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Elliott
Wave Theory
Elliott Wave Theory interprets market actions in terms of recurrent
price structures obedient to the Fibonacci sequence. Basically, Market cycles are composed of two major types
of Wave : Impulse Wave and Corrective Wave. For every impulse wave, it
can be sub-divided into 5 - wave structure (1-2-3-4-5), while for corrective
wave, it can be sub-divided into 3 - wave structures (a-b-c).
Surfer's
Waves within Wave
An important feature of Elliott Wave is that they are fractal in nature.
'Fractal' means market structure are built from similar patterns on a larger
or smaller scales. Therefore, we can count the wave on a long-term yearly
market chart as well as short-term hourly market chart.
See waves within wave:
Rules for Wave Count
Based on the market pattern, we can identify ' where we are' in term of
wave count. Nevertheless, as the market pattern is relatively simplistic,
there are several rules for valid counts:
-
Wave 2 should not break below the beginning of Wave 1;
-
Wave 3 should not be the shortest wave among Wave 1, 3 and 5;
-
Wave 4 should not overlap with Wave 1, except for wave 1, 5, a or c of
a higher degree.
-
Rule of Alternation : Wave 2 and 4 should unfold in two different wave
forms.
Wave forms in Impulse Wave
There are three major types of wave form in Impulse Wave:
(a) Extended Wave
Among Wave 1, 3 and 5, only one should unfolded into extended wave. 'Extension'
means the wave is elongated in nature and sub-waves are conspicuous in
relation to waves of higher degree.
See extension pattern:
(b) Diagonal Triangle at Wave 5
Sometimes, the momentum at Wave 5 is so weak that the 2nd and 4th sub-waves
overlap with each other and evolved into diagonal triangle.
(c) 5th Wave Failure
In some other circumstances, the Wave 5 is so weak than it even cannot
surpass the top of the wave 3, causing a double top at the end of the trend.
See diagonal triangle and failure fifth pattern:
Wave Forms in Corrective Wave
Corrective Wave forms are rather complicated, but basically we can categorize
them into six major wave forms:
-
Zig-Zag : abc pattern composed of 5-3-5 sub-wave structure.
-
Flat : abc pattern composed of 3-3-5 sub-wave structure, with b
equals a.
-
Irregular : abc pattern composed of 3-3-5 sub-wave structure, with
b longer than a.
-
Horizontal Triangle : 5-wave triangular pattern composed of 3-3-3-3-3
sub-wave structure.
-
Double Three : abcxabc pattern composed of any two from above, linked
by x wave.
-
Triple Three : abcxabcxabc pattern composed of any three from above,
linked by two x waves.
See Six Corrective patterns:
Conclusion
The attractiveness of Elliott Wave Analysis is : Three impulse wave forms
and six corrective wave forms are conclusive. All we have to do is to identify
which wave form is going to unfold in order to predict future market actions.
This is a bold statement, needless to say, knowledge of market historical
wave patterns and experiences in wave count are of paramount importance.
Please read
disclaimer
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Does Gold Always Go Up in Recessions and Depressions?
June 4, 2009
By Robert Prechter, CMT
The following article is adapted from a brand-new eBook on gold and
silver published by Robert Prechter, founder and CEO of the technical
analysis and research firm Elliott Wave International. For the rest of
this revealing 40-page eBook,
download it for free here.
I have often read, “Gold always goes up in recessions and depressions.”
Is it true? Should you own gold because you think the economy is tanking?
Whenever we hear some claim like this, we always do the same thing: We
look at the data.
The first thing to point out is that gold did not make a nickel of U.S.
money for anyone in any of the recessions and depressions from 1792, when
the gold-based dollar was adopted, through 1969, a period of 177 years.
Well, to be precise, there was a change in the valuation in 1900, when
Congress changed the dollar’s value from 24.75 grains of gold, the amount
established in 1792, to 23.22 grains, a devaluation of just six percent
total over 108 years. The government did raise the fixed price from
$20.67/oz. to $35/oz. in 1934, but that action occurred during an economic
expansion, not during the Depression. In 1968, gold finally began trading
away from the government’s fixed price. Even then, it slipped to a lower
price of $34.95 on January 16 and 19, 1970. So the idea that gold always
goes up in recessions and depressions is already shown to be wrong. It did
not go up in terms of dollars in any of the (estimated) 35 recessions or
three depressions during that period.
What almost always does happen during economic contractions is that the
value of whatever people use as money goes up as prices for goods and
services fall. When gold is used as money, its value in terms of goods and
services goes up. But gold can’t go up in dollar terms when gold and
dollars are equated. So no one “makes money” holding gold under these
conditions. It is a fine point: What tends to go up relative to goods and
services during economic contractions is money, and when gold is
officially money, that’s how it behaves. What we want to know is how gold
behaves in recessions and depressions when it is not officially
accepted as money.
Many gold bugs say that because gold was a good investment during the
Great Depression, it is a “deflation hedge.” We addressed this topic in
At the Crest of a Tidal Wave (1995, p.357) and Conquer the
Crash (2002, pp. 208-209). At the time, government fixed gold’s
price, so it didn’t go up or down relative to dollars. Gold was a haven
during that time, the same as the dollar was, since they were equated by
law. But gold served as a haven because its price was fixed while
everything else was crashing in price during the period of deflation. Gold
bugs like to claim that gold would have gone up during that period had it
not been fixed, but the crashing dollar prices for all other things
suggest that in a free market gold, too, would have fallen. It would have
fallen, however, from a higher level given the inflation of 1914-1929
following the creation of the Fed. So gold became worth more in dollar
terms than it was in 1913, which is why it began flowing out of the
country. In 1934, the government finally recognized the new reality by
raising gold’s fixed price. Since 1970, markets have been in a large
version of 1914-1930, except that gold has been allowed to float, so we
can clearly see its inflation-related, pre-depression gains.
Observe that gold’s price remained the same for a Fibonacci 21 years after
the Fed was created in 1913; it was revalued in 1934. [Ed. Note: For a
full chapter on Fibonacci time considerations for gold,
download the 40-page Gold and Silver eBook.] Then it held that
value for 35 (a Fibonacci 34 + 1) years, through 1969. So aside from the
revaluation of 1934, the inability to make money holding gold during
recessions, depressions, or any time at all save for the day of the
revaluation in 1934 held fast for 56 (a Fibonacci 55 + 1) years following
the creation of the Fed. So even after Congress created the central bank,
no one made money holding gold in a recession or depression for two
generations.
In 1970, things changed dramatically. Investors lost interest in stocks
and preferred owning gold instead, for a period of ten years. The same
change occurred again in 2001, and so far it has lasted seven years. But,
as we will see, recession had nothing to do with either of these periods
of explosive price gain in the precious metals.
The period of time one chooses to collect data can make a huge difference
to the outcome of a statistical study. If we were to show the entire track
record from 1792, gold would show almost no movement on average during
economic contractions. If we were to take only 1969 to the present, it
would show much more fluctuation. To give a fairly balanced picture,
combining some history with the entire modern, wild-gold era, I asked my
colleague Dave Allman to compile statistics beginning at the end of World
War II. This is what most economists do, because they believe “modern
finance” began at that time and that things have been “normal” since then.
It’s also when many data series begin. So our study fits the norm that
most economists use. It also provides results entirely from the Fed era,
making it relevant to current structural conditions.
[Ed. note: To study the six tables revealing gold's performance record vs.
stocks and T-notes since WWII,
download the 40-page Gold and Silver eBook.]
Table 1 shows the performance of gold during the 11 officially recognized
recessions beginning in 1945. Although one could make a case for different
start times, we took the 15th of the starting month and the 15th of the
ending month as times to record the price of gold. The results speak for
themselves. Even though it is accepted throughout most of the gold-bug
community that gold rises in bad economic times, Table 1 shows that such
is not the case.
The only reason that the average gain for gold shows a positive number at
all is that gold rose significantly during one of these recessions, that
of 11/73-3/75. The average gain for all ten of the other recessions is
0.16 percent, almost exactly zero. The median for all 11 recessions is
also zero. If we omit the five recessions during which the price of gold
was fixed, the median gain is 3.09 percent.
For long-term forecasts and more in-depth, historical analysis for
precious metals, including the six revealing tables mentioned in this
article,
download Prechter’s FREE 40-page eBook on Gold and Silver.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Bob Prechter: Gold is Still Money
May 29, 2009
By Robert Prechter, CMT
The following article is excerpted from a brand-new eBook on gold and
silver published by Robert Prechter, founder and CEO of the technical
analysis and research firm Elliott Wave International. For the rest of
this fascinating 40-page eBook,
download it for free here.
Have you ever traveled abroad and taken a look at the local currency
and wondered how the citizens of that country could take seriously what
looks like “Monopoly money?” I’ve got news for you: You’re using the same
stuff. Monopoly money is the money over which some government has a
monopoly. It is the currency of the realm only because the state makes it
illegal to use any other type.
Promissory notes issued by a state and declared the only legal tender
are always doomed to depreciate to worthlessness because of the natural
incentives and forces associated with governments. A state cannot resist a
method of confiscating assets, particularly one that is hidden from the
view of most voters and subjects. By extension, it is unreasonable to
advocate a standard for such notes, which is simply a state’s promise that
its currency will always be redeemable in a specific amount of something
valuable, such as gold. A gold standard of this type is only as
good as the political promises behind it, reducing its value to no more
than that of paper. It could be argued, in fact, that a state-sponsored
gold standard is far more dangerous than none at all, as it imbues
citizens with a false sense of security. Their long range plans are thus
built upon an unreliable promise that the monetary measuring unit will
remain stable. Later, when the government’s “IOU-something specific”
becomes, as Colonel E.C. Harwood put it, “IOU nothing in particular,”
reliability disappears and the arbitrary reigns. Although the populace
tends to retain its confidence in the currency for awhile thereafter, the
ultimate result is chaos.
The only sound monetary system is a voluntary one. The free market
always chooses the best possible form, or forms, of money. To date, the
market’s choice throughout the centuries, wherever a free market for money
has existed, has been and remains precious metal and currency redeemable
in precious metal. This preference will undoubtedly remain until a better
form of money is discovered and chosen. Until then, prices for goods and
services should be denominated not in state fictions such as dollars or
yen or francs, but in specific weights of today’s preferred monetary
metal, i.e., in grams of gold. Anyone might issue promissory notes as
currency, but the acceptance of such paper certificates would then be an
individual decision, and risks of loss through imprudence or dishonesty
would be borne by only a few individuals by their own conscious choice
after considering the risks. Critical to the understanding of the wisdom
of such a system is the knowledge that private issuers of paper against
gold have every long run incentive to provide a sound product, just as do
producers of any product. As a result, risks would be minimal, as the
market would provide its own policing. Thievery and imprudence will not
disappear among men, but at least such tendencies in a free market for
money would not have the potential to be institutionalized, as they are
when a state controls the currency. From a macroeconomic viewpoint,
occasional losses resulting from dishonesty or imprudence would be
extremely limited in scope, as opposed to the nationwide disasters that
state controlled paper money has facilitated throughout history, which
have in turn had global repercussions. As Elliott Wave Principle
put it, “That paper is no substitute for gold as a store of value is
probably another of nature’s laws.”
That being said, it is also true, and crucial to wise investing, that
markets come in both “bull” and “bear” types. Being a “gold bug” at the
wrong time can be very costly in currency terms. For nearly three decades,
gold and silver’s dollar price trends have confounded the precious metals
enthusiasts, who for the entire period have argued that soaring gold and
silver prices were “just around the corner” because the Fed’s policies
“guarantee runaway inflation.” Yet today, 29 years after the January 1980
peaks in these metals and despite consistent inflation throughout this
time, their combined dollar value (weighting each metal equally) is still
40 percent less than it was then.
It is all well and good to despise fiat money, but it is hardly useful
to sit in gold and silver as if no other opportunities exist. In contrast
to the one-note approach, which has had an immense opportunity cost since
1980, competent market analysis can help you make many timely and
profitable financial decisions in all markets, including gold and silver.
For more in-depth, historical analysis and long-term forecasts for
precious metals,
download Prechter’s FREE 40-page eBook on Gold and Silver.
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|

Think That Central Banks Move the Markets? Think Again
April 23, 2009
By Mark Galasiewski
The following is excerpted from Elliott Wave International’s Global
Market Perspective. The full 120-page publication, which features
forecasts for every major world market, is available free until April 30.
Visit Elliott Wave International to download it free.
Conventional wisdom says that central banks can influence or even
direct financial markets and the macroeconomy. The very existence of
Elliott waves challenges such assumptions. For if markets responded to
every central bank directive, how could Elliott waves exist? Parallel
trend channels, Fibonacci price relationships, the similarity of form
between waves of different sizes and time periods—none of that would be
possible. Central bank decisions would have to coincide perfectly with
turning points in Elliott waves, and we know that just doesn’t happen. But
even without using waves, we can expose the conventional wisdom for the
fallacy that it is.
Take, for example, this assertion in a recent article in a U.K.
economic weekly: “Part of the aim of central banks in driving down
interest rates is to encourage a greater risk appetite among investors.”
Two key assumptions underlie that statement: a) central banks determine
interest rates; and b) lower interest rates can increase society’s
appetite for risk.
To see how the first assumption is false, let’s take a look at the
daily chart of Australian interest rate data. It duplicates a study that
Elliott Wave International has often done with U.S. interest rate data. It
shows how movements in the cash target rate set by Australia’s central
bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), appear to follow those in
3-month Australian Treasury Bills. After decisive moves up in T-bills from
2006 to early 2008, for example, the RBA faithfully raised its target.
