whose issuers will remain fully reliable debtors throughout the contraction. Of course, as Conquer the Crash [Editor's note: Bob Prechter's best-selling business book] makes abundantly clear, finding such bonds in this depression, which will be the deepest in 300 years, will not be easy. Conquer the Crash forecast that in this depression most bonds will go down and many will go to zero. This process has already begun. This time around, you have to follow the suggestions in that book to make your debt investment work. [The Elliott Wave Theorist, March 2008]

 

Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com.

 

 

 

The Primary Precondition of Deflation

By Robert Prechter, CMT
Elliott Wave International
 

The following was adapted from Bob Prechter’s 2002 New York Times and Amazon best seller, Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression.

Deflation requires a precondition: a major societal buildup in the extension of credit (and its flip side, the assumption of debt). Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek warned of the consequences of credit expansion, as have a handful of other economists, who today are mostly ignored. Bank credit and Elliott wave expert Hamilton Bolton, in a 1957 letter, summarized his observations this way:

In reading a history of major depressions in the U.S. from 1830 on, I was impressed with the following:

(a) All were set off by a deflation of excess credit. This was the one factor in common.
(b) Sometimes the excess-of-credit situation seemed to last years before the bubble broke.
(c) Some outside event, such as a major failure, brought the thing to a head, but the signs were visible many months, and in some cases years, in advance.
(d) None was ever quite like the last, so that the public was always fooled thereby.
(e) Some panics occurred under great government surpluses of revenue (1837, for instance) and some under great government deficits.
(f) Credit is credit, whether non-self-liquidating or self-liquidating.
(g)
Deflation of non-self-liquidating credit usually produces the greater slumps.

Self-liquidating credit is a loan that is paid back, with interest, in a moderately short time from production. Production facilitated by the loan – for business start-up or expansion, for example – generates the financial return that makes repayment possible. The full transaction adds value to the economy.

Non-self-liquidating credit is a loan that is not tied to production and tends to stay in the system. When financial institutions lend for consumer purchases such as cars, boats or homes, or for speculations such as the purchase of stock certificates, no production effort is tied to the loan. Interest payments on such loans stress some other source of income. Contrary to nearly ubiquitous belief, such lending is almost always counter-productive; it adds costs to the economy, not value. If someone needs a cheap car to get to work, then a loan to buy it adds value to the economy; if someone wants a new SUV to consume, then a loan to buy it does not add value to the economy. Advocates claim that such loans "stimulate production," but they ignore the cost of the required debt service, which burdens production. They also ignore the subtle deterioration in the quality of spending choices due to the shift of buying power from people who have demonstrated a superior ability to invest or produce (creditors) to those who have demonstrated primarily a superior ability to consume (debtors).

Near the end of a major expansion, few creditors expect default, which is why they lend freely to weak borrowers. Few borrowers expect their fortunes to change, which is why they borrow freely. Deflation involves a substantial amount of involuntary debt liquidation because almost no one expects deflation before it starts.

For more on deflation, including the following topics, see Elliott Wave International’s free guide to deflation, inflation, money, credit and debt. There, you can also download two free chapters from Conquer the Crash.

Learn more about these six important topics:

1. What is Deflation and When Does it Occur?
2.
Price Effects of Inflation and Deflation
3.
The Primary Precondition of Deflation
4.
What Triggers the Change to Deflation?
5.
Why Deflationary Crashes and Depressions Go Together
6.
Financial Values Can Disappear in Deflation

Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best sellers Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.

 

 

 

Suddenly, It's a Bleak Midwinter for Housing and Lending

By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
January 7, 2008

In the bleak midwinter,
Frosty wind made moan,
Earth stood hard as iron,
Water like a stone…
(From "A Christmas Carol" by Christina Rossetti)

Shawn Colvin sings a beautiful song based on this poem by Christina Rossetti, reminding us of the bleakness of midwinter. That is exactly where the housing market seems to be now – facing its very own bleak midwinter of falling prices, rising mortgage rates and growing inventories.