T-bills have since led the RBA during the financial crisis of the past
year. In fact, the record indicates that the RBA almost always follows
T-bills over time.

The proper conclusion to draw is not that the RBA has orchestrated the
decline in rates since the early 1980s—but that it’s been riding it.
During good times, central bankers look like geniuses; during bad times,
they get tarred and feathered. Closer to the truth is that their
interest-rate decisions are not proactive, but reactive, and that they
continually follow in the footsteps of the market for lack of any other
useful guide.
Now let’s look at the second assumption: that lower interest rates
increase society’s appetite for risk. A simple glance at the weekly chart
shows this assumption to be false. After the 1987 crash, the ASX All
Ordinaries actually rallied for two years on rising rates and then sold
off through 1990 on falling rates. Stocks then rose in 1991 on continued
falling rates and sold off in 1992 on even lower rates. Continue following
the chart to the right and you will see that there is no consistent
correlation between the direction of interest rates and that of the stock
market.

The myth of central bank potency is so pervasive that conventional
analysts can’t even imagine a better explanation for price trends: that
the market is the dog wagging its central bank tail, not the other way
around.
For more information, download Elliott Wave International’s
FREE issue of Global Market Perspective, available until April 30. The
120-page publication covers every major world market, global interest
rates, international currencies, metals, energy and more.
Mark Galasiewski is the editor of Elliott Wave International’s
Asian Financial Forecast and member of EWI’s Global Market
Perspective team covering Asian stock indexes.
|

Bob Prechter on Silver & Gold
April 2, 2009
By Nico Issac
In case you hadn't noticed: Over the past year of financial turmoil,
the "safe haven" premium of precious metals has offered about as much
support as a rubber ducky in a tsunami. Despite a string of powerful
rallies, silver and gold remain well below their March 2008 peaks.
It goes without saying that the greatest opportunities in precious
metals were not had by those who played the "disaster hedge" card; but
rather by those who timed the trends as they developed, regardless of the
fundamental backdrop.
Bob Prechter is in the latter group. Amidst the buzz and whirl of the
most bullish backdrop in precious metals' recent history, gold and silver
prices soared to new, all-time highs and calls for a "New Gold Rush" and
"$30 Silver" flooded the mainstream airwaves. Yet Bob alerted subscribers
to an approaching top in the March 14, 2008 Elliott Wave Theorist.
"The wave count [in silver] is nearly satisfied, though ideally
it should end after one more new high. If this analysis is accurate, and
silver does peak and begin a bear market, gold is likely to go down with
it."
In the days that followed, prices in both metals fell off a cliff. In
turn, Bob was asked to address his exceptional call for a turn down in a
March 19, 2008 Bloomberg interview. Here are of
excerpts from that conversation:
Bloomberg: "Why did you put out that call on Friday (March 14)
about a peak in precious metals?"
Editor’s Note: You can download Bob Prechter’s 5-page report,
Gold & Recessions, free from Elliott Wave International. It features
63 years of historical analysis that reveals how gold, T-notes, and the
DJIA have performed in recessions and expansions.
Bob Prechter: "One of the reasons is that it seemed like an
absolutely sure thing. We track several indicators of sentiment. One of
them is the Daily Sentiment Index (DSI). That reached 98% bulls on a
one-day basis going into this last high. We were tracking silver as well…
as it is clearest in our minds. Now, at the time, we needed one more
slightly new high. That happened Monday morning and silver dropped 15% in
48 hours. That's a heck of a reversal and I think it's real."
"Real" indeed: From their March peaks, gold prices plummeted 34%,
alongside a 60% sell-off in silver before hitting the breaks in October.
Here, the October 2008 Elliott Wave Financial Forecast prepared
for a corrective rebound and wrote:
"Silver traced out a five-wave decline from its March peak…Gold
should also rally as silver pushes higher. Once silver's rise is
exhausted (initial target: $15.15), the larger downtrend should resume
for both metals."
A powerful, four-month bounce ensued in both metals: Gold prices came
within kissing distance of its March peak before turning down on February
20; silver followed suit -- a fulfillment of this bearish, near-term
insight presented in the February 23 Elliott Wave Theorist:
"Silver has been clear as a bell. Silver is due to turn back
down, and gold, which is back at $1000/oz, is likely to follow."
Since then, it's been a steady march lower for both metals. Obviously,
EWI's forecasts do not always prove this accurate. Yet in this case the
analysis speaks for itself.
For more metals analysis from Bob Prechter, download
Gold & Recessions a free 5-page report from Elliott
Wave International. It features 63 years of historical analysis that
reveals how gold, T-notes, and the DJIA have performed in recessions and
expansions.
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Key To Trading Success: Ignore Nature's Laws?
March 25, 2009
The following is excerpted from Robert Prechter’s
Independent Investor eBook. The 75-page eBook is a compilation of some
of the New York Times bestselling author’s writings that challenge
conventional financial market assumptions.
Visit Elliott Wave International to download the eBook, free.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
…The natural tendency of people to apply physics to finance explains
why successful traders are so rare and why they are so immensely rewarded
for their skills. There is no such thing as a “born trader” because people
are born — or learn very early — to respect the laws of physics. This
respect is so strong that they apply these laws even in inappropriate
situations. Most people who follow the market closely act as if the market
is a physical force aimed at their heads. Buying during rallies and
selling during declines is akin to ducking when a rock is hurtling toward
you.
Successful traders learn to do something that almost no one else can
do. They sell near the emotional extreme of a rally and buy near the
emotional extreme of a decline. The mental discipline that a successful
trader shows in buying low and selling high is akin to that of a person
who sees a rock thrown at his head and refuses to duck. He thinks, I’m
betting that the rock will veer away at the last moment, of its own
accord. In this endeavor, he must ignore the laws of physics to which his
mind naturally defaults. In the physical world, this would be insane
behavior; in finance, it makes him rich.
Unfortunately, sometimes the rock does not veer. It hits the trader in
the head. All he has to rely upon is percentages. He knows from long study
that most of the time, the rock coming at him will veer away, but he also
must take the consequences when it doesn’t. The emotional fortitude
required to stand in the way of a hurtling stone when you might get hurt
is immense, and few people possess it. It is, of course, a great paradox
that people who can’t perform this feat get hurt over and over in
financial markets and endure a serious stoning, sometimes to death. Many
great truths about life are paradoxical, and so is this one.
For more information, download Robert Prechter’s free
Independent Investor eBook. The 75-page resource teaches investors to
think independently by challenging conventional financial market
assumptions.
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Are We Near a Low in the Stock Decline?
Two Unique Charts Reveal the Answer
March 19, 2009
Robert Prechter, New York Times best-selling author and renowned market
analyst, was recently asked to present his thoughts on the real estate
market and the financial crisis to the Georgia Legislature. The following
article has been adapted from the transcript. Elliott Wave International
has made the
full presentation available free, including the full transcript and
30-minute online video.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
I'd like to try to answer a question: “Are we near a low in the stock
decline?” Because in these times when stocks and real estate are declining
together, they tend to bottom roughly together as well. So I want to take
a minute and look at a valuation chart for the stock market.

What we have here on the “X” axis is the bond yield/stock yield ratio
for the S&P 400 companies. Sounds fancy, but all it means is that the
further you go out to the right, the less companies are paying in
dividends compared to what they are paying on their IOUs—on their bonds.
On the “Y” axis we have stock prices relative to book value. Book value is
roughly equivalent to liquidation value, in other words, if you went and
sold all the assets on the open market. When stocks get expensive, prices
tend to rise relative to book value, and dividends tend to fall relative
to the cost of borrowing. Why does that happen? At such times, people
don't really care about dividends because they think they are going to get
rich on capital gains. So dividend payout falls, and stocks get more
expensive.
The small square boxes indicate year-end figures. The large box is a
general area that has contained values for the stock market for most of
the years of the 20th century. We had a few outliers: 1928 and August
1987, which preceded crashes in the stock market. And of course stocks
were really cheap in the early '30s and again in 1941. If you are really
astute, you have noticed something about this chart, which is that I've
left off some of the data. It ends in 1990. What happened in the past two
decades? Now I'm going to show you same chart but with the data from the
last two decades on it. The March 2000 reading we call Pluto. Real estate
wasn't so bad; I think it only got to about Neptune. But the stock market
reached Pluto in March of 2000 in terms of the bond yield/stock yield
ratio and the price multiple of the underlying values of companies. That's
going to take quite awhile to retrace.

I've also plotted the reading for November 2008. The market has made
quite a trek back toward normal valuations, but if you look at these
multiples in terms of book value, we are at 4 times. It has to go down to
2 times to get back into the box, and we are getting there on the bond
yield/stock yield ratio which means that the dividend payout is rising
somewhat to catch up with borrowing costs. And because the S&P is down
45%, of course, the dividend payout as a percentage has gone up. But there
is a problem there. If you're reading the newspapers, you know that
companies have been cutting dividends. In fact, they've been cutting them
at the fastest rate in half a century. So it is going to be difficult for
values to get back to a normal valuation range. So the stock market has
quite a bit lower to go in order to catch up with normal values, and this
suggests that real estate may have the same sort of trend going on.
For more information,
access Robert Prechter's full presentation to the Georgia Legislature,
free from Elliott Wave International. It expands on the excerpt above with
the full transcript, a 30- minute online video, and 12 additional charts
and figures.
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
6 Questions You Should Be Asking About the Financial Crisis
(And 6 Must-Read Answers)
March 11, 2009
Elliott Wave International, the world’s largest market forecasting
firm, receives thousands of questions every year from web site visitors
and subscribers on their free
Message Board.
Here the company shares 6 of the recent critical questions on the
financial crisis and 6 answers provided by their professional analysts.
For more free questions and answers or to submit your own question,
visit
Elliott Wave International’s Message Board.
Q: Can increased government spending help stop the crisis?
What do you think about the new mortgage bailout plan – or bailouts and
proposals for additional government spending in general? The opinions on
whether or not this will ultimately work seem so divided...
Answer:
In Ch. 13 of his Conquer the Crash, “Can the Fed Stop Deflation?”, Bob
Prechter writes; quote: "Can the government spend our way out of deflation
and depression? Governments sometimes employ aspects of' 'fiscal policy,'
i.e., altering spending or taxing policies, to 'pump up' demand for goods
and services. Raising taxes for any reason would be harmful. Increasing
government spending (with or without raising taxes) simply transfers
wealth from savers to spenders, substituting a short-run stimulus for
long-run financial deterioration. Japan has used this approach for twelve
years, and it hasn’t worked. Slashing taxes absent government spending
cuts would be useless because the government would have to borrow the
difference. Cutting government spending is a good thing, but politics will
prevent its happening prior to a crisis. ... Prior excesses have resulted
in a lack of solutions to the deflation problem. Like the discomfort of
drug addiction withdrawal, the discomfort of credit addiction withdrawal
cannot be avoided. The time to have thought about avoiding a system-wide
deflation was years ago. Now it’s too late. It does not matter how it
happens; in the right psychological environment, deflation will win, at
least initially."
Q: In deflation, what's best: to have no debts or preserve
capital?
During a deflationary period, if you had to choose one or the other – debt
reduction or preservation of capital – which one is MOST important?
Answer:
In Ch. 29 of Conquer the Crash, "Calling in Loans and Paying off Debts,"
Elliott Wave International’s founder and president Bob Prechter writes;
quote: "Being debt-free means that you are freer, period. You don’t have
to sweat credit card payments. You don’t have to sweat home or auto
repossession or loss of your business. You don’t have to work 6 percent
more, or 10 percent more, or 18 percent more just to stay even. ...the
best mortgage is none at all. If you own your home outright and lose your
job, you will still have a residence." Of course, one could pay off some
debts AND keep some capital – it all depends on an individual's risk
appetite and tolerance.
Q: Which news and events can move the market and which can't?
I've noticed that a lot of times, the stock market does the opposite of
what the news suggests it should do – or does nothing at all. Can you make
a distinction, if there is one, between news that does not move the market
and the news that does? I'm talking specifically about the news and
anticipation of another bailout plan plus stimulus package that is
supposedly rallying U.S. stocks right now.
Answer:
The subject of the news is almost irrelevant. What IS relevant is the
state of investors' collective mood at the time of the news release. If
they feel bullish (or bearish), they will interpret just about any news
story as bullish (or bearish) too. (Or "dismiss the news," as financial
commentators often put it.) If you need a good example, just compare the
February 6 horrific U.S. jobs report with that day's rally in the DJIA.
Or, contrast the February 10 passage of the "$838 Billion Economic
Stimulus Package" with a 300+ drop on the Dow. The important thing to keep
in mind is that while the news can cause short-term price spikes, it has
no effect on the longer-term trend; only social mood does.
Q: If this deflation deepens, will the US dollar crash?
Bob Prechter’s Conquer the Crash and your monthly publications like Bob’s
Elliott Wave Theorist, you've been saying that in deflation, "cash is
king" as the value of the dollar rises. But won't the U.S. government's
spending spree cause the dollar to crash instead against the euro and
other currencies?
Answer:
It's very important to make a distinction between the dollar's domestic
and international values. In a deflation, the value of any currency – the
U.S. dollar, in this case – rises domestically: As asset prices fall, each
unit of currency buys more domestically-available goods and services.
"Cash is the only asset that assuredly rises in value during deflation." –
Bob Prechter, Conquer the Crash, Ch. 18. However, the USD's international
value (as represented by the U.S. Dollar Index) in a deflation can rise OR
fall relative to other currencies. If, for instance, the euro is deflating
faster than the dollar, then the dollar's value relative to the euro will
rise, and vice versa.
Q: Won't government bailouts turn deflation into inflation?
Trillions of dollars in bailouts "injected" into the economy – won't they
reverse deflation and turn it into inflation instead?
Answer:
Here is a quote from Bob Prechter’s October 2008 Elliott Wave Theorist:
"Believers in perpetual inflation think that the government can keep
assuming others’ bad debts infinitely. But it can’t. The only reason that
Congress has gotten away with issuing this latest blizzard of new IOUs is
that society is still near the top of a Grand Supercycle, so optimism and
confidence still have the upper hand. But as pessimism and skepticism
continue to wax and the economy contracts, the bond market will figure out
that the Treasury will be unable to fund all these obligations with tax
collections. Then Treasury bond prices will begin falling as if they were
sub-prime mortgages. A collapsing bond market is deflation; it is a
contraction of the outstanding credit supply. Recent bailout schemes will
not reverse the deflationary freight train. They will serve only to
confuse the marketplace and hinder the efficient retirement of bad debts,
thus exacerbating the crisis and aggravating investors’ uncertainties and
thereby falling right in line with the declining trend of social mood."
Q: When will recession end – and DEPRESSION begin?
When do you think the economic DEPRESSION will officially begin?
Answer:
It took mainstream economists over a year to recognize the "official"
start of the recession! Because a depression is a much bigger and rarer
event, the delay with its "official" recognition will likely be even
greater. Not to mention the fact that, interestingly, there is no
"official" definition of a depression; even if there were one, ours here
at Elliott Wave International would probably differ. Rest assured, though:
We intend to update subscribers on any "progress" in that direction.
To read 30+ additional questions and answers on the financial crisis,
investing, capital safety and more,
visit Elliott Wave International’s free Message Board.
Elliott
Wave International (EWI) is the world’s largest market forecasting firm.
EWI’s 20-plus analysts provide around-the-clock forecasts of every major
market in the world via the internet and proprietary web systems like
Reuters and Bloomberg. EWI’s educational services include conferences,
workshops, webinars, video tapes, special reports, books and one of the
internet’s richest free content programs, Club EWI.
|
How To Tell a Good Forecast from a Bad One
March 5, 2009
Here's a forecast for you. Clear and direct. As quoted by a Reuters
reporter in his January 15, 2009, article, entitled, "Global Lending Thaw
May Yet Return to Deep Freeze."
"'This is a temporary respite and when it's over, the stock market
will make new lows...,' says Robert Prechter, chief executive officer at
research company Elliott Wave International in Gainesville, Georgia."
[Reuters, 1/15/09]
But there are lots of forecasts out there – for the economy, for the
Dow, for the price of oil, for the chances of the Boston Celtics repeating
as NBA champions – so the question arises, how can you tell a good
forecast from a bad one?
Bob Prechter addressed that very question with another reporter in a
Q&A originally published in the book, Prechter's Perspective.
Editor’s Note: For more market insights from Bob Prechter, visit
Elliott Wave International to
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook,
part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.
The following text was originally published in Robert Prechter’s 2004
bestselling book, Prechter’s Perspective.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
Q: In general, is there any way for a person to tell a good
forecast from a bad one?
Bob Prechter: There is a subtle way to tell a potentially
useful forecast from a useless one. Most published forecasts are at best
descriptions of what already has happened. I never give any forecast a
second thought unless it addresses the question of the point at which a
change in trend may occur.
As an example outside the financial markets: a sportswriter for the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution published his ratings (scale 1-5) for each of
the players on the Atlanta Braves baseball team as a forecast of how they
would perform in 1984. At the start of the season, he rated 1983's Most
Valuable Player a "5," Atlanta's slugger a "4," and the right fielder a
lowly "2" due to bad performance in 1983 following two excellent years.
Later in 1984, the MVP was batting only .215, and the slugger was batting
a dismal .179, while the lowest-rated player, the right fielder, had hit 8
home runs and led the team in batting average and RBIs.
The point is not that the sportswriter was wrong in his predictions. The
point is that he didn't make any predictions,
even though he thought he did and said he did. He was merely rating the
1983 Braves in retrospect. He ignored possible bases upon which to
forecast the 1984 season, things like motivation, new developments or
events in a player's life, cyclic changes in playing success, etc. As with
most forecasts, these things weren't even considered.
Read forecasts carefully. If they are mild-mannered extrapolations of a
recent trend, it's probably the best policy to toss them aside and go
search for something potentially useful.
Q: Obviously, the same holds true in finance.
Bob Prechter: All the time. When economists say, as they
so often do, that they see "no reason to expect anything different" from
the recent past, they mean it from the bottom of their knowledge. The
linear projections they typically employ result in logic such as that
expressed by an economist in a national newspaper, who said, "This rising
consumer confidence is good news for the economy. Rising confidence spurs
the economy, and the pickup in the economy then serves to heighten
confidence." By this line of reasoning, no change of direction could ever
occur. That's why, absent other knowledge, the only forecasts even worth
your time considering are those that predict a change. Not
because the forecaster is certain to be right, but because it shows that
he is thinking and perhaps employing a tool that can anticipate trends.
Q: So the word "prediction" doesn't necessarily apply to the
future!
Bob Prechter: Right. And it's those predictions about the
future that are the tough ones. That's why economists stick to predicting
the past, which is a crafty solution. It leads to misery among the people
who follow them, but it doesn't seem to affect economists' jobs, so it
certainly keeps them happy!
Q: Do you think that predicting the economy is possible?
Bob Prechter: It is not only possible, it is downright
easy compared with predicting the stock market. One economist has gotten a
lot of chuckles by saying that the stock market has predicted something
like 19 of the last 13 recessions. However, that is only a reasonable
statement if you believe that a certain rigid definition of a recession is
the only one that is viable. In fact, if you look at the ebb and flow of
economic activity and generally realize that it lags stock market activity
of between 0 and 12 months, you will find that there is no better single
indicator of what the economy is going to do than the stock market. Not
only that, but even 19 out of 13 is infinitely better than any economist
has ever done.
……….
For more on deflation,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook
or browse various deflation topics like those below at
www.elliottwave.com/deflation.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's
foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is
the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street
best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
A Better Way To Handle a Shrinking Business
February 26, 2009
This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market
analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of
the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive
it,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook,
part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.
The following text was originally published in Robert Prechter’s
February 2009
Elliott Wave Theorist
By Robert Prechter, CMT
During depressions, many businesses make a fatal mistake: They lay off
employees. Some businesses have no choice; if the product or service is
related more to quantity than quality, then perhaps there is no
alternative. But many businesses are far better served by keeping their
employees and reducing compensation. That way, they can continue to serve
customers with full quality and stand ready to lead the competition when
the next economic expansion arrives.
Surely most employees would rather endure an across-the-board salary
cut than risk being laid off. In the 1930s, General Electric polled its
workers on this very question, and the majority agreed that they would
rather endure salary reductions. A few years later, when the economy
recovered, GE had all of its employees in place and did not have to spend
years recruiting new people. It shot out of the gate in full operating
mode.
Moreover, the company had made progress improving designs and making plans
during the lull. When business picked up, so did salaries. In the end, it
was win-win for everyone.
Take, for example, a news service that needs to reduce costs. Instead
of cutting staff by 50 percent, thereby forcing a radical reduction in the
scope of the news coverage, it would make more sense to cut salaries by 50
percent and retain full service. If lowering the price of the service
would keep the subscriber, viewer or listener base steady, or if reducing
the cost of advertising would keep the support base steady, it would be
better to make one of those moves rather than cutting staff. Either
program would maintain quality and serve to keep the service in the
forefront among news providers. Inflexible competitors would go out of
business, thereby helping the survivors.
If an airline is in trouble, it should not cut routes and service while
holding prices and salaries up. It should cut salaries and prices and
continue serving the highest possible number of customers. That way, it
will be the carrier of choice for many fliers when the economy returns to
expansion mode. Again, everyone wins, including the employees.
This idea would work well for any business that does not have long-term
contracts – such as with labor unions or high-level employees –
guaranteeing salaries. Even in such a case, negotiating reductions would
be smarter than going bankrupt.
This approach could work for many kinds of businesses: airlines,
manufacturers, newspapers, shippers and sports teams, to name a few. If
you work for a business for which this plan would serve, mention it to
those in management. Even they would probably prefer a reduction in income
to none at all.
Reducing salaries has another benefit, which is that fewer people would
go to the state for “unemployment benefits,” reducing the strain on state
budgets and taxpayers. If your business would operate better with all its
employees, consider a company-wide salary reduction as opposed to layoffs.
……….
For more on deflation,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook
or browse various deflation topics like those below at
www.elliottwave.com/deflation.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's
foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is
the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street
best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
The Last Bastion Against Deflation: The Federal Government
February 19, 2009
This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market
analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of
the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive
it,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook,
part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.
The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW
Deflation Survival eBook, a free 60-page compilation of Prechter’s
most important teachings and warnings about deflation.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
Now that the downward portion of the credit cycle is firmly in force,
further inflation is impossible. But there is one entity left that can try
to stave off deflation: the federal government.
The ultimate source of all the bad credit in the U.S. financial system
is Congress. Congress created the Federal Reserve System and many
privileged lending corporations: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae,
Sallie Mae, the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal Home Loan
Banks, to name a few. The August issue [of The Elliott Wave Theorist]
cited our estimate that the mortgage-encouraging entities that Congress
created account for 75 percent of all U.S. debt creation with respect to
housing. For investors in mortgage (in)securities, the ratio is even
greater. Recent reports show that these agencies, which have been stealing
people blind by taking interest for nothing, account for a stunning 82
percent of all securitized mortgage debt. Roughly speaking, the government
directly encouraged the indebtedness of four out of five home-related
borrowers. As noted in the August issue, it indirectly encouraged the rest
through the Fed’s lending to banks and the FDIC’s guarantee of bank
deposits. These policies allowed borrowers to drive up house prices to
absurd levels, making them unaffordable to people who wanted to buy them
with actual money. Proof that these mortgages are artificial and the
product of something other than a free market is the fact that while
Germany, for example, has issued mortgage-backed securities with a value
equal to 0.2 percent of its annual GDP, the U.S. has issued them so
ferociously that their value has reached 49.6 percent of annual GDP, a
multiple of 250 times Germany’s rate, and that is not in total value but
only in value relative to the U.S.’s much larger GDP. (Statistics courtesy
of the British Treasury.)
Well, the ultimate source of this seemingly risk-free credit still
exists, at least for now. When Bernanke & Co. met in the back rooms of the
White House in recent weekends, he must have said this: “Boys, we’re
nearly out of ammo. We have $400b. of credit left to lend, and we have two
percentage points lower to go in interest rates. The only way to stave off
deflation is for you to guarantee all the bad debts in the system.” So
far, government has leapt to oblige. One of its representatives strode to
the podium to declare that it would pledge the future production of the
American taxpayer in order to trade, in essence, all the bad IOUs held by
speculators in Fannie and Freddie’s mortgages for gilt-edged, freshly
stamped U.S. Treasury bonds.
Now, what exactly does that mean for deflation? This latest extension
of the decades-long debt-creation scheme has essentially exchanged bad
IOUs for T-bonds. This move does not create inflation, but it is an
attempt to stop deflation. Instead of becoming worthless wallpaper and
20-cents-on-the-dollar pieces of paper, these IOUs have, through the flap
of a jaw, maintained their full, 100 percent liability. This means that
the credit supply attending all these mortgages, which was in the process
of collapsing, has ballooned right back up to its former level.
You might think this shift of liability is a magic potion to stave off
deflation. But it’s not.
Believers in perpetual inflation will ask, “What’s to stop the U.S.
government from simply adopting all bad debts, keeping the credit bubble
inflated?” Answer: The U.S. government’s IOUs have a price, an interest
rate and a safety rating. Just as mortgage prices, rates and safety
ratings were under investors’ control, so they are for Treasuries.
Remember when Bill Clinton became outraged when he found out that “a bunch
of bond traders,” not politicians, determined the price of T-bonds and the
interest rates that the government must charge? If investors begin to fear
the government’s ability to pay interest and principal, they will move out
of Treasuries the way they moved out of mortgages. The American financial
system is too soaked with bad debt for a government bailout to work, and
the market won’t let politicians get away with assuming all the bad debts.
It may take some time for the market to figure out what to do about it,
but as always, there is no such thing as a free lunch. The only question
is who pays for it.
The Fed is nearly out of the picture, so the consortium of last resort,
the federal government, is assuming the job of propping up the debt
bubble. It is multiples bigger than any such entity that went before,
because it can draw on the liquidity of American taxpayers and
clandestinely steal value from American savers. So the question comes down
to this: Will the public put up with more financial exploitation? To date,
that’s exactly what it has done, but social mood has entered wave c of a
Supercycle-degree decline, and voters are likely to become far less
complacent, and more belligerent, than they have been for the past 76
years.
An early hint of the public’s reaction comes in the form of news
reports. In my lifetime, I can hardly remember times when the media
questioned benevolent-sounding actions of the government. Articles were
always about who the action would “help.” But many commentators have more
accurately reported on the latest bailout. USA Today’s headline reads,
“Taxpayers take on trillions of risk.” (9/8) This headline is stunning
because of its accuracy. When the government bailed out Chrysler, no
newspaper ran an equally accurate headline saying, “Congress assures
long-run bankruptcy for GM and Ford.” They all talked about why it was a
good thing. This time, realism and skepticism (at a later stage of the
cycle it will be cynicism and outrage) attend the bailout. The Wall Street
Journal’s “Market Watch” reports an overwhelmingly negative response among
emailers. Local newspapers’ “Letters” sections publish comments of dismay
and even outrage. CNBC’s Mark Haines, in an interview on 9/8 with MSNBC,
began by saying ironically, “Isn’t socialism great?” This breadth of
disgust is new, and it’s a reflection of emerging negative social mood.