The latest report of the S&P/Case-Shiller home price index shows that the price of houses fell 6.7% in October, year over year. That is the largest year-to-year decline drop since April 1991. Think of it – if you had bought a home for $300,000 in October 2006, it is now worth about $280,000. And suppose you just got a new job and need to move? You are going to have trouble selling it at that price, too, thanks to so many foreclosed homes on the market. One realtor in Phoenix explained to a Wall Street Journal reporter that local residents are now competing with foreclosed homes selling for $50,000 to $100,000 less than other houses on the market. "The sellers now are having to reduce their prices by 20% to 30% to compete," she says. (Wall Street Journal, "Pace of Decline in Home Prices Sets a Record," 12/27/07)

At a meeting of the New York Society of Security Analysts on January 7, U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson said this about the U.S. economy: "We will likely have further indications of slower growth in the weeks and months ahead.''

Paulson and central bankers at the U.S. Federal Reserve recognize that they, too, face their own bleak financial midwinter. It's not just the mayhem brought on by the subprime mortgage debacle, the implosion of the housing market and the ensuing credit crunch; nor is it that the U.S. economy lurches toward a recession and hard times.

No, it is something bigger than that. Public opinion or social mood, as we call it here at Elliott Wave International, has shifted from positive to negative. When that happens, financial heroes find themselves falling from their pedestals onto frozen earth hard as iron.

Exhibit A - The headline of a recent article on Bloomberg: "Paulson Gets Diminishing Return with Bush, Like Powell, O'Neill" and the lead: "Henry Paulson escaped the Nixon White House with his reputation enhanced. He won't be so lucky this time around."

Exhibit B - The lead from a recent column by David Ignatius in the Washington Post:

"When airport rescue crews are worried that a damaged plane may have a crash landing, they sometimes spread the runway with foam to reduce the probability of fire on impact. That's what the Federal Reserve and other central banks are doing in pumping liquidity into severely damaged financial markets. Make no mistake: The central bankers' announcement Wednesday of a new coordinated effort to pump cash into the global financial system is a sign of their nervousness…."

Nervousness is in the air now. Investors are anxious about the markets; everyone is worried about the housing market. Our Elliott Wave Financial Forecast December issue explains how housing starts (and stops) are intimately tied to recessions: "One key indicator of success in pre-dating economic downturns is housing starts, which are approaching the 1-million-a-month level that has preceded all recessions of the last 40 years."

And the Fed is nervous, too. So much so that it announced a credit giveaway with four other major central banks (the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank) in mid-December to try to bolster the financial system and the banks that keep it humming. The Fed reports that banks have been stepping up to its auction window each week to purchase $20 billion. Unfortunately for the banks, most of this "liquidity" isn't that liquid. It has to be paid back within 30 days, with interest of about 4.65%.


Editor's note: Elliott Wave International has agreed to make available to our readers a 2-1/2-page excerpt from Bob Prechter's Elliott Wave Theorist in which he describes exactly how the Fed's latest effort to shore up banks' balance sheets has become "High Noon for the Fed's Credibility." Click here to read the Theorist excerpt.


Just how bleak is the future for central bankers if this recently implemented plan doesn't work? Bob Prechter explains in his just-published Theorist:

"Nevertheless, this is probably the single most important central-bank pronouncement yet. But it is not significant for the reasons people think. By far most people take such pronouncements at face value, presume that what the authorities promise will happen and reason from there. But the tremendous significance of this seismic engagement of the monetary jawbone is that if this announcement fails to restore confidence, central bankers' credibility will evaporate."

"At least that's the way historians will play it. But of course, the true causality, as elucidated by socionomics, is that an evaporation of confidence will make the central bankers' plans fail. The outcome is predicated on psychology."

The "socionomics" Prechter refers to is a new social science he has introduced that studies how humans behave in groups within contexts of uncertainty – where fluctuations in social mood motivate social actions. It explains that rather than an event happening that affects social mood (for example, falling home prices make people feel bad), what really happens is that social mood changes first from positive to negative and then lousy things happen (for example, unhappy people make home prices fall). If you can adopt this point of view, then you can see that, in poetic terms, we are fast approaching a bleak midwinter for the economy and the financial markets.

Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com.