Social mood trends arise from mental states and lead to social actions
and events. Deflation is a social event. Ultimately, social mood will
determine whether deflation occurs or not. When voters become angry
enough, Congressmen will stop flinging pork at all comers. Now the
automakers want a bailout. Voters have remained complacent about it so
far, but this benign attitude won’t last. The day the government
capitulates and announces that it can’t bail out everyone is the day
deflationary psychology will have won out.
……….
For more on deflation,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook
or browse various deflation topics like those below at
www.elliottwave.com/deflation.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's
foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is
the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street
best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
10 Things You Should and Should Not Do During Deflation
February 10, 2009
This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market
analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of
the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive
it,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook,
part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.
The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW
Deflation Survival eBook, a free 60-page compilation of Prechter’s
most important teachings and warnings about deflation.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
1) Should you invest in real estate?
Short Answer: NO
Long Answer: The worst thing about real estate is its lack of liquidity
during a bear market. At least in the stock market, when your stock is
down 60 percent and you realize you’ve made a horrendous mistake, you can
call your broker and get out (unless you’re a mutual fund, insurance
company or other institution with millions of shares, in which case,
you’re stuck). With real estate, you can’t pick up the phone and sell. You
need to find a buyer for your house in order to sell it. In a depression,
buyers just go away. Mom and Pop move in with the kids, or the kids move
in with Mom and Pop. People start living in their offices or moving their
offices into their living quarters. Businesses close down. In time, there
is a massive glut of real estate.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 16
2) Should you prepare for a change in politics?
Short Answer: YES
Long Answer: At some point during a financial crisis, money flows
typically become a political issue. You should keep a sharp eye on
political trends in your home country. In severe economic times,
governments have been known to ban foreign investment, demand capital
repatriation, outlaw money transfers abroad, close banks, freeze bank
accounts, restrict or seize private pensions, raise taxes, fix prices and
impose currency exchange values. They have been known to use force to
change the course of who gets hurt and who is spared, which means that the
prudent are punished and the thriftless are rewarded, reversing the result
from what it would be according to who deserves to be spared or get hurt.
In extreme cases, such as when authoritarians assume power, they simply
appropriate or take de facto control of your property.
You cannot anticipate every possible law, regulation or political event
that will be implemented to thwart your attempt at safety, liquidity and
solvency. This is why you must plan ahead and pay attention. As you do,
think about these issues so that when political forces troll for victims,
you are legally outside the scope of the dragnet.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 27
3) Should you invest in commercial bonds?
Short Answer: NO
Long Answer: If there is one bit of conventional wisdom that we hear
repeatedly with respect to investing for a deflationary depression, it is
that long-term bonds are the best possible investment. This assertion is
wrong. Any bond issued by a borrower who cannot pay goes to zero in a
depression. In the Great Depression, bonds of many companies,
municipalities and foreign governments were crushed. They became wallpaper
as their issuers went bankrupt and defaulted. Bonds of suspect issuers
also went way down, at least for a time. Understand that in a crash, no
one knows its depth, and almost everyone becomes afraid. That makes
investors sell bonds of any issuers that they fear could default. Even
when people trust the bonds they own, they are sometimes forced to sell
them to raise cash to live on. For this reason, even the safest bonds can
go down, at least temporarily, as AAA bonds did in 1931 and 1932.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 15
4) Should you take precautions if you run a business?
Short Answer: YES
Long Answer: Avoid long-term employment contracts with employees. Try
to locate in a state with “at-will” employment laws. Red tape and legal
impediments to firing could bankrupt your company in a financial crunch,
thus putting everyone in your company out of work.
If you run a business that normally carries a large business inventory
(such as an auto or boat dealership), try to reduce it. If your business
requires certain manufactured specialty items that may be hard to obtain
in a depression, stock up.
If you are an employer, start making plans for what you will do if the
company’s cash flow declines and you have to cut expenditures. Would it be
best to fire certain people? Would it be better to adjust all salaries
downward an equal percentage so that you can keep everyone employed?
Finally, plan how you will take advantage of the next major bottom in
the economy. Positioning your company properly at that time could ensure
success for decades to come.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 30
5) Should you invest in collectibles?
Short Answer: NO
Long Answer: Collecting for investment purposes is almost always
foolish. Never buy anything marketed as a collectible. The chances of
losing money when collectibility is priced into an item are huge. Usually,
collecting trends are fads. They might be short-run or long-run fads, but
they eventually dissolve.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 17
6) Should you do anything with respect to your employment?
Short Answer: YES
Long Answer: If you have no special reason to believe that the company
you work for will prosper so much in a contracting economy that its stock
will rise in a bear market, then cash out any stock or stock options that
your company has issued to you (or that you bought on your own).
If your remuneration is tied to the same company’s fortunes in the form
of stock or stock options, try to convert it to a liquid income stream.
Make sure you get paid actual money for your labor.
If you have a choice of employment, try to think about which job will
best weather the coming financial and economic storm. Then go get it.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 31
7) Should you speculate in stocks?
Short Answer: NO
Long Answer: Perhaps the number one precaution to take at the start of
a deflationary crash is to make sure that your investment capital is not
invested “long” in stocks, stock mutual funds, stock index futures, stock
options or any other equity-based investment or speculation. That advice
alone should be worth the time you [spend to read Conquer the Crash].
In 2000 and 2001, countless Internet stocks fell from $50 or $100 a
share to near zero in a matter of months. In 2001, Enron went from $85 to
pennies a share in less than a year. These are the early casualties of
debt, leverage and incautious speculation.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 20
8) Should you call in loans and pay off your debt?
Short Answer: YES
Long Answer: Have you lent money to friends, relatives or co-workers?
The odds of collecting any of these debts are usually slim to none, but if
you can prod your personal debtors into paying you back before they get
further strapped for cash, it will not only help you but it will also give
you some additional wherewithal to help those very same people if they
become destitute later.
If at all possible, remain or become debt-free. Being debt-free means
that you are freer, period. You don’t have to sweat credit card payments.
You don’t have to sweat home or auto repossession or loss of your
business. You don’t have to work 6 percent more, or 10 percent more, or 18
percent more just to stay even.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 29
9) Should you invest in commodities, such as crude oil?
Short Answer: Mostly NO
Long Answer: Pay particular attention to what happened in 1929-1932,
the three years of intense deflation in which the stock market crashed. As
you can see, commodities crashed, too.
You can get rich being short commodity futures in a deflationary crash.
This is a player’s game, though, and I am not about to urge a typical
investor to follow that course. If you are a seasoned commodity trader,
avoid the long side and use rallies to sell short. Make sure that your
broker keeps your liquid funds in T-bills or an equally safe medium.
There can be exceptions to the broad trend. A commodity can rise
against the trend on a war, a war scare, a shortage or a disruption of
transport. Oil is an example of a commodity with that type of risk. This
commodity should have nowhere to go but down during a depression.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 21
10) Should you invest in cash?
Short Answer: YES
Long Answer: For those among the public who have recently become
concerned that being fully invested in one stock or stock fund is not
risk-free, the analysts’ battle cry is “diversification.” They recommend
having your assets spread out in numerous different stocks, numerous
different stock funds and/or numerous different (foreign) stock markets.
Advocates of junk bonds likewise counsel prospective investors that having
lots of different issues will reduce risk.
This “strategy” is bogus. Why invest in anything unless you have a
strong opinion about where it’s going and a game plan for when to get out?
Diversification is gospel today because investment assets of so many kinds
have gone up for so long, but the future is another matter. Owning an
array of investments is financial suicide during deflation. They all go
down, and the logistics of getting out of them can be a nightmare. There
can be weird exceptions to this rule, such as gold in the early 1930s when
the government fixed the price, or perhaps some commodity that is crucial
in a war, but otherwise, all assets go down in price during deflation
except one: cash.
– Conquer the Crash, Chapter 18
……….
For more on deflation,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook
or browse various deflation topics like those below at
www.elliottwave.com/deflation.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's
foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is
the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street
best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Jaguar Inflation - A Layman's Explanation of Government Intervention
February 6, 2009
This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market
analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of
the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive
it,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook,
part of Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.
The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW
Deflation Survival eBook, a free 60-page compilation of Prechter’s
most important teachings and warnings about deflation.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
I am tired of hearing people insist that the Fed can expand credit all
it wants. Sometimes an analogy clarifies a subject, so let’s try one.
It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the
health of the nation depends upon producing Jaguar automobiles and
providing them to as many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it
begins operating Jaguar plants all over the country, subsidizing
production with tax money. To everyone’s delight, it offers these luxury
cars for sale at 50 percent off the old price. People flock to the
showrooms and buy. Later, sales slow down, so the government cuts the
price in half again. More people rush in and buy.
Sales again slow, so it lowers the price to $900 each. People return to
the stores to buy two or three, or half a dozen. Why not? Look how cheap
they are! Buyers give Jaguars to their kids and park an extra one on the
lawn.
Finally, the country is awash in Jaguars. Alas, sales slow again, and
the government panics. It must move more Jaguars, or, according to its
theory — ironically now made fact — the economy will recede. People are
working three days a week just to pay their taxes so the government can
keep producing more Jaguars. If Jaguars stop moving, the economy will
stop. So the government begins giving Jaguars away. A few more
cars move out of the showrooms, but then it ends. Nobody wants any
more Jaguars. They don’t care if they’re free. They
can’t find a use for them. Production of Jaguars ceases. It takes
years to work through the overhanging supply of Jaguars. Tax collections
collapse, the factories close, and unemployment soars. The economy is
wrecked. People can’t afford to buy gasoline, so many of the Jaguars rust
away to worthlessness. The number of Jaguars — at best — returns to the
level it was before the program began.
The same thing can happen with credit.
It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the
health of the nation depends upon producing credit and providing it to as
many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it begins operating
credit-production plants all over the country, called Federal Reserve
Banks. To everyone’s delight, these banks offer the credit for sale at
below market rates. People flock to the banks and buy. Later, sales slow
down, so the banks cut the price again. More people rush in and buy. Sales
again slow, so they lower the price to one percent. People return to the
banks to buy even more credit. Why not? Look how cheap it is! Borrowers
use credit to buy houses, boats and an extra Jaguar to park out on the
lawn. Finally, the country is awash in credit.
Alas, sales slow again, and the banks panic. They must move more
credit, or, according to its theory — ironically now made fact — the
economy will recede. People are working three days a week just to pay the
interest on their debt to the banks so the banks can keep offering more
credit. If credit stops moving, the economy will stop. So the banks begin
giving credit away, at zero percent interest. A few more loans move
through the tellers’ windows, but then it ends. Nobody wants any more
credit. They don’t care if it’s free. They can’t find a use for
it. Production of credit ceases. It takes years to work through the
overhanging supply of credit. Interest payments collapse, banks close, and
unemployment soars. The economy is wrecked. People can’t afford to pay
interest on their debts, so many bonds deteriorate to worthlessness. The
value of credit — at best — returns to the level it was before the program
began.
See how it works?
Is the analogy perfect? No. The idea of pushing credit on people is far
more dangerous than the idea of pushing Jaguars on them. In the credit
scenario, debtors and even most creditors lose everything in the end. In
the Jaguar scenario, at least everyone ends up with a garage full of cars.
Of course, the Jaguar scenario is impossible, because the government can’t
produce value. It can, however, reduce values. A
government that imposes a central bank monopoly, for example, can reduce
the incremental value of credit. A monopoly credit system also allows for
fraud and theft on a far bigger scale. Instead of government appropriating
citizens’ labor openly by having them produce cars, a monopoly banking
system does so clandestinely by stealing stored labor from citizens’ bank
accounts by inflating the supply of credit, thereby reducing the value of
their savings.
I hate to challenge mainstream 20th century macroeconomic theory, but
the idea that a growing economy needs easy credit is a false theory.
Credit should be supplied by the free market, in which case it will almost
always be offered intelligently, primarily to producers, not consumers.
Would lower levels of credit availability mean that fewer people would own
a house or a car? Quite the opposite. Only the timeline would be
different.
Initially it would take a few years longer for the same number of
people to own houses and cars – actually own them, not rent them
from banks. Because banks would not be appropriating so much of everyone’s
labor and wealth, the economy would grow much faster. Eventually, the
extent of home and car ownership – actual ownership – would eclipse that
in an easy-credit society. Moreover, people would keep their
homes and cars because banks would not be foreclosing on them. As a bonus,
there would be no devastating across-the-board collapse of the banking
system, which, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, is inevitable under
a central bank’s fiat-credit monopoly.
Jaguars, anyone?
……….
For more on deflation,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook
or browse various deflation topics like those below at
www.elliottwave.com/deflation.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's
foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is
the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street
best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Exposing Three Myths of Deflation and Recession
February 4, 2009
This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market
analyst Robert Prechter, the world’s foremost expert on and proponent of
the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive
it,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook, part of
Prechter’s NEW Deflation Survival Guide.
The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter’s NEW
Deflation Survival eBook, a 60-page compilation of Prechter’s most
important teachings and warnings about deflation.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
Myth 1: “War Will Bail Out the Economy”
Many people argue that war will bring both inflation and economic boom.
Wars have not been fought in order to inflate money supplies. You might
recall that Germany went utterly broke in 1923 via hyperinflation yet
managed to start a world war 16 years later, which was surely not engaged
in order to inflate the country’s money supply. Nor are wars and inflated
money supplies guarantors of economic boom. The American colonies and the
Confederate states each hyperinflated their currencies during wartime, but
doing so did not help their economies; quite the opposite. With respect to
war, the standard procedure today would be for the government to borrow to
finance a war, which would not necessarily guarantee inflation. If new
credit at current prices were unavailable, either the new debt could not
be sold or it would “crowd out” other new debt. The U.S. could decide to
inflate its currency as opposed to the credit supply. As explained in
Conquer the Crash, doing so would be seen today as a highly imprudent
course, so it is unlikely, to say the least. If it were to occur anyway,
the collapse of bond prices in response would neutralize the currency
inflation until the credit markets were wiped out. Despite these
arguments, I concede that war can be so disruptive, involving the
destruction of goods and the curtailment of commercial services, that the
environment from the standpoint of prices could end up appearing
inflationary. To summarize my view, the monetary result may not be
certain, but an inflationary result is hardly inevitable.
There is in fact a reliable relationship between monetary trends and
war. A downturn in social mood towards defensiveness, anger and fear
causes people to (1) withdraw credit from the marketplace, which reduces
the credit supply and (2) get angry with one another, which eventually
leads to a fight. That’s why The Elliott Wave Theorist has been
predicting both deflation and war. You cannot cure one with the other;
they are results of the same cause.
Myth 2: “Deflation Will Cause a Run on the Dollar, Which Will
Make Prices Rise”
This is an argument that deflation will cause inflation, which is
untenable. In terms of domestic purchasing power, the dollar’s value
should rise in deflation. You will then be able to buy more of most goods
and services.
It is unknown how the dollar will fare against other currencies,
and there is no way to answer that question other than following Elliott
wave patterns as they develop. From the standpoint of predicting
deflation, the dollar’s convertibility ratios are irrelevant. There may
well be a “run on the dollar” against foreign currencies, but it would not
be because of deflation. I think the impulse to predict a run on the
dollar comes from people who own a lot of gold, silver or Swiss francs.
They feel the ’70s returning, and so they envision the dollar falling
against all of these alternatives. If deflation occurs, a concurrent drop
in the dollar relative to other currencies would be for other reasons.
Perhaps the dollar is overvalued because it has enjoyed reserve status for
so long, which might make it fall relative to other currencies. If this is
what you expect, what are you going to buy in the currency arena? The yen?
Japan has been leading the way into the abyss. The Euro? Depression will
wrack the European Union. Maybe the Swiss franc or the Singapore dollar.
But these are technical questions, not challenges to deflation or domestic
price behavior.
Myth 3: “Consumers Remain the Engine Driving the U.S. Economy”
Only producers can afford to buy things. A consumer qua
consumer has no economic value or power.
The only way that consumers who are not (adequate) producers can buy
things is to borrow the money. So when economists tell you that
the consumer is holding up the economy, they mean that expanding
credit is holding up the economy. This is a description of the
problem, not the solution! The more the consumer goes into hock, the
worse the problem gets, which is precisely the opposite of what economists
are telling us. The more you hear that the consumer is propping up the
economy, the more you know that the debt bubble is growing, and with it
the risk of deflation.
……….
For more on deflation,
download Prechter’s FREE 60-page Deflation Survival eBook
or browse various deflation topics like those below at
www.elliottwave.com/deflation.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's
foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is
the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street
best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Is the World Finally Ready to Accept the Deflationary Scenario?
February 2, 2009
This article is part of a syndicated series about deflation from market
analyst Robert Prechter, the world's foremost expert on and proponent of
the deflationary scenario. For more on deflation and how you can survive
it,
download Prechter's FREE 60-page Deflation Survival Guide now.
The following article was adapted from Robert Prechter's 2002 New York
Times, Wall Street Journal and Amazon best-seller,
Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary
Depression.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
Seventy years of nearly continuous inflation have made most people
utterly confident of its permanence. If the majority of economists have
any monetary fear at all, it is fear of inflation, which is the opposite
of deflation.
As for the very idea of deflation, one economist a few years ago told a
national newspaper that deflation had a “1 in 10,000” chance of occurring.
The Chairman of Carnegie Mellon's business school calls the notion of
deflation “utter nonsense.” A professor of economics at Pepperdine
University states flatly, “Rising stock prices will inevitably lead to
rising prices in the rest of the economy.” The publication of an economic
think-tank insists, “Anyone who asserts that deflation is imminent or
already underway ignores the rationale for fiat currency — that is, to
facilitate the manipulation of economic activity.” A financial writer
explains, “Deflation…is totally a function of the Federal Reserve's
management of monetary policy. It has nothing to do with the business
cycle, productivity, taxes, booms and busts or anything else.” Concurring,
an adviser writes in a national magazine, “U.S. deflation would be simple
to stop today. The Federal Reserve could just print more money, ending the
price slide in its tracks.” Yet another sneers, “Get real,” and likens
anyone concerned about deflation to “small children.” One maverick
economist whose model accommodates deflation and who actually expects a
period of deflation is nevertheless convinced that it will be a “good
deflation” and “nothing to fear.” On financial television, another analyst
(who apparently defines deflation as falling prices) quips, “Don't worry
about deflation. All it does is pad profits.” A banker calls any episode
of falling oil prices “a positive catalyst [that] will put more money in
consumers' pockets. It will benefit companies that are powered by energy
and oil, and it will benefit the overall economy.” Others excitedly
welcome recently falling commodity prices as an economic stimulus
“equivalent to a massive tax cut.” A national business magazine
guarantees, “That's not deflation ahead, just slower inflation. Put your
deflation worries away.” The senior economist with Deutsche Bank in New
York estimates, “The chance of deflation is at most one in 50” (apparently
up from the 1 in 10,000 of a couple of years ago). The President of the
San Francisco Fed says, “The idea that we are launching into a prolonged
period of declining prices I don't think has substance.” A former
government economist jokes that deflation is “57th on my list of worries,
right after the 56th — fear of being eaten by piranhas.” These comments
about deflation represent entrenched professional opinion.
As you can see, anyone challenging virtually the entire army of
financial and economic thinkers, from academic to professional, from
liberal to conservative, from Keynesian socialist to Objectivist
free-market, from Monetarist technocratic even to many vocal proponents of
the Austrian school, must respond to their belief that inflation is
virtually inevitable and deflation impossible.
……….
For more on deflation,
download Prechter's FREE 60-page Deflation Survival Guide or browse
various deflation topics like those below at
www.elliottwave.com/deflation.
Robert Prechter, Chartered Market Technician, is the world's
foremost expert on and proponent of the deflationary scenario. Prechter is
the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street
best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and
Elliott Wave Principle and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Can the Government Stop Another Great Depression?
January 13, 2009
The following article is excerpted from a recent issue Elliott Wave
International’s Financial Forecast.
Elliott Wave International (EWI) is offering the full 10-page issue,
entitled “The Most Important Investment Report You’ll Read in 2009,” free
for a limited time. In addition to the following market commentary, it
includes independent forecasts of stocks, bonds, metals, the U.S. dollar
and economic trends.
Visit EWI to download the full report, free.
By Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall
Editors of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast
As Conquer the Crash so boldly counseled, prosperity entails managing
one’s finances and livelihood so as to be in tune with a 1930s’ style
deflationary depression. But conventional wisdom disagrees. “There’s no
comparison” to the Great Depression, says the world’s leading financial
authority, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke: “I’ve written books
about the Depression. We didn’t have the social safety net that we have
today. So let’s put that out of our minds.” He cites as evidence a 25%
unemployment rate, a one-third decline in U.S. GDP and a 90% decline in
stock prices, all of which occurred during the 1930s’ depression.
Unfortunately, what Bernanke’s managed to do is put one important word
out of his mind—yet. Like the rest of the “this is no depression” camp, he
fails to note that his cited figures are the extreme readings of that era.
Bernanke also ignores the critical fact that today’s bear market is
actually ahead of where the stock market was at the same point during the
1929-1932 decline and that the economy is lurching lower in a manner
suggesting strongly that it will have little trouble keeping pace with the
economic contraction of the 1930s (see Economy & Deflation section below).
Another common refrain is that, in contrast to the early 1930s, there
are now competent financial authorities doing everything in their power to
unlock the credit markets and reignite the bull market in equities. It’s
certainly true that the Fed is doing everything in its power, and even
some things that aren’t, to reel in the crisis. The U.S. Treasury is doing
likewise. By Bianco Research’s tally, the potential total of U.S. bailouts
is closing in on $9 trillion. But these efforts are every bit as impotent
as Conquer the Crash and the September issue of The Elliott Wave Financial
Forecast suggested that they would be. Here’s the key quote from the
September EWFF: “The bailouts keep coming at lower lows, signaling further
declines ahead.” Incredibly to most people, since this quote appeared the
Dow has declined by another 30% and various government financial wizards
have put forward even bolder yet more haphazard “rescue” initiatives.
The ballooning bailout makes us more convinced than ever that it will
fail. The whole “Keystone Cops” approach to “the rescue” strengthens our
conviction. One day the bailout is aimed at jacking up asset prices; the
next it is buying mortgages; the next it is rescuing the consumer; and the
next it’s all-hands-on-deck to prop up whoever it is that happens to be
failing on that day. The alphabet soup of rescue programs now includes
ABCPMMMFLF (no, we didn’t make this up), which is supposed to “shore up”
the $1 trillion asset-backed commercial paper markets. And still, credit
spreads shoot higher.
Another program, the “systematically significant failing institutions
program” (SSFIP), was established in November to deliver a $40 billion
“equity injection” into AIG. The problem, which will probably become the
focus of intense Congressional scrutiny at some later point, is that the
injection was made in October, before the program even existed. The Wall
Street Journal puts it this way: “Practically every day the government
launches a massively expensive new initiative to solve the problems that
the last day’s initiative did not.” At the latest economic summit in
mid-November, the U.S. and other nations were reputedly “close to a deal
to create a new ‘early warning system’ to detect weaknesses in the global
financial system before they reach epic proportions.” Among the stated
objectives: greater transparency. Of course, “sources spoke on the
condition of anonymity because plans are still being worked out.” The real
reason that these people want to remain anonymous is that like everyone
else, they recognize the proportions of the unfolding epic and thus the
futility of the bailout effort.
For more information on navigating the current market turmoil,
including forecasts of stocks, bonds, metals, the U.S. dollar and economic
trends, download Elliott Wave International’s free 10-page report,
The Most Important Investment Report You’ll Read in 2009.
Steve Hochberg began his professional career with Merrill Lynch &
Co. and joined Elliott Wave International in 1994. He became co-editor of
The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast for its inaugural issue in July 1999.
Pete Kendall joined Elliott Wave International as a researcher in 1992. He
has been co-editor of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast since its
inception in July 1999. He is also the director of Elliott Wave
International’s Center for Cultural Studies.
|
Making Preparations and Taking Action in Today’s Deflationary
Environment
December 12, 2008
Editor’s Note: The following article is adapted from Robert Prechter’s
2002 best-selling book, Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and
Prosper in a Deflationary Depression.
In addition to this article, visit Elliott Wave International to
download the
free 15-page report about how to protect yourself, you wealth and your
family in this environment. It contains details about what you should do
with your pension plan, valuable tips for business owners, insights on
handling loans and debt and important warnings against trusting the
government to protect you.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
The ultimate effect of deflation is to reduce the supply of money and
credit. Your goal is to make sure that it doesn’t reduce the supply of
your money and credit. The ultimate effect of depression is financial
ruin. Your goal is to make sure that it doesn’t ruin you.
Many investment advisors speak as if making money by investing is easy.
It’s not. What’s easy is losing money, which is exactly what most
investors do. They might make money for a while, but they lose eventually.
Just keeping what you have over a lifetime of investing can be an
achievement. That’s what this my book, Conquer the Crash, is designed to
help you do, in perhaps the single most difficult financial environment
that exists.
Protecting your liquid wealth against a deflationary crash and
depression is pretty easy once you know what to do. Protecting your other
assets and ensuring your livelihood can be serious challenges. Knowing how
to proceed used to be the most difficult part of your task because almost
no one writes about the issue. My book remedies that situation.
Preparing To Take the Right Actions
In a crash and depression, we will see stocks going down 90 percent and
more, mutual funds collapsing, massive layoffs, high unemployment,
corporate and municipal bankruptcies, bank and insurance company failures
and ultimately financial and political crises. The average person, who has
no inkling of the risks in the financial system, will be shocked that such
things could happen, despite the fact that they have happened repeatedly
throughout history.
Being unprepared will leave you vulnerable to a major disruption in
your life. Being prepared will allow you to make exceptional profits both
in the crash and in the ensuing recovery. For now, you should focus on
making sure that you do not become a zombie-eyed victim of the depression.
Taking the Right Actions
Countless advisors have touted “stocks only,” “gold only,”
“diversification,” a “balanced portfolio” and other end-all solutions to
the problem of attending to your investments. These approaches are usually
delusions. As I try to make clear in Conquer the Crash, no investment
strategy will provide stability forever. You will have to be nimble enough
to see major trends coming and make changes accordingly.
The main goal of investing in a crash environment is safety. When
deflation looms, almost every investment category becomes associated with
immense risks. Most investors have no idea of these risks and will think
you are a fool for taking precautions.
Many readers will object to taking certain prudent actions because of the
presumed cost. For example: “I can’t take a profit; I’ll have to pay
taxes!” My reply is, if you don’t want to pay taxes, well, you’ll get your
wish; your profit will turn into a loss, and you won’t have to pay any
taxes. Or they say, “I can’t sell my stocks for cash; interest rates are
only 2 percent!” My reply is, if you can’t abide a 2 percent annual gain,
well, you’ll get your wish there, too; you’ll have a 30 percent annual
loss instead. Others say, “I can’t cash out my retirement plan; there’s a
penalty!” I reply, take your money out before there is none to get. Then
there is the venerable, “I can’t sell now; I’d be taking a loss!” I say
no, you are recovering some capital that you can put to better use. My
advice always is, make the right move, and the costs will take care of
themselves.