 

 

 

Subprime Delivers One-Two Punch Just Like Hurricane Katrina Did

By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
November 29, 2007

The world is awash in bad news about the subprime mortgage meltdown, just the same way that New Orleans was awash in floodwaters from Hurricane Katrina two summers ago. A few examples:

  • The median price for new home drops 13% since last year, the most in 37 years, according to a Census Bureau report on November 29. This due in large part to buyers not being able to get financing now that lenders have tightened their lending standards in response to the subprime debacle.
  • Major Wall Street banks write off billions of dollars in subprime-backed securities.
  • Dire forecasts estimate that the credit crunch caused by the mortgage problems will cause between $250 billion to $500 billion of losses at banks and brokerages before it's done.

If you want to see how this kind of news looks on a price chart, consider the chart that we published in the latest Elliott Wave Financial Forecast. It shows how confidence in the mortgage market has simply fallen off a cliff. "The ABX Mortgage Indexes are akin to the eerie music that starts to play right before the goriest scenes in a horror movie," write our analysts Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall. Even prime-rated mortgages (the top line on the chart) seem to have been tainted by the cliff-diving exploits of the subprime and Alt-A mortgage indexes.


Editor's note: Elliott Wave International invites you to read more about this Mortgage Mutiny chart in a special three-page excerpt from the November 2007 Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, called "Transition to a Fear of Risk."


The continuing repercussions of the subprime meltdown since two Bear Stearns' hedge funds imploded in August remind me how closely this situation imitates the delayed punch of Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005. In fact, I wrote a column for Fox News on that very topic a few months ago, some of which is worth repeating.

* * * * *
[Excerpted from "Subprime Storm Mimics Katrina," originally published July 30, 2007]

Wall Street may have reason to worry about a financial hurricane poised to do the same kind of damage Hurricane Katrina did — in terms of money and assets lost — in New Orleans in 2005. Given the latest storm warnings about subprime mortgages and the Dow’s dive last week, it looks like "Subprime Katrina" might become the financial storm of the decade.

Wall Street investment bankers who remember the devastation in New Orleans might want to start battening down the hatches. In fact, some of them seem to understand their pending doom as they try to cajole the rest of the world into thinking that the subprime (otherwise known as low-quality) mortgage contagion is contained. 'Sure, sure, Bear Stearns got hit when its subprime hedge funds lost their value, but everyone else is O.K.,' they say. 'Let's all heave one collective sigh of relief that we dodged that bullet.'

Does that attitude sound familiar? It's exactly how the people of New Orleans felt for the 8-10 hours after Hurricane Katrina whipped up the Gulf Coast and dumped its rain. It was over; they had dodged the bullet. Their beautiful city that is built below sea level and surrounded by sea walls and levees was safe. That's where Wall Street is right now – hoping the levees will hold as investment bankers try to sandbag the rest of us with lots of placating talk. Well, it turns out that New Orleans was about as safe as the subprime bonds that are now below their own "C" level.

Although Wall Street bankers have been doing one heckuva job, I think it's too soon to breathe easy, just as it was too soon for those in the Big Easy to breathe easy. Here's why: Wall Street was warned about the coming hurricane-force fall-out from subprime mortgages, and it ignored the warnings, buying up all the securities backed by subprime mortgages that it could. Now, Wall Street is having trouble selling more debt. It sounds like it may be too late for many Wall Street denizens to get out of town – and their positions – before the floodwaters start rising.

Remember, too, the finger-pointing and blaming that started as soon as the rest of the nation realized that the U.S. government was not doing enough to help New Orleans? The editors of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast recognize a similar change in attitudes toward Wall Street:

"The unwinding process will be sped along by a flood of revelations about illicit hedge fund and investment banking activities. Just as Enron, Tyco and a host of other primary beneficiaries of the late 1990s bull market run became the focus of scandals, hedge funds and the banks that enabled them are starting to become a focal point for scrutiny." (The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, July 2007)

Then will come the final installment. Just as the U.S. government was slow to come to grips with the disaster in New Orleans so that people were left to fend for themselves, so too will investment bankers and investors have to fend for themselves. They may find themselves clutching their worthless paper and wishing someone would bail them out from the rooftops of their now-worthless homes.
* * * * *

Now, here we are at the end of November, and the situation for investors and investment banks has played out almost exactly as I outlined. Hardly anyone is coming out smelling like a rose. If anything it's the opposite, as the stench from quarterly financial filings rises as banks reveal how many billions in dollars they must write off for their mortgage investments gone bad. Sadly, the conclusion to my Subprime Katrina column still holds true: "Heckuva Job Brownie – now known as Helicopter Ben Bernanke and his Federal Reserve team – won't have any more luck picking up the pieces on Wall Street than FEMA did in New Orleans."

Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com.

 

 
 

Why the Fed is Such a Lousy Wizard of Oz

By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
September 7, 2007

Central bankers who "follow the yellow brick road" end up in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, every Labor Day weekend for their annual symposium sponsored by – who else? – the Kansas City Fed. (Who can forget Judy Garland saying to her little dog, "Toto, I've got a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore," in the 1939 movie, The Wizard of Oz?)

The Jackson Hole Resort serves as the Federal Reserve's equivalent of the Emerald City, as Fed governors and presidents meet with central bankers and economists from around the world to discuss economic issues. This year, the symposium focused on housing and monetary policy. Usually, the Fed chairman kicks off the symposium and, this year, the new chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, did the honors. He closed his speech with these words:

"The interaction of housing, housing finance, and economic activity has for years been of central importance for understanding the behavior of the economy, and it will continue to be central to our thinking as we try to anticipate economic and financial developments."

Then came the other speeches. And it seems that some of the guests in Emerald City were waiting for their chance to pull back the curtain and prove that the Wonderful Wizard of Oz isn't such a wizard after all. Bloomberg reported that "Federal Reserve officials, wrestling with a housing recession that jeopardizes U.S. growth, got an earful from critics at a weekend retreat, arguing they should use regulation and interest rates to prevent asset-price bubbles." Apparently, one academic paper presented at Jackson Hole graded the Fed an 'F' for the way it has handled the repercussions from the rise and fall of the housing market.

Truth be told, these folks are a little late to the table as critics of the Fed. We're glad they're joining us, but here's what they still haven't learned: It isn't because the Federal Reserve messes up by allowing credit, asset and stock bubbles to form that it's not a wizard. The Federal Reserve isn't a wizard for one particular reason that it doesn't want anybody to know – and that is that the Fed doesn't lead the financial markets, it follows them.

People everywhere want to believe in the Fed's wizardry. But all this talk about how the Fed will be able to help the U.S. economy and hold up the markets by cutting rates now is as much hooey as the Wizard of Oz promising Dorothy, the Scarecrow, the Tin Man and the Cowardly Lion that he could give them what they wanted: a return to Kansas, a brain, a heart, and courage. Because when the Fed does do something, it always comes after the markets have already made their moves.

If you don't believe it, you should look at one chart from the most recent Elliott Wave Financial Forecast. It compares the movements in the Fed Funds rate with the movements of the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill Yield. What does it reveal? That the Fed has followed the T-Bill yield up and down every step of the way since 2000. And the interesting question becomes this: Since the T-bill yield has dropped nearly two points since February, how soon will the Fed cut its rate to follow the market's lead this time?

[Editor's note: You can see this chart and read the Special Section it appears in by accessing the free report, The Unwonderful Wizardry of the Fed.]

We've got our own brains, heart and courage here at Elliott Wave International, and we've used them to explain over and over again that putting faith in the Fed to turn around the markets and the economy is blind faith indeed.

"This blind faith in the Fed's power to hold up the economy and stocks epitomizes the following definition of magic offered by Teller of the illusionist and comedy team of Penn and Teller: a 'theatrical linking of a cause with an effect that has no basis in physical reality, but that – in our hearts – ought to be.'" [September 2007, The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast]

Because, you see, what makes the markets move has less to do with what the unwizardly Fed does and more with changes in the mass psychology of all the people investing in those markets. The Elliott Wave Principle describes how bullish and bearish trends in the financial markets reflect changes in social mood, from positive to negative and back again. To extend the metaphor: The Fed can't affect social mood anymore than the Wonderful Wizard of Oz could change the direction of the wind that brought his hot air balloon to the Land of Oz in the first place.

As our EWI analysts write, "With respect to the timing of the Federal Reserve Board rate cuts, we need to reiterate one key point. The market, not the Fed, sets rates." Being able to understand this information puts you one step closer to clicking your ruby red shoes together and whispering those magic words: "There's no place like home." Once you land back in Kansas, your eyes will open, and you will see that an unwarranted faith in the Fed was just a bad dream.

Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com.