If you are preoccupied with pedestrian concerns or blithely going along
with mainstream opinions, you need to wake up now, while there is still
time, and actively take charge of your personal finances. First you must
make your capital, your person and your family safe. Then you can explore
options for making money during the crash and especially after it’s over.
…………….
For more information, Prechter has made five full chapters from his
book available for free download.
•
What to do with your pension plan
•
How to identify a safe haven (a safe place for your family)
•
What should you do if you run a business
•
Calling in loans and paying off debt
•
Should you rely on the government to protect you?
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott
Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Robert Prechter Explains the Price Effects of Inflation and
Deflation
November 19, 2008
Editor’s Note: On Nov. 19, 2008, the U.S. Labor Department reported
a 1 percent drop in the consumer price index for October 2008. The drop
marked the largest decline in 61 years, and it was the first decline in
that measure in nearly a quarter of a century. The 1 percent drop was
twice as large as many mainstream analysts had forecast. Such a large
decline in consumer prices is forcing U.S. policymakers to rethink the
possibility of deflation in America. For more on deflation, we turn to
Robert Prechter, the man who literally wrote a book on how to survive it.
The following article, adapted from Prechter’s book Conquer the Crash –
You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression, will help you
understand exactly what to expect from deflation.
In addition to this article, visit Elliott Wave International to
download the free 8-page report,
Inflation vs. Deflation. It contains details on which threat you
should prepare for and steps you can take to protect your money.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
Before explaining the price effects of inflation and deflation, we must
define the terms inflation, deflation, money, credit and debt.
Webster's says, "Inflation
is an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available
goods," and "Deflation
is a contraction in the volume of money and credit relative to available
goods."
Money is a socially accepted medium of exchange, value storage
and final payment. A specified amount of that medium also serves as a unit
of account.
According to its two financial definitions, credit may be
summarized as a right to access money. Credit can be held by the
owner of the money, in the form of a warehouse receipt for a money
deposit, which today is a checking account at a bank. Credit can also be
transferred by the owner or by the owner's custodial institution
to a borrower in exchange for a fee or fees – called interest – as
specified in a repayment contract called a bond, note, bill or just plain
IOU, which is debt. In today's economy, most credit is lent, so
people often use the terms "credit" and "debt" interchangeably, as money
lent by one entity is simultaneously money borrowed by another.
When the volume of money and credit rises relative to the
volume of goods available, the relative value of each unit of money
falls, making prices for goods generally rise. When the volume of
money and credit falls relative to the volume of goods available, the
relative value of each unit of money rises, making prices of goods
generally fall. Though many people find it difficult to do, the proper way
to conceive of these changes is that the value of units of money
are rising and falling, not the values of goods.
The most common misunderstanding about
inflation and deflation – echoed even by some renowned economists – is
the idea that inflation is rising prices and deflation is falling prices.
General price changes, though, are simply effects of inflation
and deflation.
The
price effects of inflation can occur in goods, which most people
recognize as relating to inflation, or in investment assets, which people
do not generally recognize as relating to inflation. The inflation of the
1970s induced dramatic price rises in gold, silver and commodities. The
inflation of the 1980s and 1990s induced dramatic price rises in stock
certificates and real estate. This difference in effect is due to
differences in the social psychology that accompanies inflation and
disinflation, respectively.
The
price effects of deflation are simpler. They tend to occur across the
board, in goods and investment assets simultaneously.
…………….
For more information on deflation and inflation, including money-saving
steps for protecting your wealth, download Elliott Wave International’s
free 8-page report,
Inflation vs. Deflation.
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott
Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
The Government Doesn’t Want You to Read This Article About the
Financial Crisis
December 2, 2008
Editor’s Note: This article has been excerpted from a free issue of
Robert Prechter’s monthly market letter, The Elliott Wave Theorist.
The full 10-page market letter,
Be One of the Few The Government Hasn’t Fooled, can be
downloaded free from Elliott Wave International.
By Robert Prechter, CMT
“Who Will Benefit From The Housing Act?”
This question is an actual headline from a national daily paper. The
real answer is: mortgage lending corporations, developers, real estate
agents, speculators and politicians. The government is also pledging tax
money to providers of “financial counseling” and grants for speculators
who want to “buy and renovate foreclosed housing”; in other words, it will
hand tax money to charlatans and unfunded wheeler-dealers. But a far
better headline would have been, “Whom Will the Housing Act Hurt?” The
answer to that question is: (1) prudent people, i.e. savers, earners,
renters and people who have waited to buy a house at a reasonable price;
and (2) innocent people, i.e. taxpayers.
Government action (unless it is aimed at destruction) always causes the
opposite of its stated effect. If taxpayers ultimately have to shoulder
the burden for all the bad mortgage debt, those who are on the edge of
being able to make their mortgage payments will be forced over the edge,
causing more missed mortgage payments and more foreclosures.
There is never any need for a law granting privilege except when the
goal is to reward the undeserving and to punish the innocent. If the goal
were otherwise, there would be no need for a statutory law, because the
natural laws of economics, when unencumbered, serve to reward the
deserving and punish the imprudent and the guilty. Populists loudly
challenge this idea, but they are wrong.
I thought the Fed was created to “help manage the economy.”
After a secret meeting on Jekyll Island (GA), Congress and a handful of
bankers created the Federal Reserve System for two purposes. The first one
was to allow the government to counterfeit money, thereby letting it steal
value from savers through inflation. The second was to allow bankers to
make profits through debt creation, also at the expense of savers. Any
other claim is a smokescreen.
So shouldn’t we blame the Fed for the country’s financial
problems?
That’s like blaming the collapse of your house on the biggest termite.
The Fed is only one of the monsters that Congress has created. In the
financial realm, others include Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae,
Sallie Mae, the FDIC, the FHA, the FHLBs and the income tax. But there are
also a hundred other havoc-wreaking agencies of the federal government.
Congress is to blame for ruining America. The Fed is only one of the
mechanisms it created along the way. It’s a big one, and it’s fine to
campaign against it, but to blame it for everything is to give its creator
a free pass.
This is an important distinction, because many people seem to think
that abolishing the Fed will cure America’s money woes. They seem to think
that once the Fed is abolished, Congress will behave responsibly. One
website even calls for abolishing the Fed in favor of giving
money-printing power directly to the federal government! Abolishing the
Fed is a worthy goal, but Congress will work tirelessly to create one
disastrous institution after another, because that’s what campaign donors
pay for.
For more information on the government’s role in the financial crisis,
download Robert Prechter’s free 10-page market letter,
Be One of the Few the Government Hasn’t Fooled.
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician, is the founder and
CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall Street best-sellers
Conquer the Crash and Elliott Wave Principle and editor of The Elliott
Wave Theorist monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Has Cash Been King for the Past 10 Years?
If you're like most investors, you've been nearly
brainwashed with conventional market "wisdom" that stocks are the best way
to grow your portfolio.
You would be crazy not to have your
money in the markets, right?
But when markets drop, as we've seen in this
credit crisis, it's amazing how quickly the story changes.
Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall, editors of
Elliott Wave International's Financial Forecast, challenged the notion of
stocks' superiority years before this latest downturn.
Learn how cash has been king – and will remain so
– far longer than the latest news headlines may have you believe in this
free excerpt from Elliott Wave International's Credit Crisis Survival Kit.
Elliott Wave International has also made the full
Credit Crisis Survival Kit available free for a limited time. In addition
to this excerpt, it contains 14 other articles, reports, and videos that
reveal how to survive and prosper during the credit crisis.
Visit EWI to download the kit, free.
Cash's Invisible Reign Made Visible
[excerpted from Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, August 2008]
With respect to cash and its status as the
preeminent financial asset, however, we are starting to wonder if
investors will ever come around to our point of view, which, as we
explained in the March special section, is that there are times when "the
phrase 'focus on the long term' means "get out and wait.'" As we also
pointed out, the last eight years are clearly one of these times, as cash
has outperformed all three major stock averages over this period. A July 3
USA Today article shows how this outlook is actually becoming more
farsighted as the bear market intensifies:
3-month Treasuries Beat
S&P 500 for past 10 Years
The article says, "Investors who bought stocks
for the long run are finding out just how long the long run can be." But
the farther back in time cash's dominance stretches and the rockier the
stock market gets, the farther investors seem to move from ever taking
anything off the table. After stating that "there can be times, long
times, when stocks won't beat T-bills," a professor and popular
buy-and-hold advocate is cited as "optimistic that the next 10 years will
be better than the past decade." In March EWFF stated, "Cash will continue
to outperform until stocks are no longer fashionable." There is no sign
that such a condition is even close to happening.
It's somewhat amazing that cash is not capturing
anyone's fancy because a tremendous society-wide thirst for cash is
spreading fast. "In a deflation," the Elliott Wave Financial Forecast has
stated, "Rule No. 1 is to unload everything that isn't nailed down. Rule
No. 2 is to sell whatever everything remaining is nailed to." The banking
system is surely deflating, because, echoing Elliott Wave Financial
Forecast's wording again, "Desperate American Banks Are Selling Everything
That Isn't Nailed Down." SunTrust is selling its stock in Coca-Cola, an
asset the bank held for 90 years. Merrill Lynch sold its founding stake in
Bloomberg as well as various other subsidiaries.
Meanwhile, "Americans are selling prized
possessions online and at flea markets at alarming rates." Pawnshops and
auction sites are booming. At Craigslist.org, the number of for-sale
listings soared 70% in eight months. This fits with our review of
Craigslist's prospects when it was getting started in 2005: "This is just
the set-up phase. Once the global garage sale really gets rolling, truly
astounding volumes of dirt-cheap goods will be available on-line and
elsewhere." The global garage sale is on. The chart of the U.S. savings
rate shows that the bull market in cash has come to life.

A 30-year downtrend in savings rates ended at
minus 2.3% in August 2005. In May 2008, the savings rate skyrocketed to
5%. This jolt may be somewhat overstated due to the arrival of the
government's stimulus checks, but the burst should be the start of a
critical new mindset among consumers. When the government showered the
economy with $600 checks, many did something they never would have thought
of through most of the bull market: They put the money in the bank, which
is exactly what the administration did not want. In fact, federal, state
and local governments are desperate for the tax revenue that a little
ripple-effect spending would have generated.
According to the National Conference of State
Legislatures, states must close a $40 billion shortfall in the current
fiscal year. "The problem today is that tax revenue is vanishing," says a
story about the sudden appearance of the worst fiscal crisis in New York
since 1975. Even cities like East Hampton, New York, where someone paid
$103 million for an oceanfront house last year, are out of money. "Nobody
understands how it happened," says one resident. The pages of this
newsletter show otherwise. If we are right, a deflationary decline is
depleting and destroying cash flows in novel new ways that no one alive
has experienced before.
The previous analysis was excerpted from Elliott
Wave International's Credit Crisis Survival Kit. The kit, featuring 15
free resources to help you survive and prosper during the credit crisis,
is available free.
Visit EWI to download the kit, free.
|
The Primary Precondition of Deflation
By Robert Prechter, CMT
Elliott Wave International
The following was adapted from Bob Prechter’s
2002 New York Times and Amazon best seller,
Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper
in a Deflationary Depression.
Deflation requires
a precondition: a major societal buildup in the extension of credit (and
its flip side, the assumption of debt). Austrian economists Ludwig von
Mises and Friedrich Hayek warned of the consequences of credit expansion,
as have a handful of other economists, who today are mostly ignored. Bank
credit and Elliott wave expert Hamilton Bolton, in a 1957 letter,
summarized his observations this way:
In reading a history of major depressions in the
U.S. from 1830 on, I was impressed with the following:
(a) All were set off by a
deflation of
excess credit. This was the one factor in common.
(b) Sometimes the excess-of-credit situation seemed to last years before
the bubble broke.
(c) Some outside event, such as a major failure, brought the thing to a
head, but the signs were visible many months, and in some cases years,
in advance.
(d) None was ever quite like the last, so that the public was always
fooled thereby.
(e) Some panics occurred under great government surpluses of revenue
(1837, for instance) and some under great government deficits.
(f) Credit is credit, whether non-self-liquidating or self-liquidating.
(g)
Deflation of
non-self-liquidating credit usually produces the greater slumps.
Self-liquidating credit is a loan that is paid
back, with interest, in a moderately short time from production.
Production facilitated by the loan – for business start-up or expansion,
for example – generates the financial return that makes repayment
possible. The full transaction adds value to the economy.
Non-self-liquidating credit is a loan that is not
tied to production and tends to stay in the system. When financial
institutions lend for consumer purchases such as cars, boats or homes, or
for speculations such as the purchase of stock certificates, no production
effort is tied to the loan. Interest payments on such loans stress some
other source of income. Contrary to nearly ubiquitous belief, such lending
is almost always counter-productive; it adds costs to the
economy, not value. If someone needs a cheap car to get to work,
then a loan to buy it adds value to the economy; if someone wants a new
SUV to consume, then a loan to buy it does not add value to the economy.
Advocates claim that such loans "stimulate production," but they ignore
the cost of the required debt service, which burdens production. They also
ignore the subtle deterioration in the quality of spending choices due to
the shift of buying power from people who have demonstrated a superior
ability to invest or produce (creditors) to those who have demonstrated
primarily a superior ability to consume (debtors).
Near the end of a major expansion, few creditors
expect default, which is why they lend freely to weak borrowers. Few
borrowers expect their fortunes to change, which is why they borrow
freely.
Deflation involves
a substantial amount of involuntary debt liquidation because
almost no one expects
deflation before it
starts.
For more on
deflation,
including the following topics, see Elliott Wave International’s free
guide to
deflation, inflation, money, credit and debt.
There, you can also download two free chapters from Conquer the Crash.
Learn more about these six important topics:
1.
What is Deflation and When Does it Occur?
2.
Price Effects of Inflation and Deflation
3.
The Primary Precondition of Deflation
4.
What Triggers the Change to Deflation?
5.
Why Deflationary Crashes and Depressions Go
Together
6.
Financial Values Can Disappear in Deflation
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician,
is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall
Street best sellers
Conquer the Crash
and
Elliott Wave Principle
and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist
monthly market letter since 1979.
|
3 Questions The Government
Doesn’t Want You To Ask About the Financial Crisis
(And 3 Shocking Answers!)
September 22, 2008
Bob Prechter, President of Elliott Wave
International (EWI), is no stranger to challenging the status quo. His New
York Times bestseller, Conquer the Crash, was published in 2002
before anyone was even talking about the current financial
crisis.
In his recent 10-page market letter, Prechter
shifts his focus to the government’s role in the latest financial turmoil.
Elliott Wave International is offering the full
10-page report free if you’d like to read all 28 answers.
Visit EWI to download the full report, free.
Here are 3 questions excerpted from the free
report:
1. Didn’t Congress create the Federal Housing
Authority, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and the Federal Home Loan
Banks for the purpose of helping the public buy homes?
You’re kidding, right? What happened is that
clever businessmen schemed with members of Congress to create privileged
lending institutions so they could get rich off the public’s labor. In
return, members of Congress got big campaign contributions from the
privileged corporations and, as a bonus, even more votes. The public’s
welfare had nothing to do with it.
Who celebrated when Congress passed the latest
housing bill? Answer: “The California Mortgage Bankers Association
applauded Congress for permanently increasing the size of loans Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac can buy….” (USA, 7/28) The legislation exists to “protect
the nation’s two largest mortgage companies….” (NYT, 7/24) Who took out
full-page ads to encourage Congress to “enact housing stimulus legislation
now”? Answer: the National Association of Home Builders. Who celebrated
when the administration “unveiled a new set of best [sic] practices
designed to encourage banks to issue a debt instrument known as a covered
bond”? Answer: “[Treasury Secretary] Paulson was joined at the news
conference by officials from the Federal Reserve [and] the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation…. Officials from banking giants Bank of America
Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo & Co. issued a
joint statement saying, ‘We look forward to being leading issuers’” (AP,
7/29) of covered bonds. And voters still believe that Congress is there to
help the needy.
2. Who cares if a bank goes under? Won’t the FDIC
protect depositors?
The FDIC is not funded well enough to bail out
even a handful of the biggest banks in America. It has enough money to pay
depositors of about three big banks. After that, it’s broke. But here is
the real irony: The FDIC, as history will ultimately demonstrate, causes
banks to fail. The FDIC creates destruction three ways. First, its very
existence encourages banks to take lending risks that they would never
otherwise contemplate, while it simultaneously removes depositors’
incentives to keep their bankers prudent. This double influence produces
an unsound banking system. We have reached that point today. Second, the
FDIC imposes costly rules on banks. In July, it “implemented a new
rule…requiring the 159 [largest] banks to keep records that will give
quick access to customer information.” As the American Bankers Association
puts it, the new rule “will impose a lot of burden on a lot of banks for
no reason.” (AJC, 7/19) Third, the FDIC gets its money in the form of
“premiums” from—guess whom?—healthy banks! So as weak banks go under, the
FDIC can wring more money from still-solvent banks. If it begins calling
in money during a systemic credit implosion, marginal banks will go under,
requiring more money for the FDIC, which will have to take more money from
banks, breaking more marginal banks, etc. The FDIC could continue this
behavior until all banks are bust, but it will more likely give up and
renege. Remember, every government program ultimately brings about the
opposite of the stated goal, and the FDIC is no exception.
3. Who are the “homeowners”?
Everywhere you turn, news articles are discussing
how Congress, the President and the Fed are taking action to “help
homeowners.” People’s understanding of this statement is 100 percent
wrong. The homeowners in question are not the residents of the houses. The
homeowners are banks. Unlike some states, Georgia made its law very
specific on this point. Our local paper recently explained that, by
recognizing the reality of ownership, “Georgia employs primarily a
nonjudicial foreclosure” and therefore “has one of the fastest procedures
in the country.” Specifically, “The property owner gives the mortgage
holder a ‘security deed’ or a ‘deed to secure debt’. Technically, until
the debt is paid, in full, the mortgage holder owns the property and
allows the borrower to possess it.” (GT, 8/6) In states where the mortgage
holder is deemed the property owner, the title is merely a legal
technicality. The day he stops making mortgage payments, he no longer owns
the property; the bank does. After foreclosure, many of those whom
politicians and the media call homeowners will simply go from paying
interest to a bank to paying rent to a landlord. For those with little or
no equity, it’s not that big a deal. The real devastation is happening in
banks’ portfolios, and banks, not home-dwellers, are the ones whom the
government is trying to rescue, at others’ expense.
One might be tempted to charge therefore that
Congress makes its laws for the purpose of helping banks. This idea, too,
is incorrect. Helping banks is merely a side effect. The reason that
Congress creates privileges for bankers is to benefit politicians. They
make laws in response to campaign contributions from lending institutions,
real-estate organizations and builders’ associations. They also garner
votes from mortgage holders and, miraculously, from voters who think that
their “representatives” are being “compassionate.”
The previous 3 questions and answers from Bob
Prechter were excerpted from his recent 10-page market letter, The
Elliott Wave Theorist.
Elliott Wave International is offering the full
10-page report free if you’d like to read all 28 answers.
Visit EWI to download the full report, free.
|
Gold, the Dow, T-Notes: Which Does Best During Recessions?
By Susan C. Walker,
Elliott Wave International
April 11, 2008
Each year, the NCAA college basketball tournament winnows its starting
field of 64 teams to the Final Four teams who play for a chance to become
the national champion. Congratulations to the University of Kansas and the
University of Tennessee, this year's men's and women's basketball
champions.
The structure of the NCAA tournament got me to thinking. Wouldn't it be
great if we could set up brackets for our own investments the same way –
start with 64 equities, bonds, mutual funds, commodity futures, metals,
etc. Then let them duke it out against one another to see which ones
emerge as the "Investment Final Four"?
Click here to download a free 5-page report from Elliott Wave
International with even more information on which investment does best
during recessions. The report, excerpted from Bob Prechter's Elliott Wave
Theorist, includes in-depth historical analysis and six eye-opening
tables.
Since most of us have neither the time nor the money to act as our own
version of the NCAA (which might stand for the "National Coordinator of
Asset Allocation"), it's worth knowing that Bob Prechter of Elliott Wave
International has already set his mind to the task. He has specifically
explored which investments do best in times of recession and which do best
during economic expansions. But instead of starting with a field of 64
investments, he researched the three most popular investments – gold, the
Dow, and Treasury bonds. We can call them the Treasured Three, rather than
the Final Four.
Gold and Recessions
Since economists and even Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal
Reserve, now admit that it looks like the U.S. economy has entered a
recession, many people may wonder whether they need to change the mix of
their investments. In particular, as some prices keep going up – notably
for food and gas – the threat of inflation makes people more interested in
gold as an investment, since it's usually seen as a bulwark against
monetary inflation.
It is this conventional wisdom that piqued Prechter's curiosity. He
wanted to find out whether it would hold up to a reality test. As he
writes in The Elliott Wave Theorist, "I have often read, 'Gold
always goes up in recessions and depressions.' Is it true? Should you own
gold because you think the economy is tanking? Whenever we hear some claim
like this, we always do the same thing: We look at the data."
So he and another Elliott wave analyst ran the numbers, reviewing the
behavior of these three key investments during recessions following World
War II, from February 1945 through November 2001. This is what they
learned:
Gold was not the best investment during recessions in terms
of total return.
The winner of this tournament was actually Treasury Notes, which had a
total return of 9.96%. In contrast, gold had a total return of 8.80%, and
the Dow came in at 6.89%. But that's not all – once they figured in the
transaction costs for each investment (at a 2008 level), gold fell from
second to third place as a worthwhile investment during recessions. The
total returns with transaction costs came out this way:
| 1. T-Notes |
9.82% |
| 2. Dow |
6.85% |
| 3. Gold |
4.80% |
This result turns conventional wisdom on its head. It's also worth
being aware of as you invest in 2008. Here's how Prechter sums up the
results:
The Best Investment During Recessions
The most important question, however, is not whether the Dow beat
gold or vice versa but whether making either investment would have been
better than taking no risk at all. Table 3 [see
free report provided by Elliott Wave International] shows that
ten-year Treasury notes beat both gold and the Dow during recessions
since 1945, and they did so far more reliably. T-notes provided
a capital gain in 10 of the 11 recessions, and of course they provided
interest income during all of them. And the transaction costs are low….
So if you want to make money reliably and safely during
recessions and depression, you should own bonds whose issuers will
remain fully reliable debtors throughout the contraction. Of course, as
Conquer the Crash [Editor's note: Bob Prechter's best-selling
business book] makes abundantly clear, finding such bonds in this
depression, which will be the deepest in 300 years, will not be easy.
Conquer the Crash forecast that in this depression most bonds
will go down and many will go to zero. This process has already begun.
This time around, you have to follow the suggestions in that book to
make your debt investment work. [The Elliott Wave Theorist,
March 2008]
Susan C. Walker writes for
Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical
analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a
newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a
speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also
appear regularly on FoxNews.com.
|
The Primary Precondition of Deflation
By Robert Prechter, CMT
Elliott Wave International
The following was adapted from Bob Prechter’s
2002 New York Times and Amazon best seller,
Conquer the Crash – You Can Survive and Prosper
in a Deflationary Depression.
Deflation requires
a precondition: a major societal buildup in the extension of credit (and
its flip side, the assumption of debt). Austrian economists Ludwig von
Mises and Friedrich Hayek warned of the consequences of credit expansion,
as have a handful of other economists, who today are mostly ignored. Bank
credit and Elliott wave expert Hamilton Bolton, in a 1957 letter,
summarized his observations this way:
In reading a history of major depressions in the
U.S. from 1830 on, I was impressed with the following:
(a) All were set off by a
deflation of
excess credit. This was the one factor in common.
(b) Sometimes the excess-of-credit situation seemed to last years before
the bubble broke.
(c) Some outside event, such as a major failure, brought the thing to a
head, but the signs were visible many months, and in some cases years,
in advance.
(d) None was ever quite like the last, so that the public was always
fooled thereby.
(e) Some panics occurred under great government surpluses of revenue
(1837, for instance) and some under great government deficits.
(f) Credit is credit, whether non-self-liquidating or self-liquidating.
(g)
Deflation of
non-self-liquidating credit usually produces the greater slumps.
Self-liquidating credit is a loan that is paid
back, with interest, in a moderately short time from production.
Production facilitated by the loan – for business start-up or expansion,
for example – generates the financial return that makes repayment
possible. The full transaction adds value to the economy.
Non-self-liquidating credit is a loan that is not
tied to production and tends to stay in the system. When financial
institutions lend for consumer purchases such as cars, boats or homes, or
for speculations such as the purchase of stock certificates, no production
effort is tied to the loan. Interest payments on such loans stress some
other source of income. Contrary to nearly ubiquitous belief, such lending
is almost always counter-productive; it adds costs to the
economy, not value. If someone needs a cheap car to get to work,
then a loan to buy it adds value to the economy; if someone wants a new
SUV to consume, then a loan to buy it does not add value to the economy.
Advocates claim that such loans "stimulate production," but they ignore
the cost of the required debt service, which burdens production. They also
ignore the subtle deterioration in the quality of spending choices due to
the shift of buying power from people who have demonstrated a superior
ability to invest or produce (creditors) to those who have demonstrated
primarily a superior ability to consume (debtors).
Near the end of a major expansion, few creditors
expect default, which is why they lend freely to weak borrowers. Few
borrowers expect their fortunes to change, which is why they borrow
freely.
Deflation involves
a substantial amount of involuntary debt liquidation because
almost no one expects
deflation before it
starts.
For more on
deflation,
including the following topics, see Elliott Wave International’s free
guide to
deflation, inflation, money, credit and debt.
There, you can also download two free chapters from Conquer the Crash.
Learn more about these six important topics:
1.
What is Deflation and When Does it Occur?
2.
Price Effects of Inflation and Deflation
3.
The Primary Precondition of Deflation
4.
What Triggers the Change to Deflation?
5.
Why Deflationary Crashes and Depressions Go
Together
6.
Financial Values Can Disappear in Deflation
Robert Prechter, Certified Market Technician,
is the founder and CEO of Elliott Wave International, author of Wall
Street best sellers
Conquer the Crash
and
Elliott Wave Principle
and editor of
The Elliott Wave Theorist
monthly market letter since 1979.
|
Suddenly, It's a Bleak Midwinter for Housing and Lending
By Susan C. Walker,
Elliott Wave International
January 7, 2008
In the bleak midwinter,
Frosty wind made moan,
Earth stood hard as iron,
Water like a stone…
(From "A Christmas Carol" by Christina Rossetti)
Shawn Colvin sings a beautiful song based on this poem by Christina
Rossetti, reminding us of the bleakness of midwinter. That is exactly
where the housing market seems to be now – facing its very own bleak
midwinter of falling prices, rising mortgage rates and growing
inventories.
The latest report of the S&P/Case-Shiller home price index shows that
the price of houses fell 6.7% in October, year over year. That is the
largest year-to-year decline drop since April 1991. Think of it – if you
had bought a home for $300,000 in October 2006, it is now worth about
$280,000. And suppose you just got a new job and need to move? You are
going to have trouble selling it at that price, too, thanks to so many
foreclosed homes on the market. One realtor in Phoenix explained to a
Wall Street Journal reporter that local residents are now competing
with foreclosed homes selling for $50,000 to $100,000 less than other
houses on the market. "The sellers now are having to reduce their prices
by 20% to 30% to compete," she says. (Wall Street Journal, "Pace
of Decline in Home Prices Sets a Record," 12/27/07)
At a meeting of the New York Society of Security Analysts on January 7,
U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson said this about the U.S. economy: "We
will likely have further indications of slower growth in the weeks and
months ahead.''
Paulson and central bankers at the U.S. Federal Reserve recognize that
they, too, face their own bleak financial midwinter. It's not just the
mayhem brought on by the subprime mortgage debacle, the implosion of the
housing market and the ensuing credit crunch; nor is it that the U.S.
economy lurches toward a recession and hard times.
No, it is something bigger than that. Public opinion or social mood, as
we call it here at Elliott Wave International, has shifted from positive
to negative. When that happens, financial heroes find themselves falling
from their pedestals onto frozen earth hard as iron.
Exhibit A - The headline of a recent article on
Bloomberg: "Paulson Gets Diminishing Return with Bush, Like Powell,
O'Neill" and the lead: "Henry Paulson escaped the Nixon White House with
his reputation enhanced. He won't be so lucky this time around."
Exhibit B - The lead from a recent column by David
Ignatius in the Washington Post:
"When airport rescue crews are worried that a damaged plane may have
a crash landing, they sometimes spread the runway with foam to reduce
the probability of fire on impact. That's what the Federal Reserve and
other central banks are doing in pumping liquidity into severely damaged
financial markets. Make no mistake: The central bankers' announcement
Wednesday of a new coordinated effort to pump cash into the global
financial system is a sign of their nervousness…."
Nervousness is in the air now. Investors are anxious about the markets;
everyone is worried about the housing market. Our
Elliott Wave Financial Forecast December issue explains how housing
starts (and stops) are intimately tied to recessions: "One key indicator
of success in pre-dating economic downturns is housing starts, which are
approaching the 1-million-a-month level that has preceded all recessions
of the last 40 years."
And the Fed is nervous, too. So much so that it announced a credit
giveaway with four other major central banks (the Bank of Canada, the Bank
of England, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank) in
mid-December to try to bolster the financial system and the banks that
keep it humming. The Fed reports that banks have been stepping up to its
auction window each week to purchase $20 billion. Unfortunately for the
banks, most of this "liquidity" isn't that liquid. It has to be paid back
within 30 days, with interest of about 4.65%.
Editor's note: Elliott Wave International
has agreed to make available to our readers a 2-1/2-page excerpt from Bob
Prechter's
Elliott Wave Theorist in which he describes exactly how the Fed's
latest effort to shore up banks' balance sheets has become "High Noon for
the Fed's Credibility."
Click here to read the Theorist excerpt.
Just how bleak is the future for central bankers if this recently
implemented plan doesn't work? Bob Prechter explains in his just-published
Theorist:
"Nevertheless, this is probably the single most important
central-bank pronouncement yet. But it is not significant for the
reasons people think. By far most people take such pronouncements at
face value, presume that what the authorities promise will happen and
reason from there. But the tremendous significance of this seismic
engagement of the monetary jawbone is that if this announcement fails to
restore confidence, central bankers' credibility will evaporate."
"At least that's the way historians will play it. But of course, the
true causality, as elucidated by socionomics, is that an evaporation of
confidence will make the central bankers' plans fail. The outcome is
predicated on psychology."
The "socionomics"
Prechter refers to is a new social science he has introduced that studies
how humans behave in groups within contexts of uncertainty – where
fluctuations in social mood motivate social actions. It explains that
rather than an event happening that affects social mood (for example,
falling home prices make people feel bad), what really happens is that
social mood changes first from positive to negative and then lousy things
happen (for example, unhappy people make home prices fall). If you can
adopt this point of view, then you can see that, in poetic terms, we are
fast approaching a bleak midwinter for the economy and the financial
markets.
Susan C. Walker writes for
Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical
analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a
newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a
speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also
appear regularly on FoxNews.com.
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Subprime Delivers One-Two Punch Just Like Hurricane Katrina Did
By Susan C. Walker,
Elliott Wave International
November 29, 2007
The world is awash in bad news about the subprime mortgage meltdown,
just the same way that New Orleans was awash in floodwaters from Hurricane
Katrina two summers ago. A few examples:
- The median price for new home drops 13% since last year, the most in
37 years, according to a Census Bureau report on November 29. This due
in large part to buyers not being able to get financing now that lenders
have tightened their lending standards in response to the subprime
debacle.
- Major Wall Street banks write off billions of dollars in subprime-backed
securities.
- Dire forecasts estimate that the credit crunch caused by the
mortgage problems will cause between $250 billion to $500 billion of
losses at banks and brokerages before it's done.
If you want to see how this kind of news looks on a price chart,
consider the chart that we published in the latest Elliott Wave
Financial Forecast. It shows how confidence in the mortgage market
has simply fallen off a cliff. "The ABX Mortgage Indexes are akin to the
eerie music that starts to play right before the goriest scenes in a
horror movie," write our analysts Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall. Even
prime-rated mortgages (the top line on the chart) seem to have been
tainted by the cliff-diving exploits of the subprime and Alt-A mortgage
indexes.

Editor's note: Elliott Wave International invites you
to read more about this Mortgage Mutiny chart in a special three-page
excerpt from the November 2007 Elliott Wave Financial Forecast,
called
"Transition to a Fear of Risk."
The continuing repercussions of the subprime meltdown since two Bear
Stearns' hedge funds imploded in August remind me how closely this
situation imitates the delayed punch of Hurricane Katrina in the summer of
2005. In fact, I wrote a column for Fox News on that very topic a few
months ago, some of which is worth repeating.
* * * * *
[Excerpted from "Subprime Storm Mimics Katrina," originally published July
30, 2007]
Wall Street may have reason to worry about a financial hurricane poised
to do the same kind of damage Hurricane Katrina did — in terms of money
and assets lost — in New Orleans in 2005. Given the latest storm warnings
about subprime mortgages and the Dow’s dive last week, it looks like "Subprime
Katrina" might become the financial storm of the decade.
Wall Street investment bankers who remember the devastation in New
Orleans might want to start battening down the hatches. In fact, some of
them seem to understand their pending doom as they try to cajole the rest
of the world into thinking that the subprime (otherwise known as
low-quality) mortgage contagion is contained. 'Sure, sure, Bear Stearns
got hit when its subprime hedge funds lost their value, but everyone else
is O.K.,' they say. 'Let's all heave one collective sigh of relief that we
dodged that bullet.'
Does that attitude sound familiar? It's exactly how the people of New
Orleans felt for the 8-10 hours after Hurricane Katrina whipped up the
Gulf Coast and dumped its rain. It was over; they had dodged the bullet.
Their beautiful city that is built below sea level and surrounded by sea
walls and levees was safe. That's where Wall Street is right now – hoping
the levees will hold as investment bankers try to sandbag the rest of us
with lots of placating talk. Well, it turns out that New Orleans was about
as safe as the subprime bonds that are now below their own "C" level.
Although Wall Street bankers have been doing one heckuva job, I think
it's too soon to breathe easy, just as it was too soon for those in the
Big Easy to breathe easy. Here's why: Wall Street was warned about the
coming hurricane-force fall-out from subprime mortgages, and it ignored
the warnings, buying up all the securities backed by subprime mortgages
that it could. Now, Wall Street is having trouble selling more debt. It
sounds like it may be too late for many Wall Street denizens to get out of
town – and their positions – before the floodwaters start rising.
Remember, too, the finger-pointing and blaming that started as soon as
the rest of the nation realized that the U.S. government was not doing
enough to help New Orleans? The editors of The Elliott Wave Financial
Forecast recognize a similar change in attitudes toward Wall Street:
"The unwinding process will be sped along by a flood of revelations
about illicit hedge fund and investment banking activities. Just as
Enron, Tyco and a host of other primary beneficiaries of the late 1990s
bull market run became the focus of scandals, hedge funds and the banks
that enabled them are starting to become a focal point for scrutiny."
(The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, July 2007)
Then will come the final installment. Just as the U.S. government was
slow to come to grips with the disaster in New Orleans so that people
were left to fend for themselves, so too will investment bankers and
investors have to fend for themselves. They may find themselves
clutching their worthless paper and wishing someone would bail them out
from the rooftops of their now-worthless homes.
* * * * *
Now, here we are at the end of November, and the situation for
investors and investment banks has played out almost exactly as I
outlined. Hardly anyone is coming out smelling like a rose. If anything
it's the opposite, as the stench from quarterly financial filings rises as
banks reveal how many billions in dollars they must write off for their
mortgage investments gone bad. Sadly, the conclusion to my Subprime
Katrina column still holds true: "Heckuva Job Brownie – now known as
Helicopter Ben Bernanke and his Federal Reserve team – won't have any more
luck picking up the pieces on Wall Street than FEMA did in New Orleans."
Susan C. Walker writes for
Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical
analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a
newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a
speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also
appear regularly on FoxNews.com.
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Why the Fed is Such a Lousy Wizard of Oz
By Susan C. Walker,
Elliott Wave International
September 7, 2007
Central bankers who "follow the yellow brick road" end up in Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, every Labor Day weekend for their annual symposium
sponsored by – who else? – the Kansas City Fed. (Who can forget Judy
Garland saying to her little dog, "Toto, I've got a feeling we're not in
Kansas anymore," in the 1939 movie, The Wizard of Oz?)
The Jackson Hole Resort serves as the Federal Reserve's equivalent of
the Emerald City, as Fed governors and presidents meet with central
bankers and economists from around the world to discuss economic issues.
This year, the symposium focused on housing and monetary policy. Usually,
the Fed chairman kicks off the symposium and, this year, the new chairman,
Ben S. Bernanke, did the honors. He closed his speech with these words:
"The interaction of housing, housing finance, and economic
activity has for years been of central importance for understanding the
behavior of the economy, and it will continue to be central to our
thinking as we try to anticipate economic and financial developments."
Then came the other speeches. And it seems that some of the guests in
Emerald City were waiting for their chance to pull back the curtain and
prove that the Wonderful Wizard of Oz isn't such a wizard after all.
Bloomberg reported that "Federal Reserve officials, wrestling with a
housing recession that jeopardizes U.S. growth, got an earful from critics
at a weekend retreat, arguing they should use regulation and interest
rates to prevent asset-price bubbles." Apparently, one academic paper
presented at Jackson Hole graded the Fed an 'F' for the way it has handled
the repercussions from the rise and fall of the housing market.
Truth be told, these folks are a little late to the table as critics of
the Fed. We're glad they're joining us, but here's what they still haven't
learned: It isn't because the Federal Reserve messes up by allowing
credit, asset and stock bubbles to form that it's not a wizard. The
Federal Reserve isn't a wizard for one particular reason that it doesn't
want anybody to know – and that is that the Fed doesn't lead the
financial markets, it follows them.
People everywhere want to believe in the
Fed's wizardry. But all this talk about how the Fed will be able to
help the U.S. economy and hold up the markets by cutting rates now is as
much hooey as the Wizard of Oz promising Dorothy, the Scarecrow, the Tin
Man and the Cowardly Lion that he could give them what they wanted: a
return to Kansas, a brain, a heart, and courage. Because when the Fed does
do something, it always comes after the markets have already made their
moves.
If you don't believe it, you should look at one chart from the most
recent Elliott Wave Financial Forecast. It compares the movements
in the Fed Funds rate with the movements of the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill
Yield. What does it reveal? That the Fed has followed the T-Bill yield up
and down every step of the way since 2000. And the interesting question
becomes this: Since the T-bill yield has dropped nearly two points since
February, how soon will the Fed cut its rate to follow the market's lead
this time?
[Editor's note: You can see this chart and read the
Special Section it appears in by accessing the free report,
The Unwonderful Wizardry of the Fed.]
We've got our own brains, heart and courage here at Elliott Wave
International, and we've used them to explain over and over again that
putting faith in the Fed to turn around the markets and the economy is
blind faith indeed.
"This blind faith in the Fed's power to hold up the economy and
stocks epitomizes the following definition of magic offered by Teller of
the illusionist and comedy team of Penn and Teller: a 'theatrical
linking of a cause with an effect that has no basis in physical reality,
but that – in our hearts – ought to be.'" [September 2007, The Elliott
Wave Financial Forecast]
Because, you see, what makes the markets move has less to do with what
the unwizardly Fed does and more with changes in the mass psychology of
all the people investing in those markets.
The Elliott Wave Principle describes how bullish and bearish trends in
the financial markets reflect changes in social mood, from positive to
negative and back again. To extend the metaphor: The Fed can't affect
social mood anymore than the Wonderful Wizard of Oz could change the
direction of the wind that brought his hot air balloon to the Land of Oz
in the first place.
As our EWI analysts write, "With respect to the timing of the
Federal Reserve Board rate cuts, we need to reiterate one key point. The
market, not the Fed, sets rates." Being able to understand this
information puts you one step closer to clicking your ruby red shoes
together and whispering those magic words: "There's no place like home."
Once you land back in Kansas, your eyes will open, and you will see that
an unwarranted faith in the Fed was just a bad dream.
Susan C. Walker writes for
Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical
analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a
newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a
speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also
appear regularly on FoxNews.com.
